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Foreword 
W E ARE LIVING in an age in which democratic constitutions and poli­
tics are being established, or are emerging, in parts of the world hith­
erto suffering authoritarian domination. Democracy is one of those 
rather uncertain political concepts susceptible to varying meanings. In 
contemporary writing, democracy often means the existence of a cul­
ture of civic participation in which free expression and free elections 
may thrive. Democratization, or democratic consolidation, is too fre­
quently analyzed only in these terms, without giving attention to politi­
cal institutions, and especially to legislative or parliamentary 
institutions. 
Yet, it seems axiomatic that representative assemblies are essential 
institutions for democracy in large-scale societies. Theorizing about 
or analyzing democratic transitions without including parliaments in 
the story makes for theory that is grossly atomistic and analysis that is 
glaringly devoid of institutional grounding. This series of books is 
founded on the assumption that parliaments and legislatures are at 
the heart of democracy The study of democratic politics must entail 
anatomizing the selection, structure, performance, and impact of par­
liamentary or legislative institutions. 
In Creating Parliamentary Government Al Melone tells the fascinat­
ing story of the negotiations and struggles in the early 1990s that trans­
formed the Bulgarian political regime from a Soviet-style puppet state 
to a freestanding democracy. In so doing, Melone proceeds in a theo­
retically sensitive fashion that informs his analysis of a concrete case 
of democratic transition and consolidation. He articulates sequences 
and events in the Bulgarian democratic transition by closely examining 
the actual processes of negotiating a change in regime and establishing 
democratic political institutions. By conducting in-depth interviews 
with leading actors in the Bulgarian transition, including members of 
Parliament, Melone is able to reconstruct the politics through which 
X I 
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the process of shaping a new national constitution was hammered out, 
and parliamentary institutions were made to work. 
The author first recounts the fascinating story of the Roundtable 
Talks among major Bulgarian politicians who met after the demise of 
the communist regime to put into motion the mechanism for forging 
a democratic constitution. Melone brings these politicians to life by 
letting them tell the story in their own words. As in other Eastern and 
Central European countries, the Bulgarian transition process em­
braced a remarkable array of individual leaders, independent groups, 
and organizations that ultimately formed a loose coalition. The per­
sonal accounts of the leading actors in this drama reveal both the polit­
ical and the human features of the transition to democracy in Bulgaria. 
Then, the author describes the work of the constitutional convention 
agreed upon at the Roundtable Talks. Interestingly, former commu­
nists, running in the election under the Bulgarian Socialist Party label, 
won a majority of the seats in this Grand National Assembly (as the 
Constitutional Convention was named), the seventh such convocation 
in Bulgarian history. 
Once the new constitution is in place, Melone examines the consoli­
dation of the new democracy, focusing on parliament, parliamentary 
representation, and interinstitutional conflicts. Noting that "the legis­
lative arena is the centerpiece of parliamentary democracy," the author 
presents a rich and vivid account of the parliamentary elections and 
the crucial institution-building events of the early and difficult days of 
democratic political life. Melone's sensitive analysis of the emergence 
of democratic parliamentary politics in Bulgaria sheds important light 
on the general nature of transitions to democracy, and underscores 
the possibilities for parliamentary government under fragile and even 
adverse circumstances. Moreover, this analysis allows us to understand 
the context of struggle and change in which the new Bulgarian parlia­
ment is emerging today 
SAMUEL C. PATTERSON 
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A PROPER ACKNOWLEDGMENT of those who helped me to prepare this 
book requires first a brief sketch detailing my involvement in things 
Bulgarian. Since my graduate school days in the late 1960s, I was aware 
of the in-principle importance of conducting comparative research. 
My primary research and teaching focus in the 1970s and 1980s was 
on judicial politics and related topics, including American legislative 
and interest group politics. Yet, I had long ago internalized the view 
that the comparative method is essential if as a discipline we are to 
develop a science of politics. No doubt a cross-cultural approach is 
preferable to the parochialism and ethnocentrism of American politics. 
But how does one move from an exclusive attention on the U.S. scene 
to other political cultures? As my case illustrates, it can happen when 
there is a combination of a university support system that encourages 
international exchanges, changing world events, and the good fortune 
of being in the right place at the right time. 
The relationship between Southern Illinois University at Carbon­
dale (SIUC) and the Republic of Bulgaria began in 1983. Dr. Emilia 
Kandeva-Spiridonova of Bulgaria's Academy of Science Institute for 
State and Law (since renamed the Institute for Legal Studies) received 
a Fulbright grant to study at SIUC during the 1983-84 academic year. 
During her stay in Carbondale, Emilia and I became friends. Since 
then she has been a source of information and encouragement. Her 
own work at SIUC culminated in a widely read and influential book 
in public administration published in Bulgaria about five years 
ago. Subsequently, Dr. Kandeva-Spiridonova became the director 
of Bulgaria's Center for Administration. Personnel of this organiza­
tion hosted visits and provided support to SIUC scholars. In 1997, 
Kandeva-Spiridonova became the Bulgarian Lead Advisor to the Pub­
lic Administration Reform Programme (Phare). 
During her spring 1984 visit to the SIUC campus, Dr. Kandeva­
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Spiridonova arranged for a campus visit by two representatives of the 
Bulgarian Embassy. The outgrowth of that visit was the formulation 
and signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Bulgar­
ian Council of Higher Education and SIUC. The first visitor to SIUC 
under this linkage agreement was Professor Matey Mateev. He spent 
one month working with colleagues in the Department of Physics. Fol­
lowing the demise of the old regime in November 1989, Mateev be­
came the first minister of public education in the new government. 
As a result of several visits by SIUC administrators to Bulgaria, 
these officials submitted a proposal to the United States Information 
Agency (USIA) under the University Affiliations Program. This pro­
posal was funded for the period 1987 to 1991, and it resulted in the 
exchange of nine SIUC faculty and nine Bulgarian researchers and 
faculty. Exchanges were conducted during that period in law, sociologi­
cal research, radio-television, higher education administration, educa­
tional psychology, and art. 
A major result of the grant was the first Annual Bulgarian-Ameri-
can Law Days. It was sponsored jointly by the Institute of State and 
Law of Sofia and SIUC. The theme of this May 1991 conference held 
at the Black Sea resort city of Varna, Bulgaria, was the impact of 
constitutional change on the Bulgarian legal and political system. 
Three political science professors, three law professors, and the SIUC 
executive assistant to the president for international and economic 
development, the late Charles Klasek, composed the official SIUC 
contingent. The official and unofficial Bulgarian participants far out­
numbered the Americans. They included scholars of the Institute of 
State and Law, government officials, practicing attorneys, and law 
professors. 
The timing of the Varna conference was particularly fortuitous. It 
was held after much of the work of the Grand National Assembly was 
completed. This part legislature and part constitutional convention 
was fashioning Bulgaria's new Constitution, and as a result of its work 
a new democratic document was promulgated in July 1991. Some Bul­
garian participants at the Varna conference had an intimate knowledge 
of the politics of constitution-making by virtue of their personal 
involvement in drafting various provisions. By way of explanation, 
they sometimes argued with one another. In the process, they provided 
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the American delegation with graphic descriptions and explanations 
for the likely changes in the Bulgarian political and constitutional 
system. 
Some papers by the American participants at the Varna conference 
were explicitly cross-cultural while others focused exclusively on the 
U.S. experience. Actually, it mattered little what we spoke about. With 
their forty-five years of relative isolation from Americans, our Bulgar­
ian hosts could find little wrong with anything American, including 
our papers. Needless to say, they carried this admiration to an unjus­
tifiable extreme. However, the extent to which our Bulgarian hosts 
understood the constitutional issues within a comparative political 
context was particularly striking. We found their knowledge of alter­
native constitutional and political systems remarkable. A volume con­
taining the conference papers was published in 1994 by the official 
press of Sofia University, St. Kliment Ohridski University Press. It is 
titled Law in a Fast-Changing Society, edited by Silvy Chernev. 
There was a sequel to the first Bulgarian/American Law Days. This 
time Bulgarians journeyed to Carbondale for a conference in May and 
June 1992. Their stay in the United States included visits to Washing­
ton, D.C., and other cities. The USIA-funded 1992 Carbondale confer­
ence was jointly hosted by the SIUC Law School and the Department 
of Political Science. The conference theme was the U.S. judicial process 
and constitutional system. Fifteen visiting Bulgarian jurists attended 
the conference. They included judges and justices at each jurisdictional 
level, prosecuting attorneys, private lawyers, and law professors. The 
Bulgarian participants were selected because of their probable impact 
on the future of the Bulgarian judicial system and for their lack of ties 
to the old regime. 
Unlike at the previous conference, only the American participants 
presented papers. These papers became part of a single volume pub­
lished in 1993 by the St. Kliment Ohridski University Press. Maria 
Frankowska and I are the coeditors of this volume, titled The Legal 
System and American Constitutional Democracy. This dual-language 
book contains twelve chapters by SIUC political scientists and law 
professors. 
The presence of the Bulgarian jurists on the SIUC campus offered 
a rare opportunity to gain insight into problems facing parliamen­
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tary institutions and judiciaries in a transitional society. We asked 
all the Bulgarians to respond to a closed-ended questionnaire and to 
participate in an additional in-depth personal interview. All but one 
participant agreed to fill out the closed-ended questionnaire and four­
teen agreed to in-depth personal interviews. The closed-item schedule 
was written in English with a Bulgarian translation. 
Composing the interview schedules required a careful look at the 
new Bulgarian Constitution promulgated in July 1991. To design these 
interview schedules, two graduate students, Marc George Pufong, now 
a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Valdosta 
State University, and Carol E. Hays, and I worked closely with a Bul­
garian legal scholar, Silvy Chernev, the same person who edited the 
Varna papers. He was in residence at the SIUC Law School during the 
spring term preceding the conference. Along the way, we gained an 
appreciation for the extraordinary political acumen and commitment 
to human rights and parliamentary government that went into writing 
the Constitution. 
The knowledge gained through these interviews made it possible for 
me to better understand the principles and politics surrounding vari­
ous constitutional provisions. I was also able to glimpse whether these 
jurists believed a new constitutional system could change existing atti­
tudes. Indeed, a year later I came to understand the importance of the 
preliminary research in terms of the new institutionalism movement in 
political research. Can democratic institutions coax into existence a 
civil society? The results of the interviews produced a mixed interpreta­
tion. My own reading and research conducted since those initial inter­
views compel me to question the conventional wisdom. Albeit with 
some trepidation and much hope, I now respond in the affirmative: 
folkways can follow stateways. 
In October 1992 I attended a "Conference on Legal Education 
and the New Democratic Societies—Transition Toward Democracy 
and the Rule of Law," held at South-West University "NEOPHIT 
RISLKI" Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria. The invitation came as the result of 
contacts developed at the Varna meeting, but it had nothing to do with 
the USIA program in Carbondale. At that meeting and my subsequent 
stay in Sofia, my interest in Bulgaria's fledgling civil society intensified. 
I began to entertain the counterconventional idea that just maybe Bul­
garia could experience a successful transition from totalitarianism to 
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democracy. This might happen although as a nation-state the so-called 
prerequisites for democracy are not present. While visiting with col­
leagues in Sofia after the Blagoevgrad conference, the president of one 
of Bulgaria's many new nongovernmental foundations asked me to pen 
an article about problems associated with the creation of civil society. 
At the time, I was fixated on the problem of the debilitating effects of 
the twin traps of mass society and the iron law of oligarchy on the 
creation of pluralism. However, within nine months after writing that 
piece my attention was redirected to the prior and the more fundamen­
tal issue. Namely, is it possible to coax a civil society into existence 
from the rudiments of a democratic constitution without those com­
monly supposed prerequisites such as a strong economy, a middle 
class, and experience with democratic institutions such as competitive 
political parties? This is perhaps the most interesting question in politi­
cal science today 
My first serious crack at this particular issue came in a paper pre­
sented at the 1993 Interim Meeting of the International Political 
Science Association Research Committee on Comparative Judicial 
Studies held in Santa Fe, New Mexico. It is a detailed account of Bul-
garia's National Roundtable Talks held in late 1989 and early 1990. 
My sabbatical leave of absence in the fall of 1993 was devoted to ex­
ploring this question further. Among other activities, I interviewed a 
good number of Bulgarian elites, including persons who participated 
in the National Roundtable Talks in 1990, persons elected to the 
Grand National Assembly that drafted the July 1991 Constitution, and 
members of Parliament. I also interviewed legal professionals includ­
ing justices of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court. These interviews 
form the core of materials found in this volume. A brief stay at the 
Socio-Legal Centre at Wolfson College, Oxford University, in the fall 
of 1993 was useful as a way to test ideas. I am particularly grateful 
to Professor Mavis Maclean for her invitation to Oxford and her 
encouraging colleagueship. In the months and years to follow, I pre­
sented a series of professional papers at political science association 
meetings including presentations at the American Political Science As­
sociation, the Midwest Political Science Association, the Western Po­
litical Science Association, and the International Political Science 
Association. Reactions from professional colleagues were both helpful 
and positive. 
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Introduction 
EXPLAINING TRANSITIONS from authoritarian and totalitarian states 
to democratic ones is difficult enough in such places as Spain, Portu­
gal, Greece, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.1 The even more 
spectacular events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc coun­
tries compel us to reconsider much of what is known about the dynam­
ics of political development.2 No less a venerable scholar than Samuel 
P. Huntington asserted in 1984 that the "likelihood of democratic de­
velopments in Eastern Europe is virtually nil."3 Obviously, Huntington 
and most other respected scholars and pundits were mistaken. As 
Adam Przeworski correctly observes, the fall of communism was a 
"dismal failure of political science."4 
Existing paradigms are of little aid in either predicting or explain­
ing the massive transformations that are taking place in Eastern Eu­
rope, particularly since 1989. This includes Bulgaria, long regarded 
as among the world's most repressive regimes. However, Giuseppe 
Di Palma's 1990 book, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic 
Transitions,5 is a candidly optimistic approach to understanding the 
conditions necessary for transition to democracy. This important work 
is a useful antidote to the pessimism and inadequacy of the con­
ventional wisdom represented, for example, in the seminal works of 
Huntington and Dahl.6 When applied to the Bulgarian experience, Di 
Palma's theoretical analysis proves superior as an explanation for what 
most scholars have regarded as an unlikely transformation. 
There is little disagreement about the meaning of the theoretical and 
empirical evidence. It substantiates the view that democracy develops 
best where there are strong economies, large middle classes, and sup­
portive civic cultures.7 Plural groups mediate conflict by insulating the 
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masses and elites from direct relations, and in the process they educate 
citizens about the virtues of tolerance and accommodation. Strong 
competing political parties aid the transition from authoritarianism 
and totalitarianism, help to organize public discourse, and deliver the 
political goods once the debate is complete.8 Within Bulgaria, however, 
few of the factors commonly associated with building democracy were 
prominent when, in late 1989 and early 1990, the process of political 
change began to occur. 
By July 1991, Bulgaria had adopted a new Constitution exhibiting 
the main features of democracy. Between 1991 and early 1997 politi­
cians went about the task of making government institutions work, 
and in the process they helped to consolidate one of the world's new 
democracies. Though the road to democracy is a bumpy one, it ap­
pears that Bulgarians are intent upon completing the journey. This 
book chronicles the points of interest of the initial miles traveled along 
that remarkable journey, one that is a testament to the role individuals 
can play in the process. By an exercise in human will and against the 
theoretical odds, individual political actors successfully traversed the 
difficult terrain to arrive at a point approximating the vicinity of desti­
nation democracy. 
Because Di Palma's alternative approach focuses attention at the 
micro level of analysis, emphasis is placed on the importance of craft­
ing agreements that create alliances and coalitions. He is particularly 
interested in the tactics entailed in forging agreements necessary to 
bring about transitions. Thus, when societies such as those in Eastern 
Europe approach democracy without the structural or cultural quali­
ties deemed important by Huntington and Dahl, for example, the task 
of crafting agreements becomes more crucial and challenging.9 
If there is a movement away from authoritarian or totalitarian rule, 
is it toward genuine democracy? Of course, the answer depends upon 
how one defines the word. Di Palma chooses to define democracy in a 
procedural sense, not in terms of policy outcomes, or in other words, in 
some substantive sense. In contrast to his optimistic view that political 
actors can will a democracy into existence, Di Palma's idea of what 
they may get in the end is decidedly more pessimistic. He maintains 
that it is probably wrong to assume that democracy will produce a 
better standard of living for the people. It might or it might not. What 
is important about democracy is that it is a set of procedures making it 
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possible for a people to obtain some version of the good life. Therefore, 
consistent with the view of other modern theorists of considerable rep­
utation, including Joseph Schumpeter and Samuel Huntington,10 Di 
Palma defines democracy in terms of civil liberties, competitive poli­
tical parties, choice of alternative candidates for political office, and 
the existence of institutions that regulate the exercise of governmen­
tal power.11 
Bulgaria meets Di Palma's test for a successful transition. Yet, many 
Bulgarians would dispute the contention that Bulgaria has become 
truly democratic. The argument is mainly one about ends and means. 
Yes, Bulgaria has achieved from a procedural perspective democratic 
institutions; it has a government that operates in a fashion that is more 
or less democratic. However, the transition to democracy has not 
brought about material progress. To be sure, the transition to a market 
economy has been slow and uncertain. Unemployment, inflation, and 
crime are serious problems.12 For many, unfortunately, the promise of 
democracy as a means to the good life seems a cruel hoax.13 Neverthe­
less, progress on the procedural front is impressive. In this sense, Bul­
garia is an example of a successful transition. 
There are at least two dominant ways by which a transition from 
authoritarian or totalitarian regimes toward democracy may take 
place. Each approach exhibits, of course, circumstantial variations. 
One well-practiced way is through violent revolution, and the second 
is through a peaceful transition wherein the previous ruling class is 
afforded a role in the new order. The first method requires the liquida­
tion of the existing ruling elite by firing squad or forced exit from the 
scene through exile or house arrest. In this manner, it is more than 
probable that the ruling elite will be effectively eliminated and that, in 
the process, their influence over the course of future events will be 
minimized. But such processes provide an opportunity for the victims 
of the previous repressive regime to become themselves executioners 
in the name of the new order. This type of political change teaches the 
dubious lesson that violence will cause a meaningful change in the 
existing ruling elite. From a democratic viewpoint, this lesson is defi­
cient in important respects. The scenario of violence does not instill 
respect for democratic procedures and institutions. Some may admon­
ish, "If the policy outcomes or political actors are unsatisfactory, then 
eliminate the regime incumbents." But this approach to change does 
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not create the conditions for building a civil society. Bulgarians chose 
instead the difficult path; they created institutions in which elements 
of the previous regime take their chances with the vagaries of politics 
that necessarily accompany the creation of democratic institutions. 
Along the way, these institutions are shaping the manner and nature of 
political discourse and coaxing civil society into a stable and vigorous 
existence. Bulgarians have made great strides in both respects. 
By agreeing upon fundamental changes through the mechanisms of 
National Roundtable Talks in 1990 and the convocation of a Grand 
National Assembly to create and then to adopt in 1991 a new national 
Constitution, political leaders cast aside Bulgaria's Stalinist past and 
the pattern of violence and vendetta that marks that nation's tragic 
history In the process, leaders representing reform elements of the old 
regime and the newly formed opposition laid the foundation for demo­
cratic political institutions and a market economy. Because the old 
regime suffered from a period of delegitimacy, the initial condition nec­
essary for fundamental change had already occurred. Yet, there was 
no assurance that a new democratic order would emerge. Leaders from 
a variety of backgrounds with differing ideological beliefs had to agree 
to create a new order and to go about the task of willing democratic 
institutions into place. This qualifies as a monumental accomplish­
ment. Nonetheless, the creation of a democratic polity requires more 
than the promulgation of agreements and a constitutional document 
that articulates democratic principles. The creation and maintenance 
of a social and cultural infrastructure that exhibits group pluralism is 
a necessary condition to insure the permanence of a transition from 
totalitarianism to democracy. 
Scholars including Di Palma agree that a sense of civic virtue is a 
necessary concomitant of pluralist democracy. There must be a public 
spirit in the polis directing attention away from a preoccupation with 
individual self-interest to that of community well-being. Hence, public 
decisions should be made in the interest of all the people and not just 
a small group of self-seekers. Of course, self-interest is part of the ratio­
nal calculation in public choice. Yet, it must be only a part and not the 
exclusive actuator of political behavior. The alternative is the clash of 
self-interested groups without a moral claim to justice. A most interest­
ing and important facet of the transition to democracy in Bulgaria 
is the awareness exhibited by political leaders of all stripes about the 
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importance of learning and instilling the democratic rules of the game. 
Opponents of the Communist regime came directly from the streets to 
negotiating rooms and the Parliament building to forge agreements, 
create new laws, and write a new Constitution. They had little personal 
experience with such institutions. Nonetheless, they understood that 
the ability to admonish their countrymen at mass rallies did not in 
itself qualify them for the art of democratic governance. They under­
stood that having justice on their side was not enough. They needed 
to learn the rules of the democratic game and to teach them to their 
successors if the new system of governance was to work. For those 
individuals coming from within the ranks of the reform elements of 
the atrophied communist ruling elite, the task was less difficult, but it 
did require some adjustment in thinking. In such circumstances, a cri­
sis in a dictatorship makes coexistence with democratic forces an ap­
pealing prospect; it is better than the alternative. 
Therefore, while Bulgaria did not enjoy the structural or cultural 
prerequisites for democracy, it was in the interest of those political 
actors intent upon survival to work out an accommodation with their 
democratic opponents. Such an accommodation does not require that 
all the parties are genuine democrats. It only requires a set of rules 
dictating the terms of coexistence. The parties involved in Bulgaria 
were able to accomplish this task at the National Roundtable Talks 
and the Grand National Assembly that drafted the new Constitution. 
Yet, there remains among many opponents of the old regime the view 
that reform Communists are untrustworthy; in other words, the actions 
of these latter-day democrats must be carefully scrutinized for signs of 
backsliding. For some democrats, the pact with former Communist 
Party functionaries represents a betrayal of fundamental principles; 
they believe justice requires that the Communists pay for their collec­
tive and individual past misdeeds. 
Focusing on Di Palma's political actor approach, one discovers that 
although it ran counter to the theoretical odds, Bulgaria's transition 
to democracy was a matter of careful political craftsmanship. Leading 
reform elements of the former discredited regime joined with its fledg­
ling opponents to create a democratic Constitution. They accom­
plished this feat through a painstaking process of accommodation, 
negotiation, and compromise at National Roundtable Talks. At these 
meetings, participants negotiated most of the principles and many 
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provisions found in Bulgaria's new Constitution. The Roundtable 
Talks rendered the violent option unnecessary and made democratic 
transition possible. Later, elected members to a constitutional conven­
tion created the new basic document. Since then, parliamentarians, 
jurists, and political executives have endeavored to make the new dem­
ocratic order work. Three parliamentary elections between 1990 and 
1996 with instances of turnover in party control of the law-making 
institution, hotly contested elections for local officials, two elections 
for president of the Republic, and the creation of judicial institutions 
that have exercised independence in the face of formidable opposition 
all attest to the viability of the new democratic order. The negotiations 
that took place at National Roundtable Talks were a key factor in se­
curing agreement among the competing political forces on the ground 
rules for creating national unity. 
In this book I describe how major elements within Bulgarian society 
sought coexistence through what Di Palma dubs garantismo.14 The 
1991 Constitution that the Roundtable process ultimately produced 
stresses pluralism, political competition, and the rule of law Di Palma 
argues that carefully crafted transitions from totalitarianism or au­
thoritarianism to democracy can work. Individuals can create a quality 
finished product resulting from negotiations among competing alli­
ances. A primary goal of the process of negotiation is the inclusion of 
the old as well as new political forces in the new governmental system. 
At a minimum, guaranteeing a place in the new order to reform ele­
ments of the old guard is a key to a peaceful transition to democracy. 
Parliament and Democracy 
Political elites, including Bulgaria's intelligentsia, view the Parliament 
as the symbol of the rejection of the discredited past Communist re­
gime. With all its faults, the National Assembly is the quintessential 
institution of democracy. As the reader will come to see, post-Commu-
nist leaders display a consistent concern with creating a parliamentary 
government that reflects democratic values. The task is not an easy 
one. Individual leaders stepped forward—whether at the National 
Roundtable Talks, the Grand National Assembly, or later during the 
period of democratic consolidation—to place this matter squarely on 
the national agenda. 
Introduction • 7 
This is the case because they remember the former regime, under 
which Parliament had little power and deputies acted upon instruc­
tions from the Communist Party. But old habits, particularly bad ones, 
are hard to break. In the months following the November 10, 1989, 
peaceful coup, parliamentary subservience was evident in the way the 
National Assembly received instructions from the elite assembled at 
the National Roundtable Talks. Nonetheless, Roundtable participants 
forged the basic agreements necessary for the creation of a parliamen­
tary democracy. Leaders of the Grand National Assembly elected 
in June 1990 were clearly aware of the importance of creating norms 
of conduct that would make parliamentary democracy an ongoing 
enterprise. 
Yet, the inculcation of legislative norms regulating political compe­
tition does not take place automatically. Some members of the Grand 
National Assembly resisted attempts to abide by parliamentary rules. 
They remained wedded to the ways of street demonstrations, walkouts, 
and inflammatory rhetoric. Even with the establishment of the July 
1991 Constitution and the creation of a new parliamentary system, 
leaders continue to grapple with the task of creating and implementing 
reasonable expectations of conduct. 
Parliamentary leaders reveal an acute awareness that the fate of the 
democratic regime is tied to how well the National Assembly performs 
its tasks. Framers of the July 1991 Constitution and party leaders 
speak of the importance of learning and abiding by the democratic 
rules of the game. To be sure, substantive policy matters occupy much 
of their attention. But successfully coping with the legislative process 
questions is essential if Bulgarian politicians are to learn the ways of 
parliamentary government. 
Some leaders understand better than others the importance of es­
tablishing a system of parliamentary democracy. They consciously 
work to institutionalize the norms necessary for the smooth function­
ing of parliamentary government. Yet, as will become clear, some party 
leaders possess little appreciation for the task. Though not insur­
mountable, the tendency toward bipolar party pluralism creates dif­
ficulties for the consolidation toward democracy.15 
Then too, some scholars and politicians argue that legislatures are 
ill-suited to making public policy and that strong executive authority 
is necessary to make government work.16 Given their life experience 
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with the past regime, I doubt many east Europeans would or should 
accept such a prescription. Be that as it may, the story of the clash 
between and among branches of government is instructive about the 
challenges leaders face in newly created democratic regimes. As evi­
dence of its central importance in a democratic regime, Parliament 
seems part of most conflicts. We also learn from these instances of 
interinstitutional conflict that democratic government has a holistic 
quality about it. In brief, when studying transitions to democracy it is 
helpful to employ an interinstitutional conflict approach and not to 
rely solely on a single-institution perspective. 
As a correlative proposition, there is sufficient evidence to conclude 
that public and elite support for a democratic regime is more important 
than support for a specific legislative institution.17 From the very be­
ginning of Bulgaria's democratic transition, some leaders understood 
that the National Assembly is the symbolic embodiment of democratic 
values. But there is more to the legislative function than providing sym­
bolic support for democratic systems. These institutions also provide 
forums for criticizing executive and bureaucratic activity and allow the 
expression of political dissent. Parliaments can represent the social, 
religious, and ethnic diversity in a culture. In short, legislatures con­
tribute to the day-to-day stability of a political system and to regime 
legitimation.18 
We also know that most people view government as a seamless piece 
of cloth.19 Government institutions interact to create public policy. It 
matters little to the person on the street whether the legislature, execu­
tive, or judiciary is responsible for the policy. What is important is that 
government has created a rule that affected populations are expected 
to follow. 
The experiences of the transition to democracy and consolidation 
periods in Bulgaria clearly show that constitutional systems tend to 
create ambiguities in the legitimate loci of political power. The ways 
these boundaries of authority are resolved reflect the balance of power 
within the political system and how individual leaders play their roles. 
Demonstration Effects 
The format for dismantling the Communist system was rehearsed in 
other Eastern European countries. The Polish and Hungarian round­
Introduction • 9 
table talks took place in the previous year (February-April in Poland 
and March-September 1989 in Hungary).20 Demonstration effects oc­
curred throughout Eastern Europe, and no doubt Bulgarians of all 
political persuasions learned from what had happened there and else­
where. Throughout the region, it became clear that the promise of 
communism as a way to achieve economic well-being and social and 
political equality was unfulfilled. Economic stagnation and privilege 
for a few had become the observable rule. The demise of the Brezhnev 
doctrine was also a key factor in the politics of change. Mikhail Gorba­
chev and his aides made it clear that military force would no longer be 
used to maintain Soviet-style communism in the satellite states. Fur­
ther, Gorbachev popularized perestroika and glasnost as a way to en­
courage economic and political experimentation within his orbit of 
influence. The combination of these two factors made it plain that the 
totalitarian and authoritarian communist regimes would either disap­
pear from the scene altogether, or there would have to be some accom­
modation with the new reality. Obviously, if the party leaders in power 
throughout Eastern Europe were to opt for the latter alternative, they 
would need to find ways to legitimize their rule.21 
For the reform-minded Communists and their democratic oppo­
nents in Bulgaria, the Poles and Hungarians provided the most likely 
scenario for peaceful change. Their comrades to the north were the 
first of the Eastern bloc states to attempt a transition to democracy. 
Yet, in Bulgaria there was no organized opposition with the character 
and strength of the Solidarity labor movement, nor did the opposition 
enjoy the backing of independent institutions such as Poland's Catho­
lic Church.22 Nevertheless, in Bulgaria the reform-minded Communists 
negotiated with a set of opposition political leaders. This process 
served to legitimize a loose organization of dissidents that came to be 
called the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). Negotiating at Na­
tional Roundtable Talks was also important in legitimizing existing 
institutions and the individuals who had led the coup d'etat against the 
Zhivkov regime. In Hungary, the national negotiation was a triangular 
affair: the Communist government, an umbrella opposition joined by 
Communist-sponsored organizations (including trade unions), and 
neutral observers (including churches).23 In the end, however, the shape 
of the negotiating table mattered little. In both Poland and Hungary, 
successful elections were held later: in Poland on June 4 and 18, 1989, 
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and in Hungary on March 25 and April 8, 1990.24 In both cases, the 
anticommunists won impressive victories in the initial elections. The 
democratic opponents to the reform Communists in Bulgaria could 
take heart from these events. They might reasonably suppose that they 
too would also have an excellent chance to gain control of the 
government. 
Though Bulgarians successfully employed the format of National 
Roundtable Talks to negotiate the governing principles and rules for 
democratic elections, for the anti-Communist forces the initial result 
was disappointing. Instead, the reform Communists—now called the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)—won a majority of the seats in the 
Grand National Assembly (GNA). This body functioned simultane­
ously as a working Parliament and as a constitutional convention. 
Thus, although the strategy created by the Polish Communist leaders 
to keep themselves in power did not work in that country, the Bulgar­
ian Communists were able to exploit it to its fullest. 
Other Eastern bloc countries did not follow the same scenario as 
found in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Yet in each of the remaining 
states, political change took place. In Czechoslovakia, on November 
17, 1989, just seven days after the coup d'etat in Bulgaria, there was a 
"velvet revolution." One week after the police brutally put down a stu­
dent demonstration, the entire Communist leadership resigned. On 
December 10, 1990, a new Government of National Understanding 
was sworn in, and only ten members of a twenty-one-seat government 
remained under the control of the Communist Party.25 In Romania, 
the Communist Party disappeared after the December 1989 revolu­
tion. There were no national roundtable talks, no visible reform-
minded members of the nomenklatura to lead the Party to a demo­
cratic future. There was, however, violence. In Albania, the Communist 
leaders decided to hold early elections to legitimize their rule. But as in 
the Bulgarian case, they won the first election only to lose in the next.26 
Although Bulgarians were familiar with the Polish and Hungarian 
experiences, they had to find their own solution to end the pattern of 
violence and vendetta characteristic of political change in Bulgaria's 
history. The bloody overthrow in 1923 of the peasant government led 
by Alexander Stamboliiski, the pattern of reprisals, the wave of terror 
and subsequent violent events haunt the national psyche to this day 
And the graphic media reports of the December 1989 summary arrest 
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and execution of Romania's dictator, Nicolae Ceau§escu, and his wife 
were not lost on Bulgaria's political elite. 
Research Approach 
After two trips to Bulgaria in 1991 and 1992 and after conferring with 
and interviewing Bulgarians both in the United States and in Bulgaria, 
I was able to formulate the schedules for the interviews that serve as 
the centerpiece of this book. During my October 1993 site visit to Bul­
garia, I formally interviewed twenty-four parliamentarians, political 
party leaders, interest group officials, and legal professionals. They in­
cluded, among other notables, two former prime ministers, a former 
vice president of the Republic (who was also responsible for dis­
mantling the secret police system of the old regime), and two members 
of the Constitutional Court. Between late 1989 and July 1991, most of 
my interlocutors were intimately involved in the National Roundtable 
Talks that facilitated a peaceful transition to democracy, or they were 
deputies to the Grand National Assembly that drafted the new Consti­
tution. Some persons I interviewed are legal professionals with inti­
mate knowledge of developments in the judiciary before and after 
November 10, 1989. 
Before my 1993 overseas research trip, I wrote six interview sched­
ules. I was able to administer five of the six schedules to the following 
elites: sixteen Bulgarian leaders who were personally involved in Bul-
garia's National Roundtable Talks and the Grand National Assembly 
that fashioned the July 1991 Constitution, two members of Bulgaria's 
Supreme Court, two members of the district court in Sofia (courts of 
original jurisdiction), two Constitutional Court judges, a law professor, 
and a member of the private bar. 
I identified all but a few of the sixteen Bulgarian leaders personally 
involved in the National Roundtable Talks and the Grand National 
Assembly by reading media accounts of events appearing in the For­
eign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). A few more names were 
added to the list of potential interviewees by my contacts in Bulgaria. 
In this way, they helped me to better identify the array of opinions 
among the political elites who negotiated Bulgaria's transition toward 
democracy. And, in the process, I was able to reduce the opportunity 
for bias, while improving the efficiency of my observations. 
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Most of the legal professionals I interviewed during my October 
1993 visit were known to me beforehand. I had previously interviewed 
all but two of them when they were part of a delegation visiting the 
United States during the summer of 1992; one judge I had met twice 
before and came to know fairly well during 1991 and 1992 visits to 
Bulgaria, and the interview with the remaining legal professional was 
arranged by a jurist I had known for two years. Consequently, I had 
a preexisting rapport with all but one jurist, making for candid and 
productive in-depth interview sessions. Actually, the one judge I had 
not known beforehand was very frank; he exhibited no signs of inhibi­
tion during the interview. 
Before my arrival in Bulgaria, each person I wished to contact re­
ceived a letter of introduction and a request for an interview. My pre­
established primary and secondary contacts in Bulgaria followed up 
the letters with phone calls, and only a few persons declined interviews. 
Each interview lasted from one to two hours, and during the course 
of our conversations I found that persons with similar experiences 
answered certain questions with a uniform response. At that point, I 
stopped asking the redundant questions and instead allowed the in­
terviewees to tell their stories with less structure than I had originally 
thought necessary. This approach proved rewarding because it allowed 
for greater spontaneity than might otherwise have been the case, and 
I learned about people and events that would otherwise have escaped 
my attention. 
Luben Nikolov, a former foreign correspondent for the Bulgarian 
Telegraph Agency stationed for five years in London, served as an in­
termediary, interpreter, and transcriber of the taped interviews. With­
out the aid of this BTA insider it is doubtful I would have been able 
to conduct these interviews in a time-effective manner or, in some 
cases, at all. I learned after completing my interviews that a high-
ranking figure within the BTA, now deceased, personally interceded 
on my behalf to arrange some of the interviews. One learns quickly 
that in Bulgaria access to important persons depends upon whom you 
know and who your friends might be. It sometimes matters who your 
enemies are as well, or, as in my case, whether I was a friend of a friend 
or a friend of an enemy. Despite the fascination with things Western, 
Bulgarians continue to practice the fine art of Byzantine politics. 
Because this case study focuses on analytical generalization and is 
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not a survey study attempting statistical generalization, a represen­
tative sample of all participants at the National Roundtable Talks, 
elected members of the Grand National Assembly, members of Par­
liament, and all jurists is unnecessary and not attempted.27 What is 
important is whether the persons interviewed have the personal experi­
ence to make their statements of fact and opinion noteworthy All of 
my interlocutors have been engaged in the transition to democracy 
through concrete activities and interactions. Their participation has 
been personal and often decisive. As King, Keohane, and Verba point 
out, inference is a central goal of scientific research, and it matters 
little if the data that researchers use are a random sample of the uni­
verse of all events or a case study employing qualitative information.28 
What is important is to take a scientific approach to the subject, to 
check assumptions and evidence carefully. As part of this process, I 
analyzed news reports in order to place the interviews in historical 
perspective. This helped me in the first instance to frame questions 
for the interviews. Every attempt was made to arrange interviews with 
persons representing differing viewpoints, and for the most part this 
goal was met with success. When, during the interviews, I discerned 
contradictory statements made by different persons, I pressed them for 
clarification, and this helped to identify the range of viewpoints. Only 
one person I sought to interview refused to meet with me because of 
a busy schedule (president of the Republic, Zhelyu Zhelev), and a few 
did not honor their appointments. Many persons I interviewed re­
mained politically active through 1993, and all of them possess keen 
insights about the creation of democracy in their homeland. Luben 
Nikolov's literal transcription is at times altered to make the materials 
more readable and consistent with English usage. I took care not to 
change the sense of what was said. Nikolov has read my revisions and 
certifies my faithfulness to its original literal content. Biographies of 
most persons I interviewed are contained in the endnotes to the chap­
ter where they are first quoted extensively. 
This multifaceted approach to information gathering was also useful 
in alerting me to the possible existence of alternative descriptions and 
explanations of events. During interview sessions, I could explore ap­
parent inconsistencies between what different interviewees were telling 
me and what I understood from the news reports, and contradictory 
interpretations of events presented by the interviewees. Later, when 
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analyzing the interviews, I was able to refer to both news reports and 
interview transcripts to clarify factual points. Furthermore, officials of 
the state-operated Bulgarian news agency, the BTA, provided me with 
written reports relating the key events surrounding both the National 
Roundtable Talks and the Grand National Assembly. The BTA also 
provided me with biographies of many persons I interviewed. 
Employing Di Palma's alternative framework, I describe the politics 
of the institutions responsible for the creation of a new democratic 
order in Bulgaria. Part 1 of this book contains three chapters centering 
on the National Roundtable Talks. It is particularly interesting how 
Roundtable participants interpret key events. To place these interpreta­
tions in historical relief, I first describe in chapter 2 key incidents in 
the political history of modern Bulgaria and report the sequence of 
events involving the National Roundtable Talks. Chapter 2 contains a 
brief historical narrative designed to provide readers with a frame of 
reference for understanding the perspectives of those who sought a 
peaceful transition to democracy. I then introduce readers to the key 
events and political actors of the National Roundtable Talks. In chap­
ters 3, 4, and 5, I explore, in detailed interview format, many Round­
table events with those who were present at the time. It is in these 
chapters that readers will find much of the analysis that forms the basis 
for understanding the politics of the transition. 
Part 2 centers on the Grand National Assembly that crafted the July 
1991 Constitution. I begin this part of the book with a narrative of the 
sequence of events. In chapter 6, I give a brief description of events 
surrounding the creation of the new Constitution and then outline the 
main features of the basic document crafted in 1991. Chapter 7 con­
tains interviews that reveal the politics and motivations of key figures 
who crafted the 1991 Constitution. 
The third part of the book is devoted to a description and analysis 
of important political events since the adoption of the new Constitu­
tion in July 1991 through the first weeks of 1997: what some scholars 
refer to as the process of democratic consolidation. Chapter 8 contains 
a discussion of parliamentary politics as it relates to the successful 
transition to democracy, and chapter 9 centers on the struggle for judi­
cial independence and the problem of interinstitutional conflict. This 
chapter especially highlights what might go wrong in the search for a 
"law-governed state." 
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Chapter 10 contains the conclusions. Summarizing the findings of 
the previous chapters, I focus upon the lessons for understanding tran­
sitions to democracy and the creation of parliamentary government. 
I maintain that this study provides considerable additional empirical 
evidence in support of Di Palma's claim that transitions to democracy 
may take place without the so-called prerequisites to democracy. This 
is not to say that ideas, interests, and institutions are unimportant but 
that the experience in Bulgaria requires scholars to reconsider the cen­
tral role individuals may play in bringing about political change. We 
need to focus at the micro level while not ignoring macro-level phe­
nomena. Extrapolating from the findings, I conclude that it is a mis­
take to provide development aid to repressive regimes as a way to 
encourage the creation of substructures to support democratic super­
structures. If anything, Western democracies should withhold aid as a 
tactic to encourage authoritarian or totalitarian governments to nego­
tiate democratic transitions. 

 I PART

National Roundtable Talks

There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more 
perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, 
than to take the lead in the introduction of a new or­
der of things. 
—NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI 
The Prince 

The End of Vendetta 
THE STRUGGLE FOR constitutional democracy is a central and recur­
ring theme in modern Bulgarian history. Since its liberation from five 
centuries of Ottoman control (1396-1878) Bulgaria has usually been 
governed either by a royal-military oligarchy or by Communist dicta-
torship.1 During the nineteenth century, Western-educated Bulgarian 
leaders attempted to rally their people to the cause of national unity 
and democratic values. In the 1920s, there was a democratic experi­
ment ending in bloodshed. 
At a constitutional convention held at the medieval capital of Tur­
novo in 1879, Bulgarians adopted what was, by European standards, 
an advanced basic document that included a unicameral legislature 
elected on the basis of universal male suffrage, a limited monarchy, and 
provisions for civil liberties and rights. Historian John D. Bell main­
tains this attempt at Western democracy failed because of a weak 
middle class and a low level of political support from the rural masses. 
Furthermore, Bulgaria's foreign-born monarchs opposed democratic 
institutions, preferring the familiar system of royal absolutism.2 De­
spite the many obstacles to democracy, the intelligentsia and profes­
sional classes supported democracy organized around political parties. 
Also, the nation's civil servants and part of the working class supported 
the Constitution. The Social Democratic Party (Broad Socialists) and 
the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) were active support­
ers of democratic values.3 
Yet, military coups and murder are certain deterrents to the creation 
of democratic institutions. As a prominent reformer within the current 
Bulgarian Socialist Party (formerly the Bulgarian Communist Party) 
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and twice prime minister since 1990 plainly put it in an interview: "Po­
litical vendetta is an unfortunate part of Bulgaria's political history."4 
In the name of political change, the Bulgarian people have either 
been victimized by outside forces or practiced fratricide. Under Otto­
man rule, Bulgarians complained that they lived under the "Turkish 
Yoke." They were not only cut off from commercial and social inter­
course with the rest of Europe, but they also suffered inhuman cruelties 
at the hands of the Sultan. Occasionally, bands of insurgents took up 
arms against the Turks. It was the Russian military, however, which 
ultimately liberated Bulgaria. After a series of wars, including Russia's 
own humiliating Crimean defeat (1854-56), Bulgaria was finally liber­
ated in April of 1878. 
The Cycle of Violence 
The cost of victory was high. Russia lost two hundred thousand sol­
diers, and thousands of Bulgarian peasants were murdered during the 
military campaigns. On March 3, 1878, Russia imposed upon the de­
feated Turks the Treaty of San Stefano. In part, this agreement pro­
vided for the political independence of Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, and 
Montenegro. It also ceded all of Macedonia and Eastern Rumelia 
(Thrace) to Bulgaria.5 
The Russian boost to Bulgarian pride was short-lived, however. En­
gland was prepared to go to war unless Russia agreed to rescind the 
San Stefano accord. Consequently, only months after the signing of 
the San Stefano Treaty, a new one, the Treaty of Berlin (1878), stripped 
Bulgaria of Macedonia and Eastern Rumelia. At that time, Bulgaria 
became a principality within the Ottoman Empire. This fateful 
agreement is a source for much tension and conflict that has plagued 
the Balkans ever since.6 The forfeiture of Macedonia was a particularly 
egregious result because Bulgarians regard its inhabitants as Bulgarian 
in origin, language, and customs.7 Then, a few months after con­
summation of the Berlin Treaty, there was an unsuccessful uprising in 
Macedonia against Turkish rule. Defeated, many Bulgarians left Mac­
edonia for the safe haven of the new Bulgarian Principality located in 
the northwest.8 
In 1893, Bulgarian Macedonians created a secret and violent society 
with the goal of obtaining either autonomy from the Ottoman empire 
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or annexation by Bulgaria. The Internal Macedonian and Adrianople 
Revolutionary Organization, later simply known as IMRO, engaged in 
kidnapping: one infamous incident involved an American missionary. 
The IMRO also launched unsuccessful uprisings in Bulgarian areas 
of Turkey that ended in bloody suppression and flight to Bulgaria by 
thousands of refugees.9 For decades, IMRO remained a violent force: 
it engaged in murder and assassination in the name of reuniting the 
Bulgarian people separated in Macedonia, Rumelia, and Bulgaria. 
The Principality itself was a product of the 1878 Berlin Treaty. It 
confined Bulgaria's boundaries to the northwestern section of what 
was once a larger Bulgaria. Treaty provisions required Bulgaria to in­
stall a prince elected by the Bulgarians, but the European powers had 
to approve the particulars. The Sultan was granted semiautonomous 
political control over the Principality. Alexander Battenberg, a Ger­
man and officer in the Russian Army, was crowned prince, and dele­
gates to a Grand National Assembly devised a Constitution at 
Turnovo in 1879.10 
As a consequence of military defeat at the hands of the Russians, 
Turkey had grown politically and militarily weak. Therefore, the Bul­
garian Principality exerted considerable independence from Turkey. In 
1908, the Bulgarian government proclaimed its independence from 
the Ottoman Empire.11 Bulgaria then fought two Balkan wars. Both 
the 1912 and the 1913 wars were fought to reclaim Macedonia for the 
Bulgarians. The first Balkan War was a successful joint effort with Ser­
bia, Greece, and Montenegro against Turkey. Unfortunately, the vic­
tors had serious disagreements over Macedonia. In the ensuing brief 
war, the Bulgarian army won a stunning victory over the Turks. But 
the Serbians and Greeks captured Macedonia. Then, without a decla­
ration of war, the Bulgarians attacked Serbian and Greek positions. 
However, Romania invaded quickly from the north, and the Turks re­
opened hostilities from the south. This left the Bulgarian forces sur­
rounded, and they were forced to sue for a humiliating peace. The 
resulting Treaty of Bucharest (August 1913) divided Macedonia be­
tween Serbia and Greece, and Bulgaria received only a small parcel of 
the much coveted ground. The two Balkan wars cost Bulgaria sixty-
six thousand lives and left the struggling new nation without friends. 
Even Russia sided with Romania and Serbia against Bulgaria.12 
The loss of Macedonia explains in large part why Bulgaria entered 
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World War I on the German side. There were other factors, of course, 
including the fact that the prince was a German and that Bulgaria's 
ruling party was pro-German. The Bulgarians expected that a German 
victory would result in the restoration of territories lost in the Second 
Balkan War. Instead, being on the wrong side of a war once again, 
Bulgaria lost additional territory. It was also forced to pay large repa­
rations, and its trade relations were severely restricted.13 
The cumulative effect of these military and foreign policy defeats 
was a severe diminution in public support for Bulgaria's monarchy and 
the military-dominated ruling elite. In fear of losing his life, on Octo­
ber 3, 1918, Prince Ferdinand abdicated his throne in favor of his son, 
Boris. Ferdinand left Bulgaria for Germany on a train guarded by Ger­
man troops. Bulgarians then created an interim government of na­
tional unity; it served for several months until parliamentary elections 
were held in August 1919. The government was composed of leaders 
of radical parties, including the Agrarians and the Broad Socialists. 
The elections demonstrated deep public support for these radical par­
ties. The Agrarians won 85 seats; the Communists, who called them­
selves Narrow Socialists, won 47 seats; and the Broad Socialists won 
36 seats.14 The strongest bourgeois party, the Democrats, gained only 
28 seats in the 233-member National Assembly. Alexander Stamboli­
iski, the leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU), 
then went about the delicate task of forming a coalition government, 
the balance of which was shaky at best.15 
Stamboliiski's Agrarian party is the only European peasant party 
ever to exercise government power and to put at least part of their 
program into practice. An exception to the normal pattern of oligar­
chical tendencies within political parties, BANU was internally demo­
cratic. It relied heavily upon local participation when making party 
policy. The movement was founded in December 1899 by a group of 
intellectuals known as the Bulgarian Agrarian Union (BAU). Its initial 
goal was exclusively educational. Agrarian leaders sought to make 
peasants more efficient producers and through education to make 
them more efficacious citizens.16 
Soon after the formation of BAU, the royal-military government 
instituted tax increases that produced mass peasant protests. In a May 
1900 confrontation, police violently repressed demonstrators: ninety 
peasants were killed and more than four hundred were wounded. In 
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the following year, BAU became overtly political. It changed its name 
to the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) and gained suffi­
cient popularity to lead the government for a period of three years, 
from October 6, 1919, to June 9, 1923.17 
BANU sought to redistribute wealth and power. It did so by focus­
ing upon the agricultural basis of Bulgarian society and instituting 
land reform policy. The program included the expropriation of all 
absentee landowners' holdings of a certain size. Housing reform took 
the form of reallocation of apartment space based on family size. The 
government monopolized trade in grain and tobacco, and most prof­
its were rebated to the producers. World War I profiteers had their 
earnings confiscated by the government, Stamboliiski's government 
imposed a progressive personal and corporate income tax. It made 
educational reforms, including major curriculum changes aimed at 
providing children with practical education and work experience at all 
primary and secondary schools. It also introduced compulsory labor 
service of one year for all twenty-year-old males and sixteen-year-old 
females. In a move that would alienate many intellectuals, BANU 
sought to simplify the spelling rules of the Bulgarian language. Some 
feared that the government was intending to abolish the monarchy. It 
was known that Stamboliiski held monarchs in contempt, referring to 
them as "poisonous snakes." Further, many believed that he intended 
to socialize industrial enterprises.18 Stamboliiski's government also 
earned the undying enmity of the terrorist organization associated with 
reuniting the Bulgarian people. He dispatched his foreign minister, Al­
exander Dimitrov, to Belgrade to assure the Serbians that Bulgaria was 
not behind the IMRO terrorist violence taking place in southern Serbia 
and that his government would take strong measures against the ter­
rorist leaders in Bulgaria. As punishment for carrying the message, 
foreign minister Dimitrov received a death sentence, and by order of 
the IMRO leadership he was assassinated in October 1921.19 
There existed in Bulgaria a culture of violence. It was a fertile me­
dium for the virulence that greeted Stamboliiski's ideas and programs. 
Included among conspirators who plotted against him were the fanati­
cal IMRO and the refugees from what were dubbed the "lost territor­
ies," the military, the royalists, the various manifestations of the urban 
class, and some intellectuals. All sought the end of the BANU govern-
ment.20 By the end of 1921, a pro-fascist group composed of business, 
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military, and university leaders came together to plot a coup d'etat. 
In an admiring attempt to imitate Mussolini's rise to power in Italy, 
the conspirators held a series of mass meetings in the fall of 1922. 
However, the Agrarians mobilized armed peasants to suppress these 
demonstrations, and Stamboliiski's government arrested the entire 
leadership of the Bourgeois Bloc Party.21 
Stamboliiski's initial victory over the forces of reaction made him 
overly confident. At the same time, however, it caused the pro-fascist 
conspirators to try again. They executed a surprise military coup in 
the early morning of June 9, 1923. This time they succeeded, although 
Stamboliiski himself was able to get safely away byfleeing to the moun­
tains. Within weeks, however, he was arrested, tortured, and decapi­
tated. His head was never found, but it is believed that it was presented 
to King Boris at the palace.22 
Although some local Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) organiza­
tions fought on the losing BANU side during the successful coup, the 
national leadership was neutral. The Comintern in Moscow later re­
buffed the leadership for its lack of action, causing a purge of the com­
pliant BCP leaders. The Party was then directed by the Comintern to 
subvert the new government by instigating an uprising of workers and 
peasants. This action is celebrated in Bulgarian folklore as the first 
anti-fascist insurrection, despite the fact that in the wake of its failure, 
five thousand people were counted dead. The pro-monarchy govern­
ment then enacted legislation criminalizing the BCP, where it lan­
guished in legal oblivion until 1944.23 
A few years later, in April 1925, there was a left-wing attempt to 
assassinate King Boris by blowing up a church. This terrorist act led to 
massive retaliation with the oflEicial executions of hundreds of people. 
The actual number of persons who lost their lives is uncertain. Between 
1923 and 1925, one report suggests that an estimated sixteen thousand 
BCP and BANU members were murdered. Another report indicates 
that in 1923 alone twenty thousand persons were killed. During this 
period, the IMRO carried out assassinations. Most of what was left of 
the surviving BCP leaders fled to Moscow, although a crippled under­
ground party remained to triumph another day24 
Because the BANU and BCP leadership were all but liquidated be­
tween 1923 and 1925, the new government, imbued with strong fascist 
tendencies, allowed the presence in Parliament of a watered-down 
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Agrarian representation. These tolerable Agrarians became part of a 
parliamentary opposition called the People's Bloc, which in 1931 won 
the elections. Although a considerably more moderate party than the 
one led by Alexander Stamboliiski in the previous decade, the Agrari­
ans did not take a leading role in the government, fearing another 
coup. Their fears proved warranted when a coup in May 1934, led 
by the same military group that ousted Stamboliiski a decade earlier, 
succeeded in ousting the timid Agrarians. A pro-fascist government 
ruled without political parties for about a year, after which King Boris 
established a personal dictatorship. This government lasted until elec­
tions were reestablished in 1938, when the king felt confident he could 
control the outcome.25 
During World War II, Bulgaria was again a German ally. The alli­
ance is not difficult to understand given the fascist sympathies of most 
government leaders since the overthrow of Stamboliiski's Agrarian 
government. Moreover, King Boris was part of a continuous line of 
German monarchs to occupy Bulgaria's royal palace. Further, begin­
ning in the 1930s, Bulgaria's economy grew increasingly dependent 
upon Germany. Also, the Germans made promises: at the end of a 
successful war effort, Bulgaria's claims to territories to its west and 
south would be honored by a grateful Third Reich.26 
Post-World War II Developments 
Often war serves to unite the peoples of a nation against a common 
enemy. Entry into World War II on March 1, 1941, however, did not 
signal a new age of Bulgarian national unity. Instead, it foretold an­
other round of fratricide. The underground forces of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party joined forces with Moscow to commit sabotage and 
assassination of government functionaries and police officials. The 
BCP did not attempt a general insurrection. Nonetheless, many of its 
members were killed during the war, either in small unit actions or at 
the hands of the police. Working at the direction of the Nazi Gestapo, 
Bulgaria's secret police penetrated the Communist Party underground 
and destroyed most of its members.27 
In 1943, the Fatherland Front coalition was organized. It was an 
umbrella organization open to all anti-fascist groups and individuals. 
It included members of the Agrarian Party, but the BCP dominated it. 
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At the end of World War II, on November 18, 1945, the Fatherland 
Front won a series of elections: the combined Front total was 82 per­
cent of the vote. Bulgarians repudiated the monarchy in a popular 
referendum; 85 percent of the voters endorsed a republic. Later, in 
elections held on October 27, 1946, Fatherland Front candidates won 
over 70 percent of the votes. The BCP received over 53 percent of 
the votes in the election for the Grand National Assembly; among the 
responsibilities of this body was to rewrite the nation's Constitution.28 
Nikola Petkov, a leader of a wing of the Agrarian Party, was the 
primary resistance to the complete domination of the government by 
the Communist Party. Consistent with learned behavior, Petkov and 
twenty-three other delegates were expelled from the National Assem­
bly. He was later tried, convicted, and executed. During this postwar 
period, Bulgaria was the first state to hold war crimes trials. It resulted 
in nearly three thousand executions.29 
The Communists did not gain immediate control of the nation in 
1944. Instead, their power came gradually and with great effort be­
tween September 1944 and December 1947. They eliminated political 
opposition, destroyed the social power of the middle class, and ef­
fectively isolated Bulgaria from Western foreign influences.30 In 1947, 
the first communist-inspired constitution, the "Dimitrov Constitu­
tion," was ratified. In 1971, Communist Party control was made per­
manent when a declaration in the new basic document stated that the 
constitutional edifice was founded upon the 1944 socialist revolution 
and that since then Bulgaria had become not only a people's democ­
racy but also a socialist state of the working people headed by the 
working class. The creation of this new Constitution was engineered 
by Todor Zhivkov, the successor to the Stalinist Vulko Chervenkov.31 
November 10, 1989, Coup 
Zhivkov's imitative Soviet-style rule spanned the period 1956-89 and 
ended with a bloodless coup d'etat on November 10, 1989, the day 
after the Berlin Wall fell.32 Although the leader and his close associates 
lost power, most party and government officials remained in position. 
This could have happened only if the Party itself had caused the coup. 
The drastic action was thought necessary because of widespread dis­
content with the economy, the environment, and human rights matters. 
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By 1987 the economy in Bulgaria seemed to be on a downward path 
despite the efforts of the Zhivkov regime to reverse the trend. Bulgaria's 
per capita consumption in 1985 was the lowest in Europe. The realiza­
tion of the price paid for industrialization spawned the creation of an 
environmental movement. In terms of political rights and civil rights, 
Freedom House ranks Bulgaria toward the bottom for the 1980s.33 
Petar Mladenov, in charge of foreign affairs since 1971, became the 
new leader. He and other new leaders pledged to promote pluralism 
and respect for the rule of law. They halted persecution of the ethnic 
Turkish minority initiated in 1982 by Zhivkov, inviting those ethnic 
Turks who had fled the country to return, and they also allowed oppo­
sition groups to register as legal entities. They further promised to cur­
tail the role of the secret police in the internal life of the nation.34 
The widespread contempt for the Zhivkov regime cannot be fully 
understood without recounting at least a few of its many human rights 
transgressions. During the 1950s and 1960s, the government operated 
forced labor camps. The People's Courts of 1944-46 were viewed by 
many as a way to eliminate opposition under the guise of prosecuting 
Nazi wartime collaborators. These courts convicted 12,000 people, of 
whom 2,730 were executed. In the contemporary period, the Zhivkov 
government covered up the nuclear contamination that resulted from 
the Chernobyl disaster, in the process exposing Bulgarians to serious 
physical harm. The forced assimilation of the Turkish minority was 
probably the single most notorious denial of human rights of the Zhiv­
kov administration. Besides these ideologically motivated crimes, there 
is evidence that approximately $10 billion in Western loans have disap­
peared, and forty-seven former officials are believed responsible. Todor 
Zhivkov was convicted of embezzlement in 1992 and sentenced to 
seven years in prison. These and many more acts—including the fa­
mous poison umbrella death of the Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov 
in London in 1978—are the basis of repeated calls for lustration, that 
is, societal purification (purges) through ritual sacrifice (punishments). 
Yet, there have been very few successful prosecutions of Bulgarians 
who led the nation during the Communist era.35 This omission is a 
constant source of irritation for those seeking revenge. 
There were three main features of the November 10, 1989, coup 
d'etat.36 First, high-ranking members of the Communist Party carried 
out the coup; it was change imposed from the top and not the result 
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of a popular mass movement. In this respect, it resembles the political 
reforms in the Soviet Union under the banner of perestroika.37 In­
formants tell me that especially among the younger members of the 
nomenklatura there was considerable discussion about the need for 
reform. Indeed, the dictator's popular daughter was among the early 
proponents of change. Because the old guard slavishly followed Mos-
cow's line for years, it would have been difficult for them to quash the 
new openness associated with perestroika and glasnost. Second, the 
coup was thought necessary because of widespread discontent trace­
able to worsening economic problems. Further, given the Soviet 
Union's preoccupation with its own political problems, Bulgaria was 
becoming increasingly isolated from the rest of the world. The regime's 
handling of ethnic Turks was an additional factor in the overthrow of 
the old leadership. In the mid-1980s, the Zhivkov regime forced Mos­
lims to change their names and limited the use of other languages be­
sides the official Bulgarian language in everyday communication. As 
many as 350,000 ethnic Turks left Bulgaria to escape the persecution 
after the Bulgarian authorities opened the border in May 1989. Fur­
thermore, the obvious unwillingness of the Soviet leadership to main­
tain military and political hegemony in Eastern Europe contributed to 
system breakdown. And third, leaders within the Party, the military, 
and the militia preferred reform and self-preservation to confrontation 
and possible defeat and banishment from politics altogether. 
Party spokespersons began to speak of "socialist renewal" and of a 
willingness to enter roundtable talks to solve Bulgaria's mainly eco­
nomic problems. As early as December 19, 1989, the media were quot­
ing the new Communist leadership as desiring to bring about needed 
changes without imposing them from the top. Dialogue, discussion, 
and national consensus became key terms in what was touted as the 
need for "successful restructuring."38 Many believe that the Bulgarian 
Communist Party leadership feared the possible adverse effects of 
mass protests and violence. Rather than accept the blame for the pend­
ing collapse of the economy, some opposition leaders speculate that 
the BCP leadership wanted to share with a weak opposition the re­
sponsibility for the economic crisis that was sure to come.39 
As a general proposition for all of Eastern Europe, Di Palma sug­
gests that the Communist Party leaders were faced with two choices. 
They might pursue the Chinese solution of brutal repression of regime 
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opponents by tightly controlling civil society while simultaneously pur­
suing economic market reforms. Or they might seek accommodation 
with the forces demanding change.40 Choosing the latter, the BCP 
sought to guarantee a future that required coexistence in a democratic 
political system. This approach carried with it the danger of losing 
power to the opposition. But it was a calculated risk that gave the BCP 
a chance to survive, albeit in a different political milieu. Though not 
referring to the Bulgarian situation directly, since he wrote before 
events completely unfolded there, Di Palma aptly describes the di­
lemma: "By choosing the democratic method, and therefore transfer­
ring loyalties or bestowing legitimacy on democracy, political actors 
are also choosing a degree of calculated uncertainty."41 
Knowing the cycle of revenge and vendetta contributes to under­
standing why reformers within the BCP and their democratic oppo­
nents were anxious to avoid repeating history. The BCP leadership 
chose coexistence with the newly developing forces for change. But 
they needed and insisted upon a set of rules that would guarantee the 
future of their organization within the new order. Crafting that agree­
ment was crucial for both the BCP and the creation of democratic 
institutions. 
The single most important development in bringing about the tran­
sition to democracy in Bulgaria was the series of agreements reached 
at the National Roundtable Talks. With the overthrow of Todor Zhiv­
kov, many persons questioned the legitimacy of the extant National 
People's Assembly. On December 7, 1989, the Union of Democratic 
Forces was created, instantly becoming the most powerful opposition 
force in Bulgaria. There is some ambiguity about the precise source of 
the idea for a body that would replace the National People's Assembly 
as a de facto policymaking institution for the nation. Nevertheless, the 
Roundtable became the vehicle for change despite the National 
People's Assembly's de jure status. Though the existing Parliament be­
haved as a rubber stamp for Roundtable decisions, the fact that leaders 
thought it necessary to follow normal legislative procedures in making 
changes in government policies and practices speaks eloquently about 
the future of parliamentary government in Bulgaria. There was a sense 
that change should proceed in an orderly fashion. Indeed, if Bulgaria 
was to avoid the violent models in her own history and in the process 
reject the French (1789) and Russian (1917) approach to revolution in 
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favor of the British conservative model and the contemporary Polish 
approach, then change should proceed consistent with the rules of par­
liamentary government.42 This meant that the existing National 
People's Assembly had to be consulted, no matter how perfunctory the 
process might appear. Moreover, for the old guard, because Round­
table leaders asked members of Parliament to pass on their recommen­
dations, legitimacy was afforded those specific decisions. In terms of 
creating diffuse support among all factions in society, parliamentary 
government became the accepted vehicle for regime change. Thus, the 
National Roundtable Talks are properly regarded as the precursor to 
the creation of democratic government in Bulgaria. 
The remaining sections of this chapter contain a brief narrative de­
signed to provide a timeline sketch of those talks. I provide this outline 
because few readers outside of Bulgaria will be familiar with the key 
names and events central to making the transition to democracy in 
Bulgaria a reality. Readers with little patience for names and dates may 
wish to skip the remaining pages of this chapter and proceed to the 
chapters that follow. For those who seek a fuller appreciation of events, 
however, the sequence found here will serve to satisfy the urge for or­
derly progression. 
December/January Developments 
On December 14, 1989, a mass rally of students, workers, and others 
organized around the Parliament building in Sofia. They protested that 
the government was not proceeding quickly enough in its transition to 
democracy. The rally organizers were attempting to force the National 
Assembly to abolish immediately Article 1 of the existing Constitution 
on the leading role of the Communist Party. By all accounts, the rally 
might have resulted in mob violence but for the intervention of the 
little known organizers who later become key figures for the demo­
cratic opposition. They persuaded the crowd not to storm the Parlia­
ment building and to peacefully disperse. This event was widely 
perceived as a signal of the growing impatience of the masses and evi­
dence that positive steps toward change had to be taken if serious civil 
disturbances were to be avoided. 
On January 3 and 4, 1990, delegations from various political groups 
and coalitions came together in Sofia for preliminary consultations 
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Dramatic rally around the National Assembly building, December 14, 1989 
about the procedures for National Roundtable Talks. The delegates for 
the Bulgarian Communist Party included Andrey Lukanov, Alexander 
Lilov, Belcho Belchev, Georgi Pirinski, Todor Kjurkchiev, and Ivan 
Angelov. Representatives of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 
(BZNS) included Viktor Vulkov, Svetla Daskalova, and Svetoslav Shi­
varov. There were two nonparty (independent) members of Parlia­
ment, Blagovest Sendov and Luben Kulishev. The major opposition 
group, the Union of Democratic Forces, was represented by Zhelyu 
Zhelev, Petar Beron, Petar Dertliev, Milan Drenchev, Dimitur Batalov, 
Rumen Vodenicharov, Georgi Avramov, Konstantin Trenchev, Petko 
Simeonov, Lyubomir Sobadjiev, Emil Koshlukov, Elka Konstantinova, 
Georgi Spasov, and Petar Kanev (on behalf of Christofor Sabev). 
At meetings held early in January, participants agreed upon a 
Roundtable agenda, membership of the delegations, decision-making 
rules, approaches to the release of information to the public, and other 
procedural matters. They agreed that the Roundtable would focus its 
attention upon ways to obtain national agreement and reconciliation, 
a new political system, and a law-respecting state with a judicial system 
to carry out this goal. It was agreed that the Roundtable would make 
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A leading dissident, Neshka Robeva, asking the crowd at the December 14, 
1989, mass rally not to resort to violence 
preparations for a new electoral law and that the participants would 
address socioeconomic problems. The communicants issued a joint 
declaration they called A Realistic Approach Toward National Reconcil­
iation. It supported the December 29, 1989, joint decision of the State 
Council and the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of 
Bulgaria. It was designed to deal with the denial of the rights of the 
Turkish and Muslim minorities that the Zhivkov regime had imposed 
beginning in 1984. They also agreed that the National Roundtable 
Talks would commence its work during the week of January 16-24, 
1990. At the same time delegations of the BCP, the BZNS, and the 
independent MPs held consultations with twenty groups not pres­
ent at these preliminary talks. These included representatives of the 
Fatherland Union, the Komsomol (DKMS), the Independent Trade 
Unions, and other public organizations. 
In an attempt to guarantee public access to their ideas, the UDF 
delegation placed before those present at the two-day meeting a re­
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President Petar Mladenov appeasing the crowd at the December 14, 1989, 
mass rally just minutes before allegedly stating "better the tanks come" 
quest for a suitable public building to headquarter their activities. They 
wanted permission to publish their own daily newspaper and sought 
an allotment of time on the public airwaves to transmit their views to 
a national radio and television audience. 
Formal Roundtable Talks commenced on January 16, 1990. But to 
avoid the potential release of misinformation to the public, the deliber­
ations were closed to the media. During the first meetings, the UDF 
delegation raised again their request to have their own newspaper, pub­
lic building to house their activities, and a guarantee of free access to 
radio and TV transmissions. The plenary decided to create a contact 
group representing the various Roundtable factions to treat the UDF 
requests. 
In a public appeal, Rossen Karadimov, the first secretary of the Cen­
tral Committee of DKMS, insisted upon fair treatment for the Kom­
somol. He demanded Komsomol participation on an equal footing 
with the other delegations. The Independent Trade Unions also asked 
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to participate in the talks. Finally, the Roundtable accepted Blago­
vest Sendov's suggestion that the two negotiating sides should reduce 
their quotas to give other "invited" organizations an opportunity 
to participate. 
At this early stage the UDF made their purpose clear. In an official 
declaration they said that the UDF treated the Roundtable Talks with 
the utmost sense of duty, because the process could initiate a peaceful 
transition from totalitarianism toward democratic developments in 
the country. 
During sessions held on January 22 and 23, Roundtable participants 
made brief statements about the first section of the previously agreed-
upon agenda on the political system. Each side set out its conception 
of the fundamental principles of democratic political life. This dia­
logue included why and how the totalitarian bureaucratic political sys­
tem should be dismantled and abolished. They discussed requirements 
for the law on political parties, public organizations, and movements, 
including guaranties against monopoly control over state institutions 
by any political party or public organization, and possible limitations 
on the creation of anticonstitutional parties or coalitions. Each side 
presented views on the depoliticization of certain state structures— 
the army, the militia (police), the public prosecutor and courts, and 
the educational system. In this context, they also suggested legislative 
guarantees for equal access of the political parties and public organiza­
tions to national television and radio. Finally, each side presented their 
view of the concept of separation of powers, including how legislative, 
executive, and judicial institutions might function in the future. 
During the first day of the talks, four members of the Komsomol, 
the Independent Trade Unions, the Fatherland Union, and the Move­
ment of Bulgarian Women were represented within the BCP's quota of 
forty-five delegates. Similarly, representatives of the Democratic Party 
and of the Green Party shared the UDF's quota. 
On the second day of discussions the BCP quota included represen­
tatives of the Union of the Fighters Against Fascism and Capitalism, 
the Union of the Anti-Fascist Forces in Bulgaria, the Independent 
Trade Unions, the Komsomol, the Committee for Human Rights, the 
All-Peoples Committee for Defense of National Interests, the Father­
land Union, the Union of Bulgarian Journalists, the Bulgarian Writers 
Union, the Union of Bulgarian Artists, the Union of Bulgarian Film 
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Makers, the Bar Union, the Federation of Scientific and Technical So­
cieties, and the Independent Union of Bulgarian Women. Also present 
but without invitation, the Bulgarian Union for Physical Culture and 
Sports participated in the talks. The UDF quota included one repre­
sentative of the Committee for National Reconciliation. Representa­
tives of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church Patriarchy and of the Chief 
Moslim Council were invited to the talks as guests. 
At the request of Krastio Petkov, the participants discussed the ad­
visability of issuing an appeal to cease all strikes and other protest 
activities during the duration of the Roundtable Talks. At this juncture, 
Roundtable participants also discussed the establishment of a commit­
tee to compile a document that specified all points of agreement 
among the parties about the dismantling of the totalitarian system. 
It should be noted that at an early but unknown point in the negoti­
ations to hold Roundtable Talks it was agreed that decisions of any 
such body should be made on a consensus basis. The thinking that 
motivated this decision was that the nation should proceed in a united 
fashion, on the basis of what Roundtable participants could agree 
upon. Therefore, it came as no surprise that on January 29 Roundtable 
participants debated the proposal of Svetla Daskalova, the leader of 
the BZNS, calling for the creation of a widely based government of 
national consensus. This new government would include the participa­
tion of the opposition parties and movements, a complete dismantling 
of the totalitarian system, and the opening of Bulgaria to the interna­
tional community.43 
Meanwhile the reform leaders of the Communist Party busied them­
selves with plans for reform within the Party itself. On January 30, 
1990, leaders convened an extraordinary Party Congress. The main 
goal of the meeting was to rid the BCP of Stalinist tendencies, to 
commit themselves to democratic socialism rather than Marxism-
Leninism, to create a civil society based on the principles of a law-
governed state, to emphasize the role of intellectuals in political life, 
and to encourage a market economy Introducing radical changes in 
its internal government, the Party changed its name to the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party and eliminated the oligarchical institutions of the Cen­
tral Committee and the Politburo. It also permitted the youth organi­
zation, the Komsomol (Communist Youth League), and other factions 
to sever their ties to the Party44 These changes made plain the inten­
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tions of the post-Communist leaders that they were prepared to reach 
an accommodation with the UDF. It also had the consequence of 
signaling to the nation that what might be left of hard-liners within 
the Party would not be a significant factor in future Roundtable 
negotiations. 
Between January and April, BSP leaders moved swiftly to portray 
themselves as among the leading progressive forces for democracy. As 
a further gesture toward democratic procedures, Party leaders submit­
ted the name change to a referendum of Party members, with 86 per­
cent voting in favor of the change and 12 percent voting against. They 
also changed the name of the official Party newspaper from Rahot­
nichesko Delo (Workers' Cause) to Duma (Word). Today, Duma is re­
garded as among the most objective and professional newspapers in 
Bulgaria.45 As if by an act of contrition, Easter Sunday was named an 
official state holiday, and members of the Communist government were 
seen attending services at the historic St. Alexander Nevski Cathedral 
in central Sofia.46 Finally, about one year later, in March 1991, the BSP 
published a detailed apology to the Bulgarian people for its past crimes 
and misdeeds. It announced the expulsion from its ranks of former 
leaders who had been responsible for many of the outrages against 
the people.47 
February Discussions 
On February 6, 1990, the Roundtable formally discussed the disband­
ment of Communist Party cells in the workplace and the dates for 
prospective parliamentary elections. 
Thorny issues packed the agenda for the February 12 meeting. Parti­
cipants gathered information about the progress of the contact group; 
reviewed the progress of the editing group that was preparing a draft 
agreement on Bulgaria's future political system; discussed the nation's 
economic situation based on recently published statistics for 1989 and 
the January 1990 trends; and exchanged information on the progress 
of talks with the European Economic Community (EEC) for potential 
membership and economic aid. Svetla Daskalova raised the issue of 
creating a third side at the Roundtable. But the UDF's Milan Drenchev 
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strongly argued against any such proposal. And, again, Roundtable 
participants discussed the matter of dismantling Party cells in the 
workplace. 
At this February 12 meeting, Roundtable participants discussed and 
agreed upon a declaration prepared by the contact group headed by 
the UDF's Zhelyu Zhelev and the BCP's Georgi Pirinski. It said that 
in securing widespread representation the National Roundtable re­
flects the political will of the Bulgarian people; and it is this fact that 
guarantees the irreversibility of the democratic process. The Round-
table's historical mission, the declaration asserts, is to achieve concrete 
agreements that will create the foundation for settling the nation's most 
crucial problems. These solutions entail the ways, means, and timing 
to liquidate totalitarian structures and to democratize the society. The 
Roundtable will establish the basic ideas and principles to guide future 
laws and other legislative acts and decisions that will create conditions 
for quick and decisive steps toward achieving national goals. To 
achieve these central purposes, the declaration calls for an atmosphere 
of mutual trust, constructiveness, and responsibility. 
Rumors abounded that the Roundtable was about to fail. To head 
off such fears Roundtable participants met again on March 5, 1990. 
They worked to prepare texts concerning the issues debated at the first 
round of discussion and came near to completing written statements. 
Working groups led discussions on bills for amending the Constitu­
tion, for the regulation of political parties, and for the ground rules 
governing general elections. It was envisaged that the proposals would 
be introduced at the next session of the National People's Assembly. 
Roundtable participants created an additional working group to pre­
pare for plenary discussion an analysis of the nation's socioeconomic 
problems. This matter centered on proposals for cooperation with the 
European Economic Community that the Bulgarian government had 
presented as a memorandum on February 12, 1990, addressed to the 
deputy-chairman of the EEC Commission. 
March Agreements 
Subsequently at a March 8 meeting, the contact group sanctioned all 
final draft agreements to be submitted to the plenary on March 12. At 
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their meeting, Roundtable participants gave their approval and signed 
the Agreement on the Political System, the National Agreement on the 
Guarantees for the Peaceful Development of the Transition Toward a 
Democratic Political System, and a Declaration on the Role and Status 
of the National Roundtable. 
The Agreement on the Political System stipulated as its core purpose 
the attainment of constitutionally and legislatively sanctioned judicial 
and political guarantees and mechanisms. It affirmed the sovereignty 
of the people represented by a democratically elected Parliament and 
a government under its supervision. It stipulated that there shall be 
independent functioning bodies of local governments created by free 
elections. Further, this agreement stipulated that the government shall 
function consistent with the principle of separation of powers and that 
the government shall operate with a multiparty system. This agreement 
also affirmed the principle of political freedom and guarantees equal 
treatment for all forms of ownership. It contained a list of legislative 
priorities calling for a law to amend the present Constitution, a law 
governing the activities of political parties, and a new statute regulat­
ing national radio and television. The National Agreement on the Guar­
antees for the Peaceful Development of the Transition toward a 
Democratic Political System is an eight-point statement declaring that 
peaceful mechanisms will be used to achieve political change in Bul­
garia. The Declaration on the Role and Status of the National Round­
table reasserted the function of the Roundtable as an instrument of 
national consensus and obliged participants to employ their resources 
to ensure the implementation of Roundtable agreements. 
At their March 15 meeting, Roundtable participants discussed eco­
nomic reform and the government's anticrisis program. Opinions 
differed whether "shock therapy" or a gradual approach to a market 
economy would be best for the nation. All agreed that there was no 
alternative to a market economy. They then decided to form a group 
of experts composed of economists and lawyers. The experts were 
given the mandate to prepare a Roundtable agreement and to involve 
themselves in the work of the existing parliamentary committee on 
socioeconomic problems. 
By the end of March, Roundtable participants discussed proposals 
for creating a presidential institution with a provision for a five- or six-
year term of office, bills for amending the existing Constitution, plans 
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for the election of the National Assembly, and laws for political parties 
and for the electoral system. In a public declaration, the UDF said it 
could not bind itself to the particulars of the proposed Memorandum 
of the Government; this was a document to be sent to the EEC coun­
tries on the subject of the implementation of economic reforms 
in Bulgaria. 
Then, on March 30, Roundtable participants signed three docu­
ments. The first was The Agreement on the Principles and the Basic 
Terms of the Bill for the Election of the Grand National Assembly. It 
states that the anticipated elections shall be based upon the principles 
of universal, equal, and direct franchise by secret ballot. They agreed 
that this would be accomplished within the framework of a mixed elec­
toral system that combined majority and proportional representation 
principles. This document specifies the rules for compiling constitu­
ency lists, the electoral bodies at central and regional levels, the pro­
cedure to promote candidates, the right of candidates to equal media 
access, the financing of election campaigns, the coalitions and parties 
allowed to compete in the elections, and the total number of seats in 
the Grand National Assembly. 
The Agreement on the Basic Concepts and Principles of the Bill for 
Political Parties is the second document formalized by Roundtable par­
ticipants on March 30. Its main items include guaranties for the citi­
zens' right to free association in political parties, that political parties 
shall be entered in a separate registration file of the Sofia City Court, 
that political parties shall perform their activities within the frame­
work of the Constitution and the laws of the country and in accor­
dance with their charters and programs, and that all parties shall have 
equal legal rights. At the same time, this document explicitly forbids 
political parties from engaging in certain activities. These included 
change of the constitutional order by force, creation of political parties 
based on ethnic and religious principles, interference in the work of 
government bodies, and creation of Party cells in the workplace. It 
prohibited parties that are paramilitary, subversive, or ones that have 
youth organizations. This agreement on political parties also deals 
with financing political party activities. It provides that parties shall 
not receive funds from foreign states. Another provision entails the 
disbandment of parties and the role of the judiciary in that process. 
The third accord signed on March 30 was The Agreement on the 
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Basic Concepts and Principles of the Bill for Amendment and Supple­
ment of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. It contains 
statements about the general principles of the political system and 
about the fundamental civil rights and freedoms of the people. It also 
treats the organizational forms of state power during the transition 
toward parliamentary democracy, and the status of the central and 
local governments. 
Participants decided at this eventful March 30 Roundtable meeting 
to abolish the State Council system created by the Communist Party 
in the old regime. In its place they agreed to substitute a president 
who would be elected by the People's National Assembly They argued, 
however, about whether the proper title for the new head of the state 
should be president or chairman. Furthermore, the Roundtable set 
June 10 and 17, 1990, as the dates for parliamentary elections. They 
agreed upon the creation of a working group to prepare an Agreement 
on the Guarantees for Democratic and Free Elections. 
May Completion 
After six weeks, the Roundtable plenary reconvened to wrap up its 
work. On May 14 and 15, 1990, participants signed several pacts. The 
first is the Agreement on the Guarantees for Free Elections. It created a 
Public Council with twenty-one representatives from various political 
and nonpolitical organizations to supervise the implementation of the 
election agreements concluded at the Roundtable. It provided that 
the Public Council shall have local branches in municipalities. This 
agreement contains methods for carrying out the election law. The 
Roundtable participants attached an appendix to the agreement that 
specified measures to prevent persons from voting repeatedly in the 
same election. They also agreed to a separate document called Ethical 
Code for the Elections' Campaign. It contains recommendations for the 
behavior of political parties and independent candidates. The Round­
table also promulgated an Agreement on the Basic Principles of the 
Statute of the Bulgarian Television and Bulgarian Radio and an Agree­
ment on the Elections' Campaign over the Radio and the Television. 
Finally, it passed a Declaration for Amnesty of all Political Emigrants. 
This document says that such persons may freely return to Bulgaria 
without fear of prosecution and that they may take part as candidates 
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in the elections for the Grand National Assembly. The National 
Roundtable Talks ended its work on May 15, 1990. 
Though it is a useful way to bring initial intellectual order to events, 
understanding the Roundtable requires more than this recitation of 
dates and names. In the next three chapters, I explore through the me­
dium of personal interviews the process of decision making, the in­
sights of persons actually involved in the talks, and the interaction of 
ideas, interests, institutions, and individuals that made the talks a suc­
cess and the transition to democracy possible. 
At the Creation: Internal 
Politics and Intragroup 
Dynamics 
WIT H THE APPARENT disarray within the socialist world order and 
the correlative fall of Todor Zhivkov's regime in late 1989, both the 
Communist Party and opposition forces were seeking to find their way. 
But the contours of the path were yet to be charted. While the Bulgar­
ian Communist Party was considering its future, opposition political 
groups were developing rapidly; about fifty such organizations existed.1 
A coalition of these groups combined under the umbrella organization 
known as the Union of Democratic Forces. This body was formally 
created on December 7, 1989, almost a month after the November 10, 
1989, coup d'etat bringing down Zhivkov's regime. Fourteen of these 
groups became part of a delegation representing opposition forces at 
a National Roundtable with official authorities, which included the 
Bulgarian Workers Social Democratic Party (United), the Nikola Pet­
kov Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union, the Club of Victims of Post­
1945 Repressions, the Independent Association for the Protection of 
Human Rights, the Ecoglasnost Independent Association, the Pod­
krepa Independent Labor Federation, the Glasnost and Democracy 
Club, the Civic Initiative Movement, the Committee for Defense of 
Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience and Spiritual Values, the In­
dependent Student Societies, and the Radical Democratic Party.2 
In civic culture terms these opposition groups hardly qualify as in­
terest groups or political parties within a pluralist society. During the 
forty years of Communist Party domination, dissenting groups were 
repressed. Intellectuals and other individual dissidents in the Soviet 
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tradition had an impact, but that was very different from organized 
opposition. As an expression of apolitical motives, many opposition 
groups called themselves independent, such as the Independent Soci­
ety for the Protection of Human Rights. Citizen attachment to these 
groups was not so much a matter of deep psychological commitment 
and allegiance to mutually shared values as an expression of frustra­
tion with and a rejection of government policy. 
Ecological Beginnings 
The ecological movement was an ideal way for previously unattached 
individuals to coalesce around a cause and vent their anger at the ex­
isting regime without directly challenging its legitimacy. Indeed, the 
first dissident activities to gain national attention were the mass dem­
onstrations at Ruse, a northern industrial city on the Romanian bor­
der. A Romanian chemical plant was spewing pollutants into the air 
that fell directly on the Bulgarian city. Citizens had objected to Bulgar­
ian government officials, but nothing was done. But on March 8, 1988, 
a small band of activists created the Committee for the Ecological De­
fense of Ruse. A year later, a group of intellectuals and students created 
the widely popular movement called Ecoglasnost. It was established as 
a legal entity on April 11 in the apartment of Alexander Karakacha­
nov, who at the time was a city council member in Sofia and later the 
chairman of the Green Party and participant at the National Round­
table Talks. Ecoglasnost was responsible for awakening public opinion 
and organizing the first protests with which most Bulgarians could 
identify. Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude that the ecological 
movement brought down the regime. As Karakachanov indicated in 
an interview with me, "The events which took place in Bulgaria were 
in fact a repercussion of what had happened worldwide and in Rus­
sia. . . . Left on its own . . . the ecological movement or any other dissi­
dent movement would have been mercilessly smashed if the year had 
been 1985, for example," and not 1989.3 
But opposition does not develop out of thin or even polluted air. 
There must be a social basis or ideological foundation that serves 
as the precursor for the establishment of an organized opposition. In 
Bulgaria, the creation of an ecological movement served to unite per­
sons from different backgrounds and experiences for the purpose of 
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combating serious degradations to the environment that the existing 
government seemed either unable or unwilling to combat. Petar Beron, 
an entomologist with an international academic reputation and early 
leader of the opposition, explained in an interview that the foundations 
for the UDF opposition were present before the November coup 
d'etat. In the process he related the roles individuals may play in bring­
ing about political change. Beron, with his warm personality and char­
ismatic speaking abilities, was headed toward a promising political 
future—that is, until he was accused by fellow opposition leaders of 
being an informer during the days of the old regime. In a cluttered 
office, much like those occupied by academics worldwide, I asked Pro­
fessor Beron: 
You were one of the very first . . . you, Zhelev, and others . .  . to 
give the opposition a face?4 
PB: Yes. I have been in the opposition movement, but I cannot 
make a hero of myself, and I do not want to. Many other people, 
even members of the Communist Party, who have been in high posi­
tions before—now everybody claims to have been repressed and so 
on, which is really not very decent. I have always been in science, 
traveling in . .  . various parts of the world and I can say I have al­
ways been against communism. I have never concealed this. All my 
life, I considered communism a common Utopia in the best case, as 
a theory, something, which is fantastic, you know; and as a prac-
tice—it is a crime. I have never been a member of the Communist 
Party and I have never approved in any way what they were doing. 
But I was living in the mountains, in the caves; I explored the high 
mountains, I had long journeys. I attempted to have as little to do 
with the Communist authorities as possible. 
When the many changes were taking place in other parts of East­
ern Europe it was clear that change was also coming to Bulgaria. . . . 
There were some gatherings of dissidents—they are not persons 
who are now in the highest places; they were people who have been 
in jail and so on. Some of them are marginal people, who are not 
fit for normal life, you know. . .  . So, they were pushed away very 
soon. Yet, they were the original dissidents. But the Communist dis­
sidents, the so-called perestroikists, who are now pretending they 
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are responsible for bringing about the changes—do not believe 
them. When you speak to the BSP people, they will say, "Well, we 
were some sort of . .  . [dissidents]." Do not believe them. They are 
trying to change their appearance. . . . But it is true that most of the 
politically active people have been in the Communist Party, because 
. . . nobody could be active in any field of political life unless they 
were Party members. . . . So, when the changes did occur on the 
tenth of November, the Communists were the persons who profited; 
they very quickly had the upper hand everywhere. And so, . .  . in 
1988 we founded this committee—the Civic Committee for the Pro­
tection of Ruse. 
AM: You are referring to the Ecological Committee? Was this com­
mittee led by Communists? 
PB: Yes, the Ecological Committee . .  . at this time it was easier to 
pretend to be an ecologist because outright political opposition 
would be crushed very soon if we had not. So, we pretended to be 
ecologists, but we were also claiming some openness, glasnost. . .  . It 
was clear, though, most members of this committee had been former 
Communists or actual Communists, members of the Communist 
Party. I was not a member of the leadership of this committee, but 
I participated as a group member. 
After the first demonstration the committee was suppressed. 
Most people who participated were expelled from the Party, they 
lost their jobs and so on. And then in the spring of 1989 . .  . we 
formed the organization called Ecoglasnost. I was one of the found­
ing members of Ecoglasnost in April, and I became its secretary. 
We then staged different actions against various state projects, 
we collected signatures and so on. Thus, Ecoglasnost was the focal 
point for opposition against the government. Several other newly 
formed organizations gathered around us. They attended our 
meetings. 
AM: You mean committees on human rights? 
PB: Yes, human rights committees, then Podkrepa [the Labor Syn­
dicate], then the religious committee of Christofor Sabev, then a few 
others. All these were created before the tenth of November. And 
it was the same case for the glasnost and perestroika clubs. These 
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organizations were composed mostly by intelligentsia from Sofia 
University. Most of these people were also former Communists. 
Most were highly positioned members of the Communist Party, but 
they pretended they were something else. 
You know, there are different stories about how these organiza­
tions were created. Some people claim that all these organizations 
were created by the State Security, that they were just the tools of 
the Communists. As a member of one of them, I can say that there 
is some truth in this . . . but it is not the absolute truth. It is truthful 
in part because with all that was happening in this and other coun­
tries the State Security would not just watch what was happening 
from the sidelines. They would intervene because it was their duty 
to take precautions. And they certainly tried to introduce some 
people in these organizations. Certainly there were some. . . . 
AM: You mean . . . State Security infiltrated your organizations? 
PB: Yes . .  . I cannot say to what extent this happened, but to some 
extent it was done—certainly. But it is not true, as some people may 
tell you, that all of them, all of the fathers of the UDF were police 
or Communist agents, and that the UDF was created by the Com­
munist Party and by the State Security. That is not true. The UDF 
was created by the genuine need of all these organizations, including 
the newly formed or restored political parties, to fight together, to 
create a common umbrella organization. All of us were feeling 
this. . .  . I had talks with Andrey Lukanov . . . and with Petar Mla­
denov on some occasions. They were very much opposed to the idea 
of having this opposition umbrella organization [Lukanov and Mla­
denov were leading members of the reform leadership of the Com­
munist Party]. They were asking us not to form it. But we did 
form it. 
Zhelyu Zhelev led the initiative in this direction. I was his deputy. 
We have very strong reasons to think that Zhelev himself was, if not 
an infiltrator, . . . acting in very close agreement with the Com­
munists. It is now known that he and his group of several Commu­
nists around him were in touch with Lukanov and company before 
all of this and that they had negotiated the way of doing these 
things. 
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AM: But because you were Zhelev's deputy, you knew about this at 
the time! 
PB: I did not know about this. I was always kept outside. This 
group around Zhelev—all of them were former Party secretaries 
like Ivailo Trifonov, or active Komsomol leaders—you know the 
Komsomol, youth Communist organization. . . . 
AM: Yes, I do. 
PB: . . . like [Dimitar] Ludjev or Stoyan Ganev, or Petko Simeonov 
[emphasis added]. In the past they were all active Communists. 
AM: Yes, I see. 
PB: They were trusted by Zhelev—I was not. And finally we now 
know about these talks, about these negotiations, about these deals, 
made by Zhelev with the Communist dignitaries in the past—that 
they made him promises and he made them promises. 
AM: When were these promises made? 
PB: At a very early stage. 
AM: Before the Roundtable actually commenced? Or during the 
Roundtable itself? 
PB: Before the tenth of November! 
AM: Before the tenth of November coup d'etat! 
PB: . . . We cannot prove it, but we have very strong reasons to 
believe that it happened like the way I have described. 
AM: What is the starting date of the UDF? 
PB: The starting date of the UDF is the seventh of December 1989. 
AM: Almost a month after the coup. But your organization was 
formed before . . . 
PB: Well, there had been informal contacts. During the first days 
of December we had several meetings at the university, and we nego­
tiated the whole thing on the seventh of December. The UDF was 
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founded in a building one hundred meters from here, very near. 
When you go out in the garden, I will show you the building. . .  . It 
is the Institute of Sociology At that time, the institute director who 
is now the head of the Confederation of the Independent Syndicates 
in Bulgaria was Professor Krastio Petkov. So, we created the UDF; 
Zhelev was elected chairman and I was elected secretary. 
AM: Let me be clear on this point: the communications between 
Zhelev and the Communist leaders—Andrey Lukanov and oth-
ers—did that take place before or after the creation of the UDF? 
PB: We think it was before. 
AM: I see. 
PB: Or even much before. They deny it, but we have strong reasons 
to think that it happened like this. . . . We learn more all the time. 
For example, I read yesterday in a newspaper that Ivailo Trifonov— 
Zhelev's close associate—was a candidate to go to Moscow as Bul-
garia's ambassador. But the Russians declined. Moscow newspapers 
revealed that Ivailo Trifonov was connected with the KGB [the se­
cret police of the Soviet Union]. . . . But you must understand the 
nature of the times. Mladenov was president, but the main features 
of the old regime were still in their place. Lukanov and Mladenov 
were considered, if not revolutionaries, certainly they were regarded 
as reformers against the old guard, which was even worse. We sup­
ported the reform wing of the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Now, how­
ever, it is very easy to say, "You were behaving as traitors, because 
you were talking with Lukanov . . .  " But at the time the opposition 
movement was weak. The army, the police—everything—was in the 
hands of the Communist Party. Now things are quite different. . . . 
We had to support the new trend, the new wave, the so-called re­
formers against Todor Zhivkov and his associates. Step by step we 
needed to push them out of power. It was not possible to do other­
wise. Now it is very easy to exclaim against us, but those who accuse 
us were hiding at the time! We were busy provoking the Commu­
nists. But our detractors just sat back waiting to see what would 
happen. Now everywhere they protest loudly 
So after first establishing the UDF we decided by the end of the 
year that is was now necessary to create conditions for new elec­
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tions. We subsequently formed a contact group and created the 
National Roundtable Talks. Today's radicals regard the Roundtable 
itself as an act of treason. They rhetorically proclaim: "Why talk 
with the Communists!" But we had no choice. There was no other 
way to solve the problems. . . . They say, "Why didn't you enter the 
ministries and throw them out?" It is easy to make such statements 
today, but I ask why did they not do this themselves? The answer 
is at the time it was dangerous to do so: 90 percent of the army 
officers were Communists, the whole police, everything. . . . The So­
viet Union was still in existence at this time. All the treaties were 
still valid . . . the Warsaw Treaty and so on. . . . They were still valid 
and nobody knew what might happen if violence erupted. 
AM: So, you had no choice. . . . 
PB: Of course! We had to create the Roundtable—it was a correct 
step. 
We learn from Beron that the ecological movement provided a respect­
able cover for dissidents. These were persons with a variety of objec­
tions to the old regime. They took advantage of widespread environ­
mental concerns to present a broader indictment against communism. 
As Beron observes, many of the people who were the original ecologi­
cal activists were quickly marginalized, a phenomenon that has often 
been repeated in the history of political change; revolutionaries who 
initiate change are replaced by more moderate types who are less dis­
posed toward ideological extremes and who tend to be more practical 
in their orientation.5 As personality types, Beron observes that the eco­
logical radicals who were active during the initial days of the move­
ment were generally people outside the mainstream of Bulgarian life. 
As he put it, they are people "not fit for normal life," people "who 
have been in jail and so on." 
Beron accepts the proposition that there may have been police or 
Communist Party agents within Ecoglasnost. What else would we ex­
pect from a police state? Even in so-called democratic states, such as 
in the United States, intelligence agencies are known to infiltrate alleg­
edly subversive organizations. Commonly, paid informants or agents 
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posing as followers, or fellow-travelers, report to state authorities on 
the organizational activities of the infiltrated group. Although it was 
probably infiltrated, Beron insisted that the UDF was not a creature 
of the Communist Party as critics sometimes suggest. Dr. Konstan­
tin Trenchev, the leader of the Podkrepa syndicate, further elaborated 
upon the dynamics of the UDFs formation. He explained why dis­
agreements emerged among the various groups under its umbrella. On 
a few important points, Trenchev disagreed with Beron's analysis. 
Organizational Militancy and Political Compromise 
By training, Konstantin Trenchev is a physician. In February 1989, at 
the age of thirty-four, he became the leader of the independent trade 
union for intellectuals and workers that he helped to found, Podkrepa. 
This trade union played an important role in creating the Roundtable 
and in exerting pressure upon the state authorities for change. I inter­
viewed him at Podkrepa headquarters, which is centrally located in 
downtown Sofia. Of all the organizational headquarters I visited to 
conduct my interviews, Podkrepa's was the best equipped and staffed 
suite of offices. I was impressed by the efficiency of the office and the 
staff's knowledge of worldwide events. With his support staff in atten­
dance during the interview, I first asked Trenchev how, at a very early 
stage in the Roundtable Talks, Podkrepa became involved. He said:6 
We had created earlier an Independent Association for the Protec­
tion of Human Rights. It was made up of former political prisoners, 
and I was among the few exclusions in the membership. I became a 
political prisoner after that. But I will tell you why the organiza­
tional structure took the form of a trade union. We had three basic 
arguments for this. The first one was that the socialist economy was 
facing tremendous problems and because of this the social potential 
for a trade union association was very high. The second argument 
was that there existed negative attitudes among the people toward 
the men in power, because as a rule they used this power for their 
own purposes, while at the same time a trade union could have great 
influence without being directly involved in government. And the 
third argument was that there were loopholes in the legislation, 
which were creating the opportunity for such an organization to 
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be formed without restrictions, because at that time the creation of 
political parties was totally banned. Having in mind these three pre­
sumptions we established the organization, which started devel­
oping very quickly, because people were ready for change. . . . 
We were the fourth opposition organization founded in Bulgaria. 
The first one was the Independent Society for Human Rights. It was 
also outside the scenario [acceptable groups to the governing elite] 
and its members were either dismissed from work or repressed in 
some other way. The second organization that emerged was the so-
called Association of the Clubs for Glasnost and Perestroika. It was 
an organization totally manipulated by ex-Communists and also by 
active members of the Communist Party. 
The third organization was the League for Human Rights; it was 
wholly made up of ethnic Turks. This one was smashed by the au­
thorities, and its members were forced to emigrate. And the fourth 
organization was Podkrepa. I would also mention the fifth one, the 
so-called Ecoglasnost, which was a totally directed formation too. 
AM: Directed formation? I do not understand the meaning of this 
term. 
KT: . . . they were manipulated by the Communists. The events I 
am talking about took place in 1989. Our trade union was founded 
in February 1989. In May of that same year six activists were de­
tained or arrested. We were released in September 1989. After this, 
the organization started growing very quickly because people saw 
that it was not so dangerous to be in it. On the tenth of November 
we had a membership of two thousand members. And this was the 
biggest of all the opposition organizations. We had a number of 
activities—meetings, demonstrations, rallies. Everybody was ex­
pressing their hopes for change. And we, the leaders of different 
organizations, got to know each other. Before that time we were 
personally unacquainted, although we knew each other by name. 
On December the seventh the Union of Democratic Forces was cre­
ated. Of course, there were preliminary meetings prior to that date. 
After the tenth of November some other organizations and parties 
were hurriedly created. But on the tenth of November we numbered 
only seven organizations and there was not a single political party 
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among them. The UDF emerged spontaneously as an association 
from these different forces. 
In this period Podkrepa was extremely active. We organized a 
series of meetings and rallies and on the fourteenth of December we 
formed a life chain around the Parliament building. We insisted on 
the abolishment of Article 1 of the Constitution. And this article 
was about the Communist Party. 
AM: About the leadership role of the Communist Party in society? 
KT: Yes. At the end of the year we in Podkrepa asked for a Round­
table and we went on a national strike. 
AM: Excuse me, was your organization the first to make this re­
quest for National Roundtable Talks? Was the idea for a Roundtable 
your idea, the idea of a number of UDF leaders, or was it an idea 
of the former Communist Party? I want to identify where the idea 
originated. 
KT: We went on a national strike, requesting the abolition of Party 
cell organizations in the workplace, the restoration of rights of the 
ethnic Turks, the right for free association of syndicates. I have to 
admit that we were restrained by our colleagues from the UDF, but 
nevertheless we started our protest action, which frightened the gov­
ernment and it then proposed a Roundtable. But this idea was circu­
lating in the opposition for quite some time before the government 
initiative. By the end of the month [December 1989], in fact at the 
very end of the month, the demonstrations of the ethnic Turks for 
restoration of their names took place. And the government had to 
step back on this issue too. I think that those two things—the na­
tional strike of the Podkrepa Syndicate and the protests of ethnic 
Turks—frightened the government. And it decided to act in this 
way to release the pressure. 
At the very beginning there was disagreement over the distribu­
tion of power at the Roundtable. Podkrepa insisted on a Roundtable 
between the UDF and the government, while the Communists 
wanted a Roundtable between . .  . the Communist Party, the Agrar­
ian Party, the Women's Movement, the Synod of the Orthodox 
Church, the Supreme Spiritual Council of Moslems in Bulgaria, the 
Fatherland Front, and many other formations. . . . Oh, the trade 
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unions were also included. So we were facing a gang who wanted to 
impose its point of view, to have an upper hand by any means. And 
on our side of the table some UDF people did not want representa­
tives of the ethnic Turks to participate. On the whole the Roundtable 
was an endless succession of dialogues, aiming, I think, to confuse 
the opposition, so it could not prepare itself for elections. In fact 
this was an attempt by the Communists to convince the opposition 
(or at least its leaders) of the need for a Bulgarian perestroika [re­
form rather than genuine change]. All during those talks our orga­
nization defended staunch anti-Communist positions, and we are 
proud of it. I think our failure at the first election [June 1990] was 
due to the hesitant and collaborative stand the UDF took at the 
Roundtable. 
AM: You mean that the UDF was not militant enough? It was not 
sufficiently anti-Communist! . . . 
KT: Yes, there were too many compromises and the UDF was not 
militant enough. 
AM: I think I understand. Please understand I do not mean to put 
words in your mouth—I just want a clarification . . . 
KT: I can give you an example to illustrate my point, a scandalous 
example. We had in our possession a video recording, where Presi­
dent Mladenov mentions something about tanks coming during 
a protest rally around the National Assembly. I insisted upon full 
publicity of this recording—just to show people how far the Com­
munists are willing to go to impede peaceful protest. The then chair­
man of the UDF and current president of the Republic, Mr. Zhelyu 
Zhelev, and the head of the electoral campaign, Mr. Petko Simeo­
nov, did everything to prevent the showing of the tape; they asked 
our people to show restraint. The content of this cassette finally 
became known to the public just after the elections. 
And there is another example. They banned the circulation of 
an election poster showing all the concentration camps created by 
the Communists. I consider this an illustration of a wavering and 
passive policy. Of course, I am not that kind of militant anti-
Communist who recommends that everybody should be shot or im­
prisoned. But this hesitant position of the UDF was the main 
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reason for our failure in the elections. Of course, there was bad or­
ganization and so on which also played a negative role. After all, 
the Communists won. We were the only organization that refused to 
accept the election results. Podkrepa was the only opposition group 
having organizational structures nationwide. And we had enough 
information to know that in many regions the elections were not 
fair. 
Trenchev aptly relates the motivations behind the Communist Party's 
willingness to accommodate change. It was, according to Trenchev, a 
matter of adaptation and a very successful one at that. He said: 
This adaptation concerned first of all their tactics, because the 
main goal was to preserve their influence. Thus, when we in the 
opposition were coming to the point of open conflict with them, 
they would retract their position. Their main goal was to save their 
members from the people's anger. They wanted to gain time to re­
group. They positioned new faces at the forefront. These new faces 
were persons not so directly connected with the former regime. 
These new personalities presented a flexible line, and after waiting 
out the tumult, for the transition to pass, they would then proclaim 
themselves social democrats. In this way they would avoid responsi­
bility or guilt for the past. So, I can say the Bulgarian Communists 
were very flexible, indeed. . . . The struggle in Bulgaria is not a 
struggle to restore Communist principles. Rather, the struggle cen­
ters around the issue of who will become the capitalists. And the 
Communists want to transform themselves into this social group. 
AM: To become part of the capitalist class! 
KT: Nobody wants to restore the Communist principles. 
AM: Is it possible to give the UDF behavior a charitable interpreta­
tion? . . . That is, in a forgiving way. . . . 
KT: Indeed, at the time no one had any experience. So, to a certain 
extent it is historically forgivable. And do not forget that the UDF 
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was massively infiltrated by former Communists and secret services 
men. So, certain militant attitudes were blocked from within. And I 
stand by that interpretation. 
The second generation of UDF leaders consisted of vociferous 
anti-communists. But they have not produced any real decommunis­
tization. I have, of course, my own explanation why the UDF has 
failed. First of all, the formula around which it was created was 
not carefully considered. True, we have the excuse that we were not 
experienced enough to create the UDF in a better way But later it 
should have been improved to adapt more adequately to the times. 
As a matter of fact, the UDF was a coalition. But in its true sense, 
coalition means association among real structures. The structures in 
the UDF did not continue to develop organizationally, and in some 
ways these organizations remained as little more than groups of doz­
ens of people, while other groups reached memberships of a couple 
of thousand. But practically the most important thing was that this 
conglomerate—for it was a conglomerate indeed—was actually ex­
ploiting the anti-communist feelings within the nation. Ordinary 
people thought of them not as a coalition of many organizations 
but as of one single entity; still, organizationally, they were not one 
piece, but a bunch of activists. Those activists were unable to create 
a real formation, to take control of state institutions, and to pro­
mote their ideas. When the Bulgarian Socialists were in control of 
the government the UDF did not even have a shadow government 
standing in opposition. It was not in a position after victory at the 
polls to put into place the right people to carry out its policies. . .  . 
A government of this kind is doomed. Because even the best ideas 
fail if there is no one to put them into practice. 
Currently [October 1993], the UDF is in an even more tragic situ­
ation. The first thing the UDF did when it came to power [October 
1991] was to smash its two main supporters—one was Podkrepa 
and the other was the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. They 
also attacked the institutions of the Orthodox Church; they created 
tension with the president, who was, by the way, their candidate in 
the presidential elections. Overall they fought battles on many fronts 
against all the real [oppositional] structures in society. They blame 
everyone but themselves for their own failures. They blame us for 
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our eagerness to have reform programs. They also blamed us for 
our desire for dialogue; Podkrepa wanted a tripartite dialogue. And, 
of course, they lost the battle. 
Nowadays [beginning December 1992] we have a government, 
born of utmost compromise. No one regards it as responsible for 
anything. But at the moment we can find no replacement. We could 
topple this [Berov] government easily. The politicians in the Parlia­
ment could also do it, but they are hopelessly deadlocked; no one 
is doing a thing to find a way out. 
AM: What has to happen to break the deadlock? 
KT: I wish I knew the answer. If I could tell the members of my 
syndicate whom they should vote for I would not suffer the current 
rulers even for a month. 
Thus, besides Ecoglasnost there were several other organizations cre­
ated before the November 10, 1989, coup d'etat that brought down the 
Zhivkov regime. After that event Podkrepa played an especially active 
role in organizing meetings, mass rallies, and strikes. These staged 
events served to exert pressure upon the Communists who were still in 
control of the government. The goal of these activities was to produce 
meaningful change. Trenchev claims parentage for the National 
Roundtable Talks, but, as he admits, others also called for the talks, 
including the leaders of the Communist Party. In fact, Party leaders 
formally proposed the talks, although the idea had been floated in 
other quarters. Trenchev recognized that the Communists were at­
tempting to employ the age-old divide-and-conquer tactic. The govern­
ment sought talks with many independent groups instead of what all 
finally agreed upon: namely, two sides represented at the Roundtable, 
the government on one side and the opposition united under the ban­
ner of the UDF. Yet, loose federations suffer from a major disadvan­
tage. It is difficult for them to behave quickly and decisively. To keep 
the coalition together, such umbrella organizations must compromise 
among themselves, and this spirit may translate into what Trenchev 
calls a hesitant and collaborative stand toward the opposition. He is 
critical of the UDF because it was not sufficiently militant. Trenchev 
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blames the initial election defeat at the hands of the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party and the subsequent disarray within UDF ranks on its all-too-
willing desire to reach an accord with the government in power. Yet, 
as Trenchev readily admits, the opposition had little experience in such 
matters. Moreover, there was good reason for all the parties at the 
Roundtable to fear failure. 
A Social Movement from the Top 
Political outsiders may bring to political discourse the twin qualities 
of new ideas and honesty—virtues sometimes lacking in well-worn 
politicians—but they often lack the instincts and skills that come with 
experience. But within UDF leadership ranks were some who had 
firsthand knowledge of their Communist Party opponents. Former 
Communist Party members and activists were involved in the forma­
tion of the UDF, the National Roundtable Talks, and the Grand Na­
tional Assembly that fashioned a new Constitution. By all accounts, 
these ex-Communists played at the very least the important role of 
intermediary. In that role they made the process of negotiation and 
compromise smoother than it might otherwise have been. 
Petko Simeonov is among the most interesting ex-Communists to 
become active in Bulgaria's transition to democracy. His father was 
sent to prison twice before 1944, because he was a Communist and 
anti-fascist. Some members of his family were killed by what Simeonov 
describes as the fascist regime. Thus, he began his conscious political 
life as a true believer in communism. Simeonov explained that this 
perspective continued until he entered the university. Sometime around 
1964-65, he began to see things in less dogmatic ways. He was a Com­
munist Party member twice. The first time he was thrown out of the 
Party, but on the second occasion he left on his own. Unlike Petar 
Beron and Konstantin Trenchev, Petko Simeonov was politically en­
gaged in a variety of ways all his life. Although his background and 
initial involvement in the transition to democracy are different from 
those of Beron and Trenchev, the recitation of facts about how the 
opposition forces were created and the understandings created be­
tween those forces and the reform communist leaders are similar. How­
ever, Simeonov provides, from a lifetime of political activity, insights 
that Beron and Trenchev are incapable of relating. 
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I interviewed Petko Simeonov at the headquarters of the Bulgarian 
Liberal Party.7 At the time, he was the leader of this party, which had 
no elected representatives in the parliament. As was the case for many 
of the original opposition members, Simeonov found himself in the 
political wilderness with too few followers. Nevertheless, he was boun­
teous with vivid memories of the role he played in the transition to 
democracy. I first asked Simeonov how he got involved in the Round­
table and the Grand National Assembly. 
PS: I had some credit among Bulgarian dissidents, and I guess, a 
certain position among the Sofia intelligentsia before November 
10, 1989. . . . 
I was the scientific secretary of the Institute of Sociology and it 
was in my study there . . . where the foundation . .  . the decision 
to create the Ruse (ecological) club . . . took place. . . . Among the 
participants at this meeting were Zhelyu Zhelev, Ivailo Trifonov 
(currently chief of the Cabinet Office of the President), and some 
five or six other people, who later played different roles in Bulgaria's 
political life. Subsequently, I was among the founding fathers of the 
Club in Support of Glasnost and Perestroika. The first of the above-
mentioned events happened at the end of February 1988, and the 
second one—the formation of the Club in Support of Glasnost and 
Perestroika—took place on November 3, 1988. 
AM: So a whole year before the coup [November 10, 1989], you are 
part of the dissident movement? 
PS: Yes. I had two personal acts of dissidence during that period. 
The first took place sometime at the beginning of 1988, I cannot 
remember exactly when, but it was when I started to speak on Radio 
Free Europe. The other thing I did was on May 4, 1988.1 remember 
this exactly: I wrote a comprehensive letter against communism to 
Milko Balev (the second in command in the Communist Party, sec­
retary of the Central Committee and Politburo member). Balev was 
the most trusted person around Todor Zhivkov. . . . This letter of 
mine was widely disseminated by the samizdat press. 
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AM: You mean by samizdat, the illegal or underground press? 
PS: Yes. By the tenth of November 1989 I had already attained a 
certain position and prominence. Before November 10 I was in the 
leadership of the Club in Support of Glasnost and Perestroika, and 
after that date I became its chairman. I was actively involved in the 
consultations around the creation of the UDF as early as the sum­
mer of 1989. The UDF was founded on December 7, 1989, a month 
or so after the coup. The signing of the founding declaration took 
place at the Institute of Sociology. At the time, I was no longer the 
institute's scientific secretary, because I had been sacked after the 
demonstrations at Ruse. But I was still influential at the institute, 
and as a result I was able to secure its premises, where the signing 
took place. We had all our meetings there. Later we got the building 
at 134 Rakovska Street [the current UDF headquarters]. The UDF 
used the institute premises, which were secured by me. 
AM: Very interesting. So intellectuals were very much involved. . . . 
PS: The persons involved were mainly intellectuals. . .  . In the first 
call of the UDF Coordinating Committee . .  . all the members were 
intellectuals. There was not a single worker or a peasant as a mem­
ber of the Coordinating Committee. 
AM: So one might say that it was a social movement from the top. 
PS: Yes, indeed. I was a member of the Coordinating Committee 
in my capacity of chairman of the Club in Support of Glasnost and 
Perestroika. Then, I became chairman of the Central Election Club 
and I was appointed manager of the election campaign during the 
first elections [June 1990]; I was a deputy leader of the UDF. There 
were no other deputies—just a chairman (Zhelev) and his deputies. 
During the election I was the director of the Democracy newspaper. 
I want to ask you a question myself. Are you interested in the 
peaceful transition as such or certain kinds of events? 
AM: Well, I am interested in the events and the roles played by 
individuals in those events. . . . 
PS: I see. . .  . On December 14, 1989, the Communist National 
Assembly under pressure from the informal dissident groups started 
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debates on the abolishment of Article 1 of the Constitution on the 
leading role of the Communist Party. The UDF was born just one 
week before. A mass rally was organized around the National As­
sembly, and people for the first time in their lives felt free. Well, 
this new feeling of freedom is very intense, and it could become 
dangerous. There were appeals from the crowd around the National 
Assembly building to enter by force and to throw the deputies out. 
Mr. Zhelev, myself, and some other persons circulated around with 
megaphones, trying to appease the people. We appealed to them 
not to storm the building. There were others who admonished the 
crowd to get inside, saying that the bloodshed is unavoidable. And 
let me tell you this—because you mentioned an interest in the role 
of the individuals—at that point Mr. Zhelev and the rest of us, Mr. 
Ivailo Trifonov and Konstantin Trenchev, took to the rostrum in 
front of the building of the Students' House of Culture, just oppo­
site the Parliament. From there, Mr. Zhelev for the first time said to 
the people that we are for a peaceful transition to democracy; we 
stand for changing the system through elections, through free elec­
tions. Be patient, he said. We have to advance step by step. So we 
appealed to the people to disperse and to go home and they did. 
AM: Let me see if I understand. UDF forces organized this rally to 
begin with, before it got out of hand. 
PS: Now, because I was one of the organizers of the rally, let me 
explain. There were two [parallel] gatherings, two meetings of infor­
mal dissident groups. One of these was organized by students. The 
other represented a life chain [picket line], which we, a group from 
the Coordinating Committee, helped to organize around the Na­
tional Assembly when it was having its debate about Article 1 of the 
Constitution. This was a life chain made up of people holding their 
hands together. 
AM: But what came first? Did the Communist Party officials first 
initiate the discussion on changing Article 1, and then demonstra­
tions followed? 
PS: The pressure [by the informal dissident groups] preceded the 
debates on Article 1. We entered into a dialogue with the authori­
ties, with totalitarian authorities, right after Todor Zhivkov was de­
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posed, and that happened before the creation of the UDR And they 
gave us their word they would abolish Article 1 of the Constitution. 
AM: Did they force persons within the Communist Party who may 
not have wanted to go along with the abolishment of Article 1 to 
do so? 
PS: No, there were ongoing changes within the Communist Party. 
AM: But I am interested in understanding whether UDF activities 
were important in strengthening the hand of the reform faction 
within the Communist Party, that group within the Party who 
wanted to abolish Article 1. 
PS: The situation in the country was very peculiar then. Let me 
summarize: Todor Zhivkov had changed forcefully the names of the 
ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. The emerging organized opposition stood 
in defense of the Turks. This later proved to be of great importance 
for the preservation of ethnic peace. The third event—the Turks 
have started their mass exodus, their mass "excursion" to Turkey. 
This created an outcry within the ranks of the Communist Party 
itself over the approach used by the Party leadership. That is why 
the deposing of Todor Zhivkov on November 10, 1989, dealt a blow 
to all conservative forces in the Communist Party. They were the 
guilty ones. And because of this they lost their voice within the 
Communist Party. Thus, it was within the ranks of the Communist 
Party itself that the call for abolishing Article 1 was the strongest. 
We put pressure on them to speed up this abolishment. 
AM: This is very important to understand, because it is not clear 
abroad that there was a conscious effort on your part to keep the 
pressure on the Communist Party. 
PS: Do not forget that I was a Party member until December 31, 
1989, when I declared that I quit. There were members of the 
Communist Party in the first [UDF] Coordinating Committee. The 
protest rally on December 14, 1989, which I mentioned before, is 
significant not only for Mr. Zhelev's slogans for a peaceful transi­
tion. . . . Article 1 of the then existing Constitution could not be 
abolished by a simple debate in the National Assembly—which 
took place on December 14. According to the provisions of the then 
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existing Constitution the people would have to wait an additional 
month before the abolishment of Article 1 could occur. Therefore, 
at the December 14 mass rally we were trying to appease the people. 
We argued that the constitutional procedure should be followed. 
And indeed, on January 16, 1990, Article 1 was abolished. On Janu­
ary 3, 1990, the preliminary talks on the formation of the Round­
table began. 
It is especially interesting that intellectuals from the university commu­
nity were actively involved in the dissident movement at least one year 
before the November 10, 1989, coup d'etat that brought down the 
Zhivkov regime. Simeonov and others used their positions within the 
university to network with others by disseminating their views through 
the underground press and other avenues, including Radio Free Eu­
rope. Of course, these dissidents could go only so far before they were 
relieved of their positions within the university. Clearly, then, the op­
position to the regime was led by intellectuals. It was not a peasant 
or workers' movement. These intellectuals-turned-activists were little 
known to the public before the December 14 demonstrations. The in­
tellectuals insisted upon a peaceful transition to democracy. They 
admonished the thousands that had circled the Parliament building 
demanding a change in the Party's constitutional role as the leading 
force in society to use nonviolent means to achieve democracy. The 
dramatic events of December 14 are definitive because they placed the 
intellectuals at the head of the mass movement to change the character 
of Bulgarian society. And they established a peaceful rather than a 
violent strategy for how it might be achieved. 
The Party Line: Glasnost and Perestroika 
Why did the new leaders of the former Communist Party negotiate 
with an opposition that it otherwise might have crushed with a show 
of force? The answer is not as straightforward as one might suppose. 
There is considerable evidence suggesting that many of the younger 
members of the Bulgarian Communist Party believed reform was nec­
essary. It is true that Zhivkov's ruling oligarchy failed to adapt suffi­
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ciently to the changing times and conditions, and there was widespread 
recognition that the system had failed. Yet, it is also true that Zhivkov 
wisely realized that political organizations need new talent to bring life 
to structures that would otherwise atrophy. Ironically, it was this cadre 
of relatively young Party apparatchiks created by Zhivkov that caused 
the November 10 coup d'etat, bringing down his regime. Matters were 
made worse for Zhivkov because of his tendency and that of his prede­
cessors in office to follow slavishly the policy cues of the Soviet Union. 
By all accounts, the doctrines and actions of the Soviet Union's Mik­
hail Gorbachev played a significant part in strengthening the hand of 
reform elements within Bulgaria's Communist Party. 
Given this habitual pattern of conformity, it was possible for reform­
ers within the Communist Party to embrace glasnost and perestroika 
without being accused of anti-communist activity. President Gorba­
chev of the Soviet Union encouraged public discussion and dissent; he 
reduced censorship and made it fashionable to challenge the authority 
of the Party apparat. None of this was lost on the people of Eastern 
Europe, including those in Bulgaria. Perestroika ("restructuring") and 
glasnost ("openness") played an important role within the then exist­
ing Bulgarian Communist Party to encourage reformers to create new 
political and economic structures to meet the challenges of the age. A 
new freedom to voice different views combated those entrenched forces 
that defended the status quo. 
Georgi Bliznashki is a faculty member at Sofia University specializ­
ing in constitutional law. He was a Socialist member of one of the 
Roundtable's contact groups, and when I interviewed him in 1993 he 
was a member of Parliament.8 He helps us to understand the internal 
political dynamics of the Bulgarian Communist Party and how it was 
possible for reformers to gain an upper hand over the old guard. 
Georgi Bliznashki said: 
Well, I believe the things that happened in Bulgaria were substan­
tially influenced by events that already had taken place in other 
countries in 1989. This means that the basic opposition in the coun­
try against Todor Zhivkov and his regime was coming from inside, 
from the ranks of the Communist Party itself. And the main factor 
influencing the emerging trends was perestroika. It was not by 
chance that among the founding fathers of the first organized 
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dissident groups in Bulgaria were such prominent intellectuals as 
Professor Chavdar Kjuranov, Stefan Prodev, and many others who, 
subsequently, after the removal of Todor Zhivkov, occupied key po­
sitions in the Socialist Party leadership [the BCP changed its name 
to the Bulgarian Socialist Party]. There were, of course, differences 
of opinion because before the tenth of November 1989, most of 
the Central Committee members were personally selected by Todor 
Zhivkov. Because of this fact, different concepts within the Socialist 
Party about its political prospects were taking shape gradually. Mr. 
Petar Mladenov, in particular, the man who replaced Todor Zhiv­
kov, was using the typical perestroika phraseology of the time. But 
I want to point out that his key thesis was that the Bulgarian people 
had made their socialist choice once and forever. If you remember, 
Mr. Gorbachev was talking the same way. 
AM: Yes, reform for Gorbachev was a matter of reform within the 
general framework of the existing political order. 
GB: Yes, within the framework of the totalitarian rule. And, well, 
there was another group within the Party and it was formed around 
Mr. Andrey Lukanov, who was then the leading reformer within the 
ranks of the Socialist Party [BSP], This faction was united around 
the idea that the transition should go further than the totalitarian 
system—it should be about creating a new system. We were dis­
cussing the theme for the change of the political system; . . . well, 
you know, there was considerable discussion within the Party. It 
entailed the kind of regime we would have here in Bulgaria. I re­
member very well the aspirations of Mr. Lilov, who was elected as 
the new chairman of the Party after the BCP's Thirty-eighth Con­
gress in January 1990. He was a reform-minded leader, but he was 
not going to stray too far away . . . from the status quo. I remember 
we discussed with him the topic of what is the main characteristic 
of the political regime here in Bulgaria; that is, whether it was au­
thoritarian or totalitarian. And his thesis was that it was administra­
tive . . . there is a Russian word for this view—I think Gavriil Popov 
used this term. He was the first to use the term several years ago— 
that in Bulgaria we should have an administrative-command sys­
tem, a kind of authoritarian rule and not a totalitarian one. 
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Well, it was an important discussion, and at the first stage of the 
National Roundtable it was one of the points that the Socialist Party 
was fighting for. We would not accept the proposition that Bulgar­
ian socialism was equivalent to totalitarian rule, because such a rule 
is characteristic of repressive regimes. And, you know, I was using 
then another political category which seemed rather strange to most 
foreign observers. Well, I was using a term, it was well known, but 
it was not accepted within the leadership and especially by those 
foreigners not well informed on the subject. But I was trying to use 
the term autarchy as a totalitarian democracy. It seems strange at 
first 
AM: You mean a contradiction in terms . . . ? 
GB: Yes, because Mr. Zhivkov and the old regime were not isolated. 
They have had for a long period of years grassroots support within 
the society. Because Bulgaria was a very poor country—one of the 
poorest in Europe—and during his rule there was a trend toward 
modernization, especially economic modernization. And, well, 
there are some specifics here in Bulgaria about our own history. The 
regime was not as repressive as was the case for Poland, Czechoslo­
vakia, or Hungary. This is so because the Russians were considered 
. . . old friends of Bulgaria. The Russians liberated Bulgaria from 
the Turkish yoke and, especially you know, after the First World 
War there was a very deep crisis in Bulgaria . . . The ruling class just 
. . . prosto se sruti [just collapsed]. And you know, there was conflict 
within the left between the Communists and the Agrarians. After 
the killing of Stamboliiski in 1923 the strongest party on the left 
was the Communist Party, and on the right the strongest parties and 
movements were of a fascist kind. You know, Bulgarian society was 
very much divided for more than fifty or sixty years. After the catas­
trophes in the Balkan wars and the First World War we lost our 
sense of national unity. There is a very complex history of what hap­
pened later in Bulgaria. It is important to know that the Communist 
Party was not an invention of the Russians. You know what hap­
pened in Hungary: the Russians came and they created a Commu­
nist Party, which later took the power and so on. Well, it was not. . . 
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AM: An indigenous party . . . ? 
GB: Yes. The Social Democrats here were very weak because they 
fought against Stamboliiski in the coup d'etat, so they paid the 
price—there are very deep divisions in our history. And well, the 
socialist regime contributed to the well-being of the mass of the pop­
ulation. It was a totalitarian rule. But, well, in the everyday life you 
are not interested in freedom—you are looking for your work, for 
having a job, and for having something to eat and so on. You know, 
all those absolute values—they come later on. 
AM: Right. I understand you to mean that eating comes first and 
then comes liberty. 
GB: Yes . .  . 
AM: So, you say it was by consent—totalitarianism by consent? 
GB: Yes. For many years there was no official opposition. We did 
not have events here in Bulgaria like those in Germany or Poland 
during the 1960s; nothing occurred in Bulgaria like the events in 
Czechoslovakia during the 1970s, nor in our own days, events like 
those that transpired in Poland. Nothing happened here. . . . Mr. 
Zhivkov was at the highest place for many years. There was a group 
at the top, his circle of followers and very close friends for many 
years at the top; it was a kind of septuagenarism. They were not 
stepping down—they were staying. You know, there was opposition 
from within the Socialist Party. . .  . In the beginning there was con­
siderable discussion within the Party about the future of the country. 
And perhaps the key figure during this period was Mr. Lukanov 
. .  . he may have played the same role here in Bulgaria as Adolfo 
Suarez did in Spain. He is from an old family: his father, his grand­
father were active in politics. His grandfather was leader of the Party 
in the twenties—he was second in command of the Party here in 
the twenties.9 Well, Andrey Lukanov was the man who could make 
the social contract with the opposition coming from within the 
Party. He was the same figure as Adolfo Suarez, who came from 
the ranks of the Phalanges and forged reform in Spain changing the 
political system. 
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AM: How long was this reform thinking going on in Bulgaria? Did 
this type of thinking take place long before November the tenth? 
GB: Yes of course. 
AM: I mean, would you say several years? That is, when did people 
start talking seriously about reform? Was it simply a matter of 
thinking and talking, but it was all very quiet until the events sur­
rounding the collapse of. . . ? 
GB: Perestroika was the big catalyst for the events . .  . of devel­
oping opposition. . . . 
AM: Okay. And you are suggesting that perestroika seemed to free 
people to start talking openly about reform. Is that what happened? 
GB: Yes . . . there was great interest in the events in Russia. And 
people went to the post offices wanting subscriptions to Ogoniok 
[the largest circulating Russian weekly magazine] and all the Rus­
sian papers. In fact, because of the great demand it became very 
difficult to obtain these publications. 
Well, Mr. Zhivkov was trying to maneuver amidst all the talk 
about reform. He made expressions in support of the concept of 
change, but it was just talk and nothing happened. And people 
knew that he was just talking. His expression was a very famous 
one: that we should keep quiet, that we should just lay down while 
the storm is raging and later we will see what will happen, in the 
wake of the storm. That is, we will react after the storm passes . . . 
to lay low. 
Andrey Lukanov was unmistakably a principal actor in the reform 
movement within the Bulgarian Communist Party. He served as a 
member of the Politburo and was responsible for the economic reforms 
under Zhivkov from 1984 to November 10, 1989. He helped to orga­
nize the coup that toppled Todor Zhivkov. He later became the first 
prime minister under the new July 1991 Constitution. Lukanov sought 
a peaceful transition based on the premise that change was necessary. 
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In an interview with me that took place in a lounge of the Parliament 
building Lukanov phrased the problem in historic terms:10 
The idea we had from the very beginning was to move the . .  . notion 
of peaceful transition into the center of the political debate, being 
aware not only of the dangers of the transition as such, but the 
additional dangers, that have been rooted in the Bulgarian civil war, 
as I call it—in the fact that the Left and the Right sectors, the Bul­
garian leftist and rightist sectors of the Bulgarian society, have been 
in conditions of a civil war, hot and cold—for seventy years, starting 
from the end of the First World War and the well-known September 
1923 uprising against the coup d'etat, carried out in June 1923. 
Since then, vendetta was—I would say—the principle of Bulgar­
ian politics. One side persecutes the other, oppressing it in different 
forms, starting with very violent forms—killings, summary execu­
tions, and both the Left and the Right are responsible for these acts 
. . . these persecutions severely limit one's opportunities and civil 
rights because of belonging to the losing side at a given period of time. 
So, this was a fact of life we were very clearly aware of, because, 
many of us, especially Mladenov and myself, had been on that side. 
His father has been killed; my grandfather has been killed. 
So, although I happened to spend a great part of my life as a 
representative of the winning side, I was deeply aware of the injus­
tice, dangers, and constant confrontations.11 And some of the other 
active participants in the reform process at the beginning were them­
selves participants in this civil war—the armed struggle during the 
resistance. Mr. Djourov, the minister of defense; the minister of the 
interior, who was previously chief of staff [of the Bulgarian Army], 
Mr. Semerjiev, were themselves guerrillas. 
I am trying to emphasize the idea that the reformers within the 
Bulgarian Communist Party were not only politically and intellectu­
ally but also morally committed to stop the civil war: to avoid the 
dangers of physical confrontation inherent both in Bulgaria's his­
tory and in the difficulties inherent in the process of transition. 
AM: You said something that is especially interesting to me. You 
speak of vendetta. This vendetta is deeply ingrained in Bulgarian 
life, isn't it? It penetrates beyond politics . . . ? 
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AL: To some extent it is in the national character. Which is the 
nasty side of our altogether interesting national character. 
So this was one of the sides. On the other side at that time the 
leading positions in the opposition itself were taken by dissidents, 
who were fighting the totalitarian society. Of course, dissidence in 
Bulgaria was much weaker than in other ex-socialist countries, but 
still they were fighting totalitarianism under the slogans of civil soci­
ety, democratic rights, and other personal rights. 
And we were altogether sincere believers in democracy. The right-
wing part of the UDF at that time was not known; it was present, 
but it was playing third- and fourth-rate roles behind the scene. . . . 
Many of the frontline dissidents and creators of the new opposition 
in Bulgaria were themselves ex-Communists. Some of them were 
Communists even at the time they were forming the opposition 
against us. They left the Party two or three months after the tenth 
of November. So, in a way they also understood—because of their 
background—that democracy could not be achieved through repe­
tition of vendetta, through revenge in the form of repression against 
the other side . . . 
AM: But as the leader of the reform movement you certainly en­
countered opposition from within your Party? How did you deal 
with that opposition? 
AL: Yes. To some extent, but at the time it was not too difficult to 
overcome it, because, first of all, there was a general recognition in 
the society that totalitarian socialism has failed. So, at that time 
people who liked to defend it uncritically were rather subdued; they 
felt that it was not the right kind of statement to make. And our 
authority was unchallenged absolutely. The five of us [the Politburo 
members who rebelled against the Zhivkov regime] were enjoying 
high opinion rankings from . .  . all sectors of the society—even 
those who hate me today gave me . . . 
AM: Excuse me, are you referring to public opinion polls? 
AL: Yes, they gave, for example, Mladenov 80 percent confidence 
rating, which was . . . 
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AM: Fantastic, yes. 
AL: So, both within the Party and the general public our support 
was so great that we could impose our own way of thinking . . . 
without using any other means than conviction and our own . .  . I 
should say . . . our own statement as to how things should be done 
if we want to achieve democracy. 
So, from that point of view we had such strong support—public 
support and internal support within the Party—that it was not a 
problem. Really! Opposition and discussion came later, when things 
started to normalize, and after we insisted on transforming the 
Party itself into a democratic institution, doing away with demo­
cratic centralism and Marxist-Leninist dogma. Three or four 
months later we faced opposition from conservatives within the 
Party. But at the beginning there was no resistance to change— 
everybody understood that change was inevitable. 
AM: But nonetheless you needed an opposition not within the 
Party, but outside the Party in order to use it against potential oppo­
nents from within the Party. You know, I am surmising this. 
AL: Not from that point of view. Actually we . .  . argued rather 
schematically, starting from the principle that a democratic society 
should be based on pluralism. 
AM: Yes. 
AL: And that is why I think everybody recognized that we were 
very constructive in helping the opposition to establish itself. That 
is to say, dissidence was very weak in Bulgaria—there was no oppo­
sition force at the moment of the great change. 
AM: But from time to time you did challenge the legitimacy of the 
opposition . . . ? 
AL: No. In formal terms—never. We challenged them sometimes 
on . .  . their line of confrontation. Because the way the Bulgarian 
opposition was formed they were opposing everything. This is one 
of the ways to set up an opposition. But to establish themselves they 
had to divide the nation; they had to say that others are bad and we 
are good. They drew the dividing line in a way that made Bulgarian 
political life more confrontational than is healthy for such a period. 
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AM: I have noticed in a number of press reports from those days 
that you talked about avoiding witch-hunts against—you used the 
words—honest Communists. 
AL: Not only that. We invited the opposition to form a coalition 
government as early as December 1989. Before the Roundtable! 
AM: Oh, I did not know that. 
AL: Two or three weeks before the Roundtable we said that we are 
ready to share power, not because we have similar views but because 
we think the nation is facing a very difficult transition period with 
many crises to come. And in these conditions we should try to con­
centrate on finding a national consensus on basic, fundamental 
issues. That is why . .  . I was insisting all along that we form a 
coalition government and that we should keep places in the govern­
ment for the opposition. 
* * 
Bulgarian leaders had long imitated the Soviet Union. With the an­
nouncement of new directions and programs of each successive Soviet 
leader, beginning with Stalin, Bulgaria's leaders had sought to please 
their patrons. At one time, following the Soviet lead, Bulgaria em­
barked upon a program of massive industrialization at the expense of 
agriculture. At one point, Bulgaria had a foreign policy hostile toward 
China and the West. Devotion to the Soviet Union was so complete 
that Todor Zhivkov had offered to Khrushchev and Brezhnev that Bul­
garia become the Soviet Union's sixteenth republic!12 It is ironic that 
this habit of ideological subservience might in the end encourage the 
development of democracy in Bulgaria. The Soviet ideas of glasnost 
and perestroika were quickly adopted by Bulgarians in part because 
they had always followed the latest fashions in Soviet doctrine. Todor 
Zhivkov could hardly renounce the new doctrines since he had in the 
past so devoutly followed the Soviet line. This provided the opportu­
nity for the younger generation of Party officials and leaders to ask 
questions and to propose changes. As Lukanov said, everyone knew 
"totalitarian socialism has failed." Thus, what remained of the Lenin-
ist/Stalinist opposition within the Party was easily circumvented, and 
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the instinct for survival took hold for those who had nowhere else to 
go in what surely had become a world dominated by capitalism and 
democratic ideas. 
Not only the political logic inherent in the situation but also the 
history of Bulgaria served to motivate thoughtful people to consider 
seriously a peaceful transition rather than the alternative. The history 
of violence, lost wars, and the practice of vendetta in Bulgarian life 
reminded all of the principal actors that there ought to be a better 
way to achieve change. And indeed, they did find a way. However, the 
path was encumbered with distrust, misunderstanding, and fear. 
Agreements at the National Roundtable Talks would need careful 
crafting. 
Start of the Roundtable: Initial 
Posturing, Gamesmanship, 
and the Secret Police 
O  N DECEMBER 27, 1989, a spokesperson for the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party announced that it had agreed with the UDF 
to hold Roundtable consultations.1 The first meeting between represen­
tatives of the government and the UDF was held on January 3 and 4 
at the National Assembly building in Sofia, the nation's capital. Before 
the meeting between the two sides, there was consultation among rep­
resentatives of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Bulgarian Na­
tional Agrarian Union (BZNS), public organizations, and the creative 
workers' unions.2 Some groups, including trade unions and communist 
youth organizations, insisted upon representation at the talks. How­
ever, the UDF refused to sit at the Roundtable with the Fatherland 
Front, Bulgarian trade unions, the youth association, and other "for­
mal" organizations, claiming these organizations were linked to the 
Communist Party. The UDF characterized them as a "third wheel on 
a two-wheel carriage," with the UDF on one side and the BCP, the 
National Agrarian Union, and the government on the other.3 The ma­
jor players negotiated an agreement to provide forty-three participants 
for each side. The UDF and the BCP could choose representatives of 
any organization to be part of their delegations.4 
Though the opposition made assumptions about widespread popu­
lar support, the BCP nonetheless had the greatest single membership 
in Bulgarian society: BCP members made up one-eighth of the popula­
tion and were in one-fourth of all Bulgarian households. Consequently, 
individual opposition organizations could not command widespread 
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loyalty, which left leaders of those organizations without a firm foun­
dation of citizen support. It made political sense to combine individual 
protest groups under the loosely knit alliance called the Union of Dem­
ocratic Forces. 
The apparent fragility of the opposition prompted the BCP to chal­
lenge its legitimacy, so the UDF demonstrated its authenticity by or­
ganizing mass protest rallies. It did so after leaving the Roundtable 
Talks because government forces seemed to be dragging their feet, and 
negotiations stalled. Also adding to the UDF's legitimacy was the 
apparent preference for it by Western observers and diplomats. With 
other Eastern European countries undergoing radical change, addi­
tional legitimacy was bestowed upon opposition forces.5 
To Include the Turkish Ethnic Minority? 
On several occasions participants raised the matter of Turkish ethnic 
minority representation at the Roundtable Talks, but they did not dis­
cuss it publicly. Although repi'esentatives of the Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms (MRF) were invited to attend, this Turkish minority 
group never became part of either the UDF or BCP delegations. Both 
sides feared reprisals from anti-Turkish nationalist forces within Bul­
garian society In fact, the Turkish question was never given a full 
public airing. However, it was the subject of private discussions in 
the closed contact groups established by the two sides to prepare the 
agenda and work out the details for agreements at the plenary meet-
ings.6 Stefan Gaitanjiev is an academic sociologist with the Institute 
for State and Law, and in October 1993 he was the secretary of the 
Bulgarian Democratic Center Party. In 1990 he was an active partici­
pant in the National Roundtable Talks. His interpretation of why the 
MRF was not seated at the Roundtable is substantiated by others I 
have spoken with about this matter. Gaitanjiev said:7 
most of the participants were in favor of the idea that the UDF 
should represent the interests of the national minorities, . .  . to take 
the role of their only defender and to rightfully count on their votes 
in future elections. But the Movement for Rights and Freedoms of 
Ahmed Dogan declared that it did not want to enter the UDF; in­
stead, it wanted a share of the UDF quota at the Roundtable. This 
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[MRF] proposal was most strongly rejected by Rumen Vodeni­
charov from the Independent Society for the Defense of Human 
Rights, who at that time had the support of most Bulgarian Mos­
lems. And I think this reflected to a great extent a struggle for influ­
ence over those people. Nationalistic convictions were at the time 
more pronounced in people like Petko Simeonov and Zhelyu Zhelev. 
Another conflict was . . . 
AM: Before you discuss other conflicts please finish discussing the 
conflict concerning the representatives of the Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms at the Roundtable. Press reports indicate that the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms was invited to participate, but 
ultimately it did not. If I understand your response, they did not 
participate because within the UDF there were elements that did 
not agree to give them standing within the UDF quota. Is that 
correct? 
SG: The basic principle of the Roundtable was that there were two 
sides only. On the one side stood the UDF—and on the other the 
BCP. From its initial quota of thirty-seven representatives, the BCP 
agreed to give spots to the Agrarian Union, the Fatherland Front, 
and some other organizations. On the UDF side, apart from the 
member organizations, the only additional quota allocated was for 
the Committee for National Reconciliation. Mihail Ivanov was one 
of its representatives. . . . Other representatives of that organization 
included Ibrahim Tatarla, who currently is in the Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms, and Manush Romanov—the present leader 
of the [Gypsy] Democratic Union, Roma. 
AM: So, this was one source of conflict within the UDF at the 
Roundtable? 
SG: Yes. . . . The problem, I repeat, is this: the Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms requested participation from the UDF quota. 
They were not invited. And the bulk of the members of the [UDF] 
Coordinating Committee as well the participants in the Roundtable 
Talks were not sure that the MRF would stick to the goals of the 
UDF. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms was not considered 
a big organization—at the time it was a newly created organization. 
The disagreement was over a matter of principle . . . never mind that 
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at the time I supported as a matter of principle the inclusion of the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms. In retrospect, it was a correct 
decision not to seat the Movement. As it has turned out, the fact 
that they were not seated has not been an obstacle for the peaceful 
transition. The reason for this conclusion is that a fundamental 
problem for Bulgaria is to avoid ethnic conflicts. 
Stefan Gaitanjiev's justification for not including the RFM may seem 
at first disingenuous. After all, if representatives of significant popula­
tions are not included in decisions about the future of the country in 
which they reside why should these minorities obey? Surely, one might 
conclude, the decision not to include the RFM is a problem of legiti­
macy. Yet, there is another important aspect of this issue. Given the 
history of ethnic unrest in the entire Balkan region it may be wise to 
treat ethnic and religious differences as outside the bounds of accept­
able political discourse. Indeed, playing the so-called "nationalistic 
card" is a charge that the various factions within Bulgaria's political 
community level at each other from time to time. This issue does not 
go away, as subsequent events attest. The Constitution adopted in July 
1991 treats ethnic and religious minorities in a special way, thereby 
creating serious constitutional issues; and beginning with the June 
1990 elections, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms has played an 
important role in parliamentary politics. 
Initial Roundtable Meetings 
The initial January 3, 1990, meeting between the two sides of the 
Roundtable lasted for three hours. A major discussion item was the 
creation of contact groups to make reform proposals. The UDF 
wanted to concentrate on reforming the political system. It sought 
elimination of the Communist Party's monopoly with a call for a multi­
party system, disbandment of Party organizations in the workplace, 
and depoliticization of the army, the militia, the courts, and the procu-
racy.8 The Bulgarian Communist Party sought to discuss reform of the 
economy, ecology, the legal system, and politics.9 Collectively, Round­
table participants decided to focus on national agreement and recon­
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ciliation, the political system, the legal system, drafting a new election 
law, and socioeconomic problems.10 The UDF also placed on the 
agenda questions relating to their ability to communicate views to the 
general public. They asked for an adequate building to house their 
operations and also sought unrestricted media access, first by re­
questing the right to publish their own daily newspaper and then by 
demanding access to radio and television. Government representatives 
agreed to put this matter to the appropriate officials for resolution be­
fore the first formal Roundtable meeting. The UDF clearly sought to 
place the BCP in the glare of the public spotlight. In this way, the UDF 
might garner public concessions for the immediate task at hand and 
make UDF leaders familiar household names. This tactic might also 
enhance their ability to win general elections later. 
The major resolution of the January 4 meeting was an expression of 
support for the joint resolution of the State Council and the Council 
of Ministers of Bulgaria adopted on December 29, 1989. This measure 
repudiated the actions of the former Zhivkov regime in repressing the 
Turkish ethnic minority. The statement of the UDF, the BCP, and 
twenty-three political and public organizations called for national rec­
onciliation, denounced the old regime's program to change Moslem 
names, and upheld people's right to use other languages besides Bul­
garian in informal communication and to observe traditional customs. 
The declaration appealed to universal principles of human rights and 
respect for law with equal protection for all groups in society.11 
The Roundtable resumed deliberations on January 16, 1990. How­
ever, a January 14, 1990, mass rally, estimated at 150,000 persons, was 
organized by the UDF to keep political pressure on the government. 
UDF representatives reiterated their demands for political reform, 
which included, among other things, that elections be held later rather 
than earlier (November 1990 was suggested), a government building 
to house the UDF, and access to the press.12 A few days later, a UDF 
spokesperson said that an agreement had been achieved in principle 
with government forces led by the BCP. This agreement provided that 
Roundtable proceedings would be broadcast live on Bulgarian radio 
and that Bulgarian television would air substantial parts of them.13 
Still, UDF forces threatened to walk out of the Roundtable Talks 
immediately after the first session. They reiterated demands for the 
publication of a UDF newspaper, a building to house its activities, and 
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access to radio and television. The government stated that the issue of 
the building had been resolved in principle. The Sofia City People's 
Council was to provide the premises by the end of the week, and the 
authorities were to resolve the matter of opposition access to radio 
and television.14 In the end, UDF officials agreed to compromise and 
go on with the talks; "for yet another time we will show good will 
despite the foot dragging on the decision."15 The next day, however, the 
UDF demanded postponement of Roundtable deliberations until its 
demands were met. Furthermore, it objected to the editing procedures 
for television reports, which were contrary to the original agreement. 
The UDF thought it unfair for proceedings to be edited without the 
presence of representatives of the two sides. Both sides reached a com­
promise on January 22, 1990, agreeing not to participate in the selec­
tion of television material in exchange for the promise that the 
television crew would work closely with members of each delegation 
in preparing broadcasts.16 Radio broadcasts were aired live during 
the day, and edited versions of the proceedings were televised in the 
evening. 
Meanwhile, Zhelyu Zhelev, leader of the UDF delegation, kept pres­
sure on the BCR He charged that the Party leadership was afraid to 
undertake serious negotiations with the opposition before the BCP Ex­
traordinary Congress at the end of January. According to Zhelev, BCP 
leaders feared internal attacks by Stalinists and Zhivkovists.17 He ap­
parently understood, as the BCP leadership had earlier, that the expo­
sure and exploitation of group disunity were old and useful tactics to 
reduce an opponent's legitimacy. 
For its part, the Bulgarian Communist Party leadership attempted 
to portray itself as a force for reason and democracy. It publicly ob­
jected to the rally organized by the UDF in Sofia on January 14, 1990. 
Anti-Communism and new forms of totalitarian thought threatened 
the transition to democracy and a law-governed state, so went the re­
frain. Andrey Lukanov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the 
Central Committee of the BCP, said that the Party fully assumed re­
sponsibility for the damage inflicted by the totalitarian system and for 
the crisis facing the country. However, Lukanov emphasized that "we 
categorically protest against the attempts to identify the totalitarian 
system with the entire Party and its 984,000 members."18 This state­
ment emphasizing reconciliation pleaded that opponents should not 
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The National Roundtable Sessions, the site of long and substantive debates 
between opposing forces 
blame the entire membership for the transgressions of a few. The Party, 
it suggested, is responsible for making the transition from totalitarian­
ism to democracy possible. Permit it to remain a viable force in society 
and it will accede to the reasonable demands of the opposition forces. 
Substantive Posturing and Gamesmanship 
On January 23, 1990, Roundtable participants got down to substantive 
discussions. Zhelyu Zhelev, the philosophy professor turned UDF 
leader and later president of the Republic, argued that the transition 
should be rapid and modeled on what had happened in the German 
Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia as well as in Poland and 
Hungary. He pointed to the dangers of civil war and military dictator­
ship, dangers the Soviet Union also faced, if Bulgaria should move 
slowly toward democracy. Zhelev argued that if Bulgaria moved fast it 
would help the Soviet Union make reform there irreversible, which 
would result in the complete collapse of the center of European 
totalitarianism.19 
The BCP leader agreed with Zhelev. Andrey Lukanov said that he 
too sought quick revolutionary changes in the Eastern European coun­
tries and that he understood the linkage between the future of the 
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The National Roundtable. The Communists and their allies display 
confidence and flexibility. Andrey Lukanov is seated third from right. 
The opposition side at the National Roundtable. The three persons seated in 
the center are Zhelyu Zhelev (hand on mouth), to his left Petar Beron and 
Petko Simeonov. 
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Soviet Union and that of Bulgaria. Lukanov's main point, however, 
was that socialism should not be regarded as dead. Rather, Bulgaria 
should renounce the Stalinist model of socialism. The BCP declared 
its support for a democratic and humane form of socialism as the only 
way to guarantee social justice, economic progress, and spiritual devel­
opment. Professing the Party's willingness to enter discussions with all 
forces seeking change, the leader of the BCP delegation stressed that 
the Party had a program for democratization and de-Stalinization. The 
first step in the process was to repeal paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1 
of the existing Constitution. This provision proclaims that Bulgaria is 
a socialist state headed by the working class. Repealing this constitu­
tional provision would effectively end the BCP monopoly of political 
power. Lukanov also urged Parliament to enact laws immediately that 
would make it possible for free elections to take place. The Party 
agreed that the state and economy should be dissociated from political 
parties. Further, the power of political parties was to be limited in the 
exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial authority. Lukanov went 
on public record to support the establishment of a constitutional court 
as a guarantee against a return to monopoly power. He also endorsed 
depoliticization of the law courts, the chief prosecutor's office, and the 
office of minister of the interior. However, given its special place in 
national security, he urged a go-slow approach to depoliticization of 
the armed forces. Finally, he denounced, as he had done earlier, "the 
nationwide witch-hunt" against "honest Communists."20 
Various other participants spoke of the importance of restoring reli­
gious freedoms; effecting meaningful emancipation of women; and 
shifting emphasis from heavy industry to agriculture, light industry, 
and tourism.21 Svetla Daskalova, minister of justice and secretary of 
the Standing Committee of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party (BZNS), the 
nation's other ruling party, called for early elections because postpone­
ment would "destabilize the situation in the country."22 She agreed with 
most of what BCP representative Lukanov said. But placing distance 
between the BZNS and the BCP, and thereby enhancing the legitimacy 
of her own organization, she disagreed that the Constitution should 
proclaim Bulgaria a socialist state. She said this would taint the legal 
status of non-Marxist parties and handicap development of a multi­
party system. She also expressed the view that the future president 
should have limited political functions and stated her preference for 
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this person being elected by the National Assembly for a five-year term 
only. Daskalova also argued for the election of members of Parliament 
by a system of proportional representation as opposed to the then cur­
rent winner-take-all majority election system. She agreed with other 
speakers that in the future there should be a ban on political parties 
in the workplace.23 
Milan Drenchev, leader of the opposition Nikola Petkov Bulgarian 
Agrarian Party, spoke about Bulgaria's unpreparedness for a multi­
party system and argued therefore that parliamentary elections should 
take place in the autumn—meaning better later than earlier. As Zhivko 
Zhivkov, chairman of the National Council of the Fatherland Front, 
aptly pointed out, this is the one major issue that divided representa­
tives of the official government and the opposition. "On about four-
fifths of the problems under discussion, however, it is possible to reach 
a consensus."24 Although this statement oversimplifies what finally 
happened, there is no doubt that jockeying for political advantage in 
the forthcoming elections was on the minds of everyone. In power for 
more than forty years, the Communists had the political apparatus in 
place to wage election battles successfully. While confident that their 
message would ultimately carry the nation, the opposition forces 
needed time to organize for victory at the polls. 
The BCP strategy for early elections proved to be the winning one. 
Parliamentary elections were held June 10-17, 1990. They combined 
proportional representation with a majority system, and the former 
Communist Party, by then renamed the Bulgarian Socialist Party, won 
a majority (211) of the 400 seats with 47.15 percent of all votes. The 
Union of Democratic Forces won 144 seats with 36.2 percent of the 
votes, the Bulgarian Agrarian Union won 8.03 percent of the votes and 
16 seats, and the Rights and Freedoms Movement, the Turkish ethnic 
minority party, won 23 seats and 6.03 percent of the vote. Assorted 
other parties won 2.59 percent of the total votes and 6 seats.25 The 
voter turnout was 91 percent of the eligible citizens.26 Thus, the origi­
nal BCP strategy prevailed, at least in the short term. The UDF went 
along with early elections, professing that the people sought rapid reso­
lution of the national problems.27 But by so doing, the Reds, as the 
forces of the former BCP were called (the UDF forces were called 
Blues), could capitalize on their considerable organizational ability to 
deliver the vote. They not only guaranteed their place in a new Bulgar­
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ian political system but also were able to maintain Communist Party 
dominance, however fragile or uncertain it may have been,28 
The successful gamesmanship entailed in garantismo requires con­
siderable attention to detail and delicate negotiation. The willingness 
of the Communist Party to end its formal dominance in the gov­
ernment, army, and workplace made credible the Party's claim that it 
too sought basic reform of the political system. What made its claim 
particularly convincing was that, through its control of the existing 
government, it instituted fundamental changes. However, when it orga­
nized professional party clubs as a substitute for the Communist Party 
in the workplace, Party leaders made it plain through their actions that 
they did not intend to give up their influence altogether.29 
A particularly useful negotiating tool was the early creation of small 
contact groups that kept talking when the two sides were publicly at 
an impasse. When negotiations first started in January 1990, the 
Roundtable leadership created six of these groups dealing with sepa­
rate issues: legislation, national security, economic changes, religious 
freedoms, mass media, and Communist Party property. Therefore, it 
was possible to avoid public discussion on issues that both sides pre­
ferred to skirt. The contact groups also saved time by identifying mat­
ters where there were no significant disagreements.30 
Party Monopoly Ends 
Did BCP officials consciously invent specific proposals for ending the 
Party monopoly, or did they respond to suggestions from other quar­
ters? Although there is good reason to believe that reform leaders of 
the Communist Party anticipated needed changes, there is evidence 
that the BCP also responded to events. Less than a month after the 
November 10, 1989, coup d'etat, lawyers working in Sofia's legal offices 
took part in a December 4, 1989, mass meeting. Decrying the weak­
ness of legislative and judicial institutions, they shouted democratic 
slogans such as "Enough legal nihilism!" The lawyers fashioned a reso­
lution calling for the repeal of Article 1 (referring to the Party's leading 
role in society); the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial 
power; the establishment of a constitutional court to protect human 
rights; and other measures that eventually became part of the Consti­
tution adopted in July 1991.31 
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One week after the lawyers' rally, the BCP Central Committee at 
its December 11-13 plenum agreed to repeal paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
Article 1. It instructed its parliamentary members to introduce the ap­
propriate proposal at the National Assembly.32 Parliamentarians sub­
mitted a draft law on December 14. After the obligatory one-month 
waiting period, the National Assembly took up the proposal on Janu­
ary 15, 1990. It amended paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1 by eliminating 
any constitutional reference to the Party playing a leadership role in 
the affairs of state. However, some members of the National Assembly 
objected to retaining paragraph 1 of Article 1, which proclaimed Bul­
garia a socialist state,33 and referred the matter to an Assembly com­
mission. After debate among commission members, they eliminated 
from Article 1 any reference to the word socialism and approved the 
simple statement that "The People's Republic of Bulgaria is a demo­
cratic and law-governed state."34 The Constitution as finally adopted 
in July 1991 does not contain "the People's" reference, a code term for 
socialist government. Article 1(1) reads: "Bulgaria shall be a republic 
with a parliamentary form of government." 
By seizing the moment, the BCP leadership could argue that they 
were solidly behind the movement for eliminating the Party's political 
monopoly. In a speech delivered to the National Assembly, Andrey 
Lukanov made a point he was to later emphasize at the Roundtable 
Talks: 
This plenum decision and the consequent actions of the parliamen­
tary group are a clear confirmation of the BCP willingness to be a 
factor in the real democratization of the Bulgarian society and in the 
renewal of socialism in our motherland, to relinquish its monopoly 
over political power that has been established by the law, view politi­
cal pluralism as the natural environment of its political activity, and 
conduct an honest and open dialogue without privileges and dis­
crimination with all sociopolitical forces in our country.35 
The Politburo of the Central Committee and the State Council by 
a decree dated January 24, 1990, disbanded the Party's propaganda 
agency within the armed forces. By doing so, it demonstrated that the 
BCP could be trusted to carry out political reform, control the military, 
and deflate anxieties about a military coup. For forty years the army 
had imposed political education upon its personnel as a way to insure 
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Party discipline and control. This action was cited as further proof of 
the Party's commitment to end its monopoly, consistent with the repeal 
of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1 of the Constitution. Lieutenant 
General Radnyu Minchev, spokesperson of the Ministry of National 
Defense, said: "With the multiparty system already being created in 
the country, it is impermissible for any party to build its own organiza­
tions and conduct political propaganda in the Army. This would nega­
tively impact the troops' combat readiness and discipline. . . . The BPA 
[Bulgarian People's Army] will continue in the future to be governed 
solely by the Constitution of the country, the orders of the supreme 
state and military leadership, and the national military doctrine."36 
Opposition forces led by Zhelyu Zhelev, chairman of the Union of 
Democratic Forces, well understood the motives of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party. If there was to be a coalition government that would 
legitimize the Communists having an ongoing role in the nation's polit­
ical life, then the BCP must be prepared to yield more of its power and 
information about its internal operations. If this weakened its voter 
appeal, so be it, and so much the better. Probably responding to wide­
spread rumors that BCP leaders were using the organization's financial 
resources for their personal benefit, Zhelev asked the BCP to provide 
the Roundtable with information related to its structures, financial and 
property situation, and income sources. UDF participation in a coali­
tion government and its possible refusal to take part in general elec­
tions, projected at the time to be held in May 1990, turned on the 
BCP's willingness to accede to these UDF demands.37 There is no evi­
dence, however, that Roundtable participants seriously discussed in 
public the matter of BCP property and income or subjected the matter 
to a negotiated settlement. 
Disbanding the State Security System 
Zhelev welcomed the changes that had been taking place, but he 
wanted more and insisted on discussing in greater detail the depolitici­
zation of not only the army but also the militia forces, the courts of 
justice, and the prosecution. He called for disbanding the State Secu­
rity Department and depoliticizing the Ministry of Internal Affairs.38 
This demand was answered in a speech by General Attanas Semerjiev, 
head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and later vice president of the 
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Republic. Semerjiev admitted to past transgressions of civil liberties, 
but he said that the traditional structures of the State Security Service 
had been disbanded. In its place, he mentioned the establishment of a 
National Intelligence Service and a Protection Service. Semerjiev 
promised that they would be law-abiding. He also pledged that those 
who had abused their power and broken the law in the past would have 
no role in the new regime. He assured Roundtable participants that 
they would not be subject to electronic surveillance, as some had al­
leged, and stated categorically that he would not release the names of 
informers in the previous regime. To do so, he said, would be a viola­
tion of law.39 
By all accounts, General Semerjiev exhibited extraordinary leader­
ship. He assured Roundtable participants of his good intentions, and 
he substantially transformed the Interior Ministry from a heretofore 
fearsome secret police agency into an intelligence operation that exer­
cises greater respect for civil liberties. At least temporarily, Semerjiev 
was able to silence opposition leaders with evidence that the bad old 
days of police state abuses were over. Additionally, when dealing with 
public protests, Semerjiev exhibited restraint. His personal commit­
ment to a peaceful transition to democracy and the organizational 
acumen he exhibited may have been key factors in breaking the cycle 
of political violence so prevalent in Bulgaria's history. 
I interviewed Semerjiev at his tastefully decorated Sofia apart-
ment.40 Our meeting took place several years after his retirement. At 
the time, he was working on a memoir, and I found this urbane man 
in a reflective mood. I first asked him: "How is it that you got involved 
in the Roundtable deliberations?" 
AS: My participation at the Roundtable was mainly due to the fact 
that I was the minister of the interior. In the first place, it was quite 
natural that the security and public order forces were greatly scruti­
nized by the society and the then existing opposition. One of their 
main tasks was the disbandment of these structures. Because of the 
role the security and public order structures had played in the society 
and because of their past repressive functions, they were considered 
as one of the pillars of the totalitarian regime. Naturally their restruc­
turing, their democratic transformation, was one of the key factors 
in the transition towards democracy, a market economy, and a civil 
society. The Roundtable could not avoid tackling these problems. 
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General Attanas Semerjiev, interior 
minister and first vice president of the 
Republic 
I have to say that the former Communist Party leadership totally 
realized the legitimacy of the interest and the insistence of the new­
born opposition in knowing what was going on in the security ser­
vices. And it responded to this request by agreeing that the interior 
minister ought to take part in the work of the Roundtable, that its 
representative should make a thorough statement at the Roundtable 
and participate in a wide-ranging discussion. So it happened. 
AM: Pardon me. Did you participate at the request of the opposi­
tion forces? 
AS: This happened . .  . by mutual consent. In the course of the pre­
liminary talks between the ruling party . . . and the just created co­
ordinating structures of the opposition. 
Yet I will speak parenthetically and inform you, dear Professor 
Melone, that preceding the Roundtable Talks there was a dialogue 
between the leadership of the Interior Ministry, the leaders of the 
newly created UDF, and critical elements of Bulgaria's intelligent­
sia. This dialogue started on my initiative. I was appointed minister 
of the interior the night before the twenty-eighth of December. On 
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the twenty-ninth of December, the State Council, the government, 
and the Plenum of the Central Committee of the ruling Communist 
Party made a decision to abolish the discriminatory acts aimed at 
the population with a Turkish ethnic identity and the Bulgarian 
Moslems [the so-called Pomacks]. The country was stormed by 
waves of public meetings, rallies, demonstrations, and strikes. 
To better understand the complexity of the situation just contem­
plate that in the Kirdjaly region [borders Turkey] and in many other 
places there were parallel public rallies going on: on one side there 
were ten to fifteen thousand people, and on the other side twelve 
to fifteen thousand massed in demonstrations and counterdemon­
strations; on one side people were expressing nationalistic, pro-
Bulgarian slogans: they sought to nullify the decision taken by the 
top state and party institutions, or at least to have a moratorium 
placed on it. On the other side, we had the Bulgarian Turks and 
Moslems. They supported the decision, but at the same time they 
were using some unrealistic, I dare say, provocative slogans aimed 
at the Bulgarian population. In general, this was the situation 
everywhere. . . . 
On the second of January, less than a week after we started the 
changes at the Interior Ministry, the Ministry leadership took the 
initiative. I want to stress this once more: we initiated the effort 
to meet with the most respected and most active members of the 
former dissident organizations and of the emerging opposition. We 
made great efforts to get in touch with them on the first and second 
of January—official holiday dates—to invite them to the Interior 
Ministry for talks. 
I will mention just some of the names because they speak about 
the level of representation at this meeting: Mr. Petar Beron; Mr. 
Stefan Prodev, who was among the most active and staunch dissi­
dents [currently he is editor-in-chief of the Socialist Party Duma 
newspaper]; the poet Marco Ganchev (maybe you had a chance to 
listen to his essays broadcasted on Radio Free Europe before the 
changes started on the tenth of November 1989); the writer Georgi 
Mishev; the academician Nikola Popov, the rector of the Sofia 
University; Mr. Hristo Ganev, cinematographer; and Mr. Anjel 
Vagenstein, the playwright and one of the most prominent film di­
rectors. Vagenstein is also well-known in the West: he was a very 
straightforward and principled dissident indeed. At this meeting, I 
Start of the Roundtable • 89 
announced our ideas about far-reaching reforms within the Interior 
Ministry. We aimed to transform the Ministry from a pillar of the 
totalitarian system into a modern institution, expressing the inter­
ests of the society as a whole and safeguarding the national interests: 
the interests of the citizens and the preservation of public order. 
I add to this description of events the acknowledgment that the 
idea for these reforms should not be considered General Semerjiev's 
personal credit. They were borne out of the course taken by the new 
leadership of the Party and the country—a course towards straight­
forward democratization of the national life, towards a market econ­
omy, towards the establishment and development of a pluralistic 
society and parliamentarianism, towards the creation of a law-
respecting state based upon the principles of parliamentarianism. . . . 
I have to state that despite the hangovers from the totalitarian 
past, the officers in the Ministry were ripe for these changes. The 
conceptualization of these reforms was a process that came to 
fruition and was effected inside the Ministry by the officers of that 
same Ministry. . . . We clearly understood that those institutions 
should be set totally free from the tutelage of the ruling party. By 
the way, the new party leadership also advocated the dissociation of 
the Party from the state. . . . 
This was one of the key points of the new policy. Adopting a 
course towards liberation of the structures of the security and public 
order from the patronage of the former Communist Party, we began 
the deideologization and depoliticization of these structures. I do 
not want to sound immodest. But I was one of the people who gen­
erated these initiatives, relying upon the support of the president, 
Mr. Petar Mladenov. . . . And if memory serves me correctly, on the 
seventh of January, only ten days after I took office, the State Coun­
cil issued a decree to disband the Party and the Komsomol commit­
tee structures. . .  . I will not conceal the fact that almost 90 to 95 
percent of the people in the security services were Party members. 
It was not easy for them to abandon the Party and the Komsomol, 
or, to be more precise, to quit these organizations. But their strong 
allegiance to the institution [the Interior Ministry] and the realiza­
tion of their duty as citizens prevailed. 
AM: This is a very interesting story because, as you know, it is typi­
cally very difficult to ask bureaucrats to change their perspective, to 
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change their point of view. It seems to me that you are describing a 
situation where these people were ready for this change. What was 
it about their experience or perhaps even their education that made 
them ready? 
AS: I will tell you. People who worked at the Interior Ministry and 
its branches were bright and well-educated. Long ago the cadres 
were of a far lower quality. But at the right moment a new genera­
tion of well-educated, experienced, self-motivated, and responsible 
people formed the staff of the security services. It was not difficult 
for them to come to terms with the new realities emerging in Bul­
garia and Europe; they were able to realize that the new situation 
requires a redefinition of Ministry functions. It was also understood 
that it was necessary to identify a new role for the security services. 
That is why they wanted the changes and helped to promote them. 
It is in this context that they not only accepted the changes as a fact 
of life but they also became supportive of depoliticization. A similar 
situation existed at the Ministry of Defense. 
I will take the liberty to quote for you some of the data from a 
sociological poll of the armed forces; it was conducted in April-May 
1990. The results show that approximately 80 percent of the officers 
of lower military ranks, up to the rank of captain, between 50 and 
60 percent of the senior officers, from major upward, and over 60 
percent of the sergeants and soldiers categorically supported the law 
for depoliticization of these structures. 
I will speak parenthetically and give you some more details, tak­
ing into consideration your scientific interests, because an academic 
study needs greater depth and preciseness. The State Council's de­
cree for the abolition of the structures of the former ruling Party 
and the Komsomol did not forbid the staff of the security service 
from being members of a political party. These structures [the Party 
and Komsomol cells at the workplace] were disbanded, and political 
parties were forbidden to promote any kind of political activity in 
the units of the Interior Ministry and the army. At the same time, 
however, there were no limitations whatsoever on the right of ser­
vicemen to be members of political parties outside the workplace. 
This is why it became necessary at a later stage to pass the law on 
depoliticization. It regulates such things not only in the armed 
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forces and in the security structures but also in the judiciary: 
namely, in courts, prosecution offices and also in the diplomatic ser­
vice. In other words, all of the so-called law-enforcing institutions 
have been depoliticized. The law makes it illegal for these civil ser­
vants to be political party members even outside their institutions. 
AM: Just a brief point of clarification. In many different spheres 
parties in the workplace were prohibited, but political clubs were 
created in their place. Did that happen in the Interior? 
AS: No, it did not happen—neither in the armed forces, nor in the 
Interior Ministry. . . . We strongly believed that depoliticization and 
deideologization were necessities, that it was necessary for these 
structures to stay neutral, to keep them away from any involvement 
in the emerging political confrontation. Otherwise, it could be 
suicidal for their own existence. By the way, I was among the 
most active figures who insisted and argued before parliamentary 
committees that it was necessary to enact as quickly as possible the 
law for depoliticization. In my capacity as vice president, I energeti­
cally argued for this position at the Parliament, at a special meet­
ing of all standing parliamentary committees. . . . Let me add that 
the bill that was passed by the Grand National Assembly was intro­
duced there by President Zhelev. I was a strong proponent of this 
law, but it was he who introduced it in the National Assembly. 
Let me go back and follow the logic of my narration. As I have 
already said, on the seventh of January [1990] a decree for dis­
bandment of the Party structures at the institutions in the defense 
and security sphere was published. 
AM: Was it published in the State Gazette! 
AS: Yes. That is an official document. On the fifteenth and six­
teenth of January I proclaimed a program for reforms in the security 
forces of the Interior Ministry. This program was duly discussed and 
approved. If I rightly remember, on the seventeenth of January, at 
the request of the writers-dissidents whom I had already met on the 
second of January, I went to a meeting with the Governing Council 
of the Bulgarian Writers Union. This was the most respected public 
organization of Bulgarian intellectuals. Over a hundred of the most 
active members of the union were in attendance at that meeting. I 
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informed them how the restructuring and the democratic reforms in 
the Interior Ministry were intended to go. I must say I was extremely 
pleased by their response. Tons of questions were asked, and we 
gave them straightforward and fair answers. And believe me, deep 
and far-going structural reforms took place virtually in a month's 
time after that meeting. 
AM: Within a month after this meeting? 
AS: Well, the changes took place almost in parallel with the above-
mentioned events. At the end of January and the beginning of Feb­
ruary the bureaucracy of the Ministry had already changed shape. 
Along with these structural changes our substantive activity also 
changed; namely, the functions of the security services. There were 
far-reaching and very radical. . . personnel changes. . . . Almost all 
the top people in the Ministry, with very few exceptions, were re­
leased from office and were replaced by professional people from 
the new generation. There were also significant reductions in staff 
numbers. 
AM: Well, I am a little confused. I thought you said earlier that 
there was an agreement within Interior about the necessity for these 
changes, but now you are saying that you found it necessary to fire 
or to release a number of officials. 
AS: Indeed, they wanted changes, but you understand that the new 
times, the new policy, the new concept for security quite naturally 
needed new people to implement them. 
AM: Despite the fact that the old people were ready for change 
themselves? 
AS: I am talking about changes at the top, for the top officials. 
AM: At the top—at the very top! Okay, I understand. So the sub­
structure of the bureaucracy was ready for change? 
AS: Well, see, I have to tell you that even the deputy ministers 
themselves and the directors of the national security services were 
ready for changes. . .  . So when on the third, fourth, or fifth day 
after I took office we decided to start the changes. But we had to 
face the fact that it would be difficult to accomplish. Because all 
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these changes strongly influenced the lives of many people. We had 
to sack them because of the overall restructuring in the organiza­
tion, and this was very painful. Then I consulted my colleagues from 
the Interior Ministry leadership and asked them: "Are we all ready 
to submit immediately our collective resignation and by this act to 
make others understand the necessity for change?" All the people I 
asked declared they were ready to do this. 
I want to make clear the extent to which things were well consid­
ered and the democratic nature of decision-making procedures. We 
convened about four thousand people gathered in four halls; these 
halls were connected with hi-fi speakers. The whole Ministry leader­
ship stood in front of six hundred people in the main hall to explain 
and debate the problems facing us. My opening words began 
with the following statement: "As the changes will be inevitably 
detrimental to employee and social status [for many people in the 
Ministry], we declare our intention to resign from office the day 
after the reform is implemented." 
AM: Did all of you write letters of resignation—all the top people? 
Or was it simply a declaration? 
AS: Most of my colleagues submitted immediately their formal let­
ters of resignation. Subsequently, however, some of them began 
to have second thoughts, but I reminded them of our "gentlemen's 
agreement," and they had to stand by their word. In one way or 
another the personnel changes were implemented. Additionally— 
as I have said already, but want to repeat again, because it is my 
impression that the fact has not received enough notice—the total 
number of Ministry personnel was cut. Some structures were to­
tally disbanded. 
AM: Did the budget remain the same or did it shrink? 
AS: The budget shrunk as well. I want to explain right away that 
the notorious Sixth Directorate, which was, from a legal point of 
view, a political police, was disbanded. Sorry, I have to correct my-
self—its [main] task was to scrutinize the so-called dissidents, but 
its functions also included the fight against terrorism and the preser­
vation of art treasures [from theft and so forth] . . . 
The former Directorate for Security and Protection—the 
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proverbial UBO [the corresponding Bulgarian initials of the direc­
torate] . . . was trimmed by 70 to 75 percent; it was reorganized into 
the National Protection Services. Yet, I am afraid that currently, 
under the conditions of democracy, this service is back again to its 
former being. 
AM: Oh, it is back to what it was doing formerly—secret KGB-
style activities? 
AS: No, this structure always had purely protective and auxiliary 
functions, serving the top leadership [of the state]. 
AM: Bodyguards? 
AS: Yes, bodyguards. Such services exist everywhere. In the United 
States it is a state within the state. But we had to cut its size, because 
formerly it performed functions not typical for organizations of this 
kind. It is not right for the Interior Ministry to be burdened with 
[household functions].41 However, we successfully reorganized and 
trimmed this service and then had it transferred to and placed under 
the auspice of the presidency. So, currently, it is under the 
presidency. 
The same thing happened to the famous First Main Directorate 
[PGU], this was the Bulgarian Intelligence Service. It was reorga­
nized into the National Intelligence Services [NRS], removed from 
the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry, and placed under the au­
thority of the presidency. It has kept this status to this day. Yet the 
issue of who shall supervise it has become a cause for political con­
flict during the last two years; it is mainly a dispute between the 
UDF and the president. 
In the second place, the military counterintelligence [VKR] was 
withdrawn from the state security system and from the Interior Min­
istry. It was placed under the command of the General Staff of the 
Army. It has retained this position ever since. 
AM: So, what is left to the Interior Ministry? 
AS: I will explain. There was a department within the Ministry that 
supervised prisons. On my own initiative it was transferred to the 
Ministry of Justice. I was deeply convinced that the supervision of 
the penal regime and its behavioral function, more specifically the 
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execution of a prisoner's sentence, should not be part of the Interior 
Ministry's prerogatives. That is properly a responsibility of the Min­
istry of Justice. Well, what then was left to the Interior Ministry? 
Those . . . structures assigned the responsibility for safeguarding 
public order, the police in particular, remained as part of the Interior 
Ministry. By "police" I mean the wide range of its functions, includ­
ing the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, trade with people, 
corruption, and so on. 
Another large concern left for the Interior Ministry is counter­
intelligence. In your country its functions are performed by the FBI. 
Indeed, I am not well aware of its exact functions, but it seems to 
me they are similar. I also need to mention the internal forces; these 
are the forces that guard the borders of the country. Another part 
of the organization concerns auxiliary services that provide logistic 
and technical support. 
In short, the organizational reforms and the democratic transfor­
mation within the Interior Ministry were in-depth operations. They 
were not mere changes in the facade. . . . This was not gimmickry. 
There was great disrespect for this institution, and just after the 
tenth of November [1989] the Interior Ministry was the focus of 
public criticism. It was subjected to a number of severe social and 
political actions. Yet after the reforms in March and April [1990] it 
began to quickly gain respectability. 
There was another factor that played an instrumental role in 
these changes. As minister of the interior I decided to avoid and 
abandon totally the use of force. This happened at a time when the 
streets and squares were full with tens of thousands of people. There 
were many meetings, marches, vigils, hunger strikes, occupation 
strikes. And as might be expected . . . there appeared all kinds of 
marginal people: degenerates, anarchists, recidivists, criminals. The 
forces of public order had to face many provocations. It was our 
duty to keep public order at huge mass rallies, where over two hun­
dred or three hundred thousand people gathered. All during this 
period the security forces did not harm a single citizen. 
AM: No incidents? 
AS: There were no incidents. We based our activity upon dialogue. 
In my capacity as minister of the interior, on just my second day in 
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office, I created a special department for liaison with the political 
forces and all other civil organizations. My cabinet office was turned 
into a meeting place, where every political leader, activist, or gov­
ernment functionary was most welcome any time of the day On my 
initiative we proclaimed the guiding principles in the activity of the 
Ministry; namely, the supremacy of the law and the Constitution, 
respect for all civil and democratic human rights, the nonuse of 
force including the ways and means for suppression, and the full 
openness and transparency of Ministry activities (of course, without 
penetrating some special spheres that required secrecy). All these 
measures played positive roles. And we showed great self-restraint. 
I believed—and my colleagues shared this belief—that the argu­
ments for force, of machine-guns and tanks, should be totally dis­
carded. We succeeded in safeguarding public order during the first 
free democratic elections in June 1990. If memory serves me cor­
rectly, there were over 1,100 foreign observers, including a big group 
from the United States, headed by a congressman. They stated 
unanimously, although with some minor reservations, that the gen­
eral elections had been absolutely democratic and fair and that the 
elections represent a big step forward for democracy in Bulgaria. I 
do not want to exaggerate the role of the Interior Ministry and the 
role played by its structures. All the political forces, the government, 
and the president contributed to this success. But I cannot deny the 
significant role of the council for nonviolence that was created on 
my initiative. I came up with this idea, and I made an appeal to the 
BSP, the UDF, the Agrarian Union, the Fatherland Union, and all 
other political forces to create this public body. They sent their rep­
resentatives, and an independent civil council was created with the 
aim to safeguard civil peace by promoting the nonuse of force. 
The council met a couple of times every week. Its meetings were 
public, and television and radio sent their representatives to cover 
them. It became routine for one of the deputy ministers to analyze 
the situation in the country: the minister would point to certain in­
fringements of public order and other dangerous events that could 
threaten civil peace. Open debate would follow about whether we 
were following the proper course and then we would issue appeals. 
AM: General, when exactly was this council created? 
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AS: It was created in April, on the eve of the general elections, when 
the tension, the polarization in the society, increased and the social 
temperature rose substantially, reaching dangerous levels. 
AM: Was it officially created pursuant to the Roundtable political 
agreement on the peaceful transition? There was a Roundtable 
agreement in March—was your action taken pursuant to that 
agreement? 
AS: No, this was an independent initiative of ours. We spared no 
effort to invent forms and mechanisms that could secure a peaceful, 
bloodless transition to democracy. We sought a well-balanced tran­
sition, guaranteed not by the use of force but through dialogue, 
through reasonable compromise between the political forces—a 
civilized transition. And despite the fact that we were pressed to the 
wall all too often, we did not step back from this approach. 
Now, allow me to explain one more thing. The former Bulgar­
ian Communist Party, renamed . . . the Bulgarian Socialist Party, 
is not a party conceived and operated in the fashion of the Soviet 
Union. . .  . In fact it [the BSP] initiated the changes in the country. 
In Bulgaria there was no opposition against the former regime of 
the sort that existed in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia. The Bul­
garian dissidents were few, and they came mainly from the circles 
of the old Communist Party That is why the changes had to begin 
and were started by reformers (the perestroika supporters) and top 
people from the Party leadership. The new leaders of the Party es­
tablished contacts right after the tenth of November [1989] not be­
cause of outside pressure but because they themselves believed they 
should do this. The Party leadership declared null and void dozens 
of articles in the then existing criminal code that had limited civil 
liberties; in other words, it restored all civil rights of the people. . . . 
These actions were due to the new party leaders like Petar Mlade­
nov, Andrey Lukanov, Georgi Atanasov. As the minister of the in­
terior, I provided, so to speak, the opposition with telephones and 
cars. I helped them in every possible way because we understood 
that without proper material conditions they would be unable to 
carry out real political activity. By government decision, the UDF 
was given two public buildings, one of them on 134 Rakovsky Street 
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and the other on 39 Dondukov Boulevard, I think. These are nice, 
spacious buildings. 
The Party based its policy on the dialogue that was taking place. 
At its initiative the Roundtable worked out a national agreement on 
a peaceful, nonviolent transition. At its XIV Extraordinary Con­
gress on the thirty-first of January, and the first and second of Feb­
ruary 1990, the Party rejected all the theory and practice belonging 
to the past. It accepted a new system of political values and a new 
political platform, based, so to speak, on a European system of val­
ues. It abandoned democratic centralism,42 which unfortunately 
reigns currently in the UDF and many other opposition parties. I 
beg your pardon for this straightforward opinion—you may find it 
offensive, for I really do not know what you believe in—but that is 
the truth. 
AM: To say organization is to say oligarchy. 
AS: Indeed. Despite the fact that at the elections for the Grand 
National Assembly the Bulgarian Socialist Party won an absolute 
majority of 52 or 53 percent, it insisted that a coalition government 
should be formed. By the way, it had approached the opposition 
with the proposal to participate in the government of the country 
as early as February and March; that is, before the election. After 
the election victory in 1990, which by the way was a landslide vic­
tory, the party [BSP] alone decided not to assume the presidency. 
Instead, it brought about the election [in Parliament] of Dr. Zhelev 
for this post. This was done in the name of national understanding 
and agreement. Party leaders were deeply convinced that Bulgaria's 
way out of its national crisis can be found only if the full potential 
of the nation is mobilized. 
Now let me add a few more words along this line and get back 
to the Roundtable Talks. When, during the Roundtable Talks, some 
time around the beginning of February 1990, I informed the parti­
cipants about the range of the changes in the Interior Ministry, 
Mr. Petko Simeonov and some other leaders of the opposition said: 
"Well, it seems that you had been successful in dismantling the 
system." 
I don't think "dismantling" is the proper word. It was in fact 
a democratic transformation of the system. The Bulgarian under­
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standing of this word "dismantling" carries the connotation of liqui­
dation followed by re-creation of certain structures. Bulgaria could 
not afford this: we did not have a West Germany to shelter us, and 
we were not in the position of Poland and Hungary. There continues 
to be a turbulent situation along our borders. We cannot turn our 
country into a fenceless yard. That is why we needed to implement 
these democratic reforms, to transform the system from an instru­
ment of totalitarianism into an institution that serves the demo­
cratic process. We need to create democratic order in the country 
and yet at the same time we must safeguard the national interest. 
The U.S. secretary of state could not understand the substance 
of these reforms, but I think it was your ambassador Mr. Sol 
Polansky who should take the blame. The State Department sent a 
letter or two to the foreign minister of Bulgaria and expressed its 
satisfaction with the ongoing changes. But at the same time, the 
State Department claimed that the security forces' organizations re­
mained intact, that they were not yet disbanded. I think this was a 
totally unfounded and unfair accusation. I believe I share the opin­
ion of Mr. Alvin Toffler,43 a politologist [political scientist] and col­
league of yours in the USA, who said to survive in the new realities 
we need to change. Indeed, the Interior Ministry survived because 
it changed. The change, as painful and difficult as it was to accom­
plish, was necessary to preserve the institutions that guarantee the 
security of Bulgaria. 
The State Department became enchanted by a thesis of Dr. 
Rolf Darendorf. He argued that one of the main prerequisites of 
democratic change is the disbandment of or the change of the 
nomenklatura. 
But I ask you: who was not in Bulgaria's nomenklatura? The 
whole elite—in political life, management, science, or in the econ-
omy—they were all on the nomenklatura lists. And . . . most of the 
intelligentsia were keen to enter the nomenklatura. To waste this 
national potential. . . bodes ill for the country. Mind you that over 
a half or even two-thirds of the UDF MPs are former members of 
this party [BCP] and were in the nomenklatura. In the GDR, the 
eastern provinces of Germany, they did not proceed like this. And, 
therefore, we were unwilling to proceed foolishly with the cadres of 
the Ministry. Okay, we might have said, we will sack them—a couple 
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of thousand people—but how would we find replacements? For this 
reason I definitely disagree with Mr. Darendorf 's thesis. That is why 
I was shocked by the State Department's statement that they saw 
nothing changed in Bulgaria. Not to mention the fact that such 
statements represent an interference in the internal affairs of a sov­
ereign state. I will stop at this point. 
So, let me repeat, when I made my speech at the Roundtable— 
and they were very inquisitive; they asked me questions for four 
hours and twenty minutes—finally they were all satisfied by what 
they had heard. 
AM: I know, I read some of their statements. 
AS: And now let us express a personal point of view. You are aware 
there was a great fire in August 1990. The party building, the Su­
preme Council's building of the Bulgarian Socialist Party was set 
on fire. Do you know this? 
AM: I heard about this, yes.44 
AS: This was a very dramatic night. The people who organized this 
plot obviously wanted to cause bloodshed. Dr. Zhelev happened to 
be in Varna at that time, the Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov was 
abroad. So I immediately went to the spot where I spent the whole 
night. There was a hurricane, . .  . a terrible eruption of extremism, 
mob aggression beyond description. Yet, I did not permit the vio­
lence to escalate or for a single drop of blood to be shed. I knew 
that after the first blood the square would be soaked with it all over. 
Nowadays there are some people who blame me for my patience 
and restraint. There are old party veterans, dogmatics. They call me 
a traitor. 
AM: Because you did not put down mob violence? 
AS: Because this [mob violence] represented a gross infringement 
of public order and there is a reasonable expectation that security 
forces should put it down. Indeed, a building was set on fire and the 
security forces did their best to stop it. But I forbade them to use 
force, because those people [the provocateurs] were just waiting for 
this to happen. They were armed with pipes and iron bars; they 
were bloodthirsty. That is why people blame me: faced with such a 
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brutal infringement of the public order, with an outrage, the police 
should have performed its duties. But they ignore the fact that this 
was not purely criminal activity. It had a broad political background 
and was part of a political plot to cause bloodshed. 
AM: Did you arrest anyone at the time or afterwards? 
AS: There were some arrests, and we had an investigation. It lasted 
for over a year—a year and a half—but yet to this very day the 
court has not proceeded with the prosecution's case. 
AM: But as a tactic of crowd control did you make any arrests or 
did you refrain from arresting anyone? At the time, did you just try 
to protect public buildings? Did you arrest people during that night 
or afterwards? 
AS: Oh, yes, some people were arrested on the spot. However, the 
next morning Mr. Petar Dertliev—I greatly respect him, he is a 
friend of mine but I disapprove of his behavior in the circum-
stances—and some other people like Ludjev intervened, and we had 
to set free those we had arrested. . . . 
AM: Let me ask one more question. We are taking a tremendous 
amount of your time. As a former chief of staff, are you convinced 
that the army will not be a factor in the future? 
AS: I am totally convinced . . . the army will not interfere in 
politics. 
AM: What is the reason? Is it because of the new army leadership? 
AS: The Bulgarian Army has never been in a position to intervene 
in the internal affairs of the state. . . . 
I am not a historian, neither a politologist [political scientist] or 
philosopher, but I dare express some considerations, which might 
be useful for you in contemplating this matter. 
According to Marxist-Leninist teaching on army and warfare, 
an army performs two functions. They are external and internal: 
namely, defense against the foreign enemy and inside the country— 
neutralization, so to speak, of forces that attempt to change the 
social order . .  . to safeguard the existing political system. After the 
war [World War II] there was no reason for the Bulgarian People's 
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Army . .  . to perform any internal functions. This was due to two 
factors: first there were Soviet troops stationed here until 1947. And 
secondly, the new regime of the people's democracy was widely ac­
cepted by a great many people. This is not a distortion of the truth 
but a fact of life. As far as the existence of an opposition here, it was 
not strong and it was suppressed. Its suppression was conducted by 
the forces of law and order like the Interior Ministry, the courts, and 
the public prosecutor. It was not necessary for the army to play the 
role of an instrument for the suppression of an internal opposi­
tion. . .  . We in the Ministry of Defense were convinced that because 
of the postwar pattern of behavior and the new sociopolitical situa­
tion that the internal functions of the Bulgarian Army were defunct; 
the army had no internal functions any more. It is in this spirit that 
the current officers have been reared; they were taught that we have 
just one task—to guarantee the sovereignty, the independence, and 
the territorial integrity of Bulgaria. So there were only the external 
functions left. The officer's corps does not belong to any particular 
class and along with this the whole teaching of Marxism-Leninism 
proclaims respect for the people and for their democratic traditions. 
This interview is especially enlightening because General Semerjiev 
makes clear the role of police state functionaries in bringing about 
the peaceful transition to democracy. His statements illustrate that, in 
addition to the forces of the Communist Party on one hand and the 
opposition UDF forces on the other, the Interior Ministry played a 
vital role in making accommodation possible. Semerjiev's testimonial 
underlines Di Palma's point that individuals can make a huge differ­
ence in the transition to democracy. Most people I encountered in Bul­
garian political circles expressed great respect and even admiration 
whenever the name of Attanas Semerjiev came up. The main reason 
he was named by Parliament as Bulgaria's first vice president was the 
respect and stature he had attained with the reorganization of the Inte­
rior Ministry and his exercise of restraint when faced with provocation. 
Semerjiev understood that a peaceful transition was possible only 
if all sides worked closely together. In fact, Semerjiev actively sought 
to bring all the sides together, assuring them that he was sincere in 
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reorganizing the services of the Interior Ministry. He made the opposi­
tion aware of his intentions, and he kept it informed about progress 
made on this front. 
Perhaps an even more delicate matter concerned his own bureau­
cracy. Semerjiev makes a strong case that Ministry personnel were pre­
disposed to change. Nevertheless, bureaucrats everywhere are loath to 
give up their domains, routines, and authority. Semerjiev had to seize 
the window of opportunity available to him at the beginning of his 
tenure to obtain promises from Ministry functionaries to give up their 
power. Yes, it was for them a matter of rational calculation. They con­
cluded that serious mistakes were made in the past and that under the 
circumstances change was inevitable. Moreover, given the fact that the 
Party was now in control of reformers and that the Ministry head was 
an advocate of change, they had little choice but to transform their 
bureaucracy. Nonetheless, the tactic used by Semerjiev to obtain writ­
ten resignations from the Ministry's top leadership was a brilliant 
stroke to compel compliance in the event that some of the bureaucrats 
might at some later date change their minds. 
Results of Initial Steps 
The preliminary steps taken during the first month or six weeks of the 
National Roundtable Talks laid the foundation for more substantive 
agreements that would follow. But there was a final bone of contention 
that was raised early during the Roundtable and has been repeated 
many times since: the matter of the property of the Bulgarian Commu­
nist Party. In February 1990, Zhelyu Zhelev asked the BCP to provide 
the Roundtable with information relating to its structures, financial 
and property situation, and income sources. It was widely charged that 
BCP leaders were using the organization's financial resources for their 
personal benefit. Zhelev insisted that participation by the UDF in a 
coalition government and its possible refusal to take part in general 
elections to be held in May 1990 turned on the BCP's willingness to 
accede to these UDF demands.45 However, there is no evidence that 
Roundtable participants seriously discussed the matter of BCP prop­
erty and income or subjected the matter to a negotiated settlement. 
Still, many years after the Roundtable Talks, the charge of personal 
104 • Chapter 4 
gain by Party leaders is widely circulated and believed. No doubt this 
charge has weakened the credibility of the Bulgarian Socialist Party. 
In summary, the early Roundtable actions required adjustments on 
the part of all participants, and there remained considerable distrust 
particularly toward the representatives of the government in power. 
Nevertheless, the accomplishments of ending the constitutional mo­
nopoly of the Communist Party, restricting BCP control in the work­
place, providing the UDF with facilities to conduct its affairs, and 
reorganizing the Interior Ministry were important initial steps toward 
negotiating a pact for a peaceful transition to democracy Despite their 
genuine differences, both sides proved by their actions that it was pos­
sible to work with the other to achieve meaningful political change. 
Roundtable Agreements and 
the Election for the Grand 
National Assembly 
FOR A MONTH THE Roundtable made no visible progress.1 Amid 
charges of a lack of cooperation, there were rumors of walkouts, per­
sonal illness, and the creation of an alternative roundtable composed 
of organizations not included in the official talks. However, during 
the hiatus a contact group met to iron out details of an agreement. It 
was cochaired by UDF leader Zhelyu Zhelev and BCP representative 
Georgi Pirinski.2 
On March 12, 1990, the leadership of the BCP, UDF, and twenty-
six other Roundtable participants signed three significant agreements: 
(1) Declaration on the Role and Status of the National Roundtable, 
(2) National Agreement on Guaranteeing the Peaceful Development 
of the Transition Toward a Democratic Political System, and (3) 
Agreement on the Political System.3 
Rules Establishing Political Civility 
The Declaration on the Role and Status of the National Roundtable 
was necessary because there were public suggestions that the Round­
table had no right to interfere with the activities of the government 
and the National Assembly.4 This declaration obligated Roundtable 
participants to "utilize their representation in the legislative and execu­
tive organs and their public influence in order to ensure the implemen­
tation of the agreements that have been adopted by consensus, and 
to initiate action related to the most important issues."5 The acting 
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National Assembly was to accept the determinations of the Round­
table and to faithfully make constitutional changes and legislative ini­
tiatives. This declaration served that purpose, although there were 
moments when the result was in doubt. 
The National Agreement on Guaranteeing the Peaceful Develop­
ment of the Transition Toward a Democratic Political System is a 
model statement about nonviolent political mechanisms for achieving 
peaceful transition. It contains in eight points the following set of prin­
ciples and rules: 
1. To refrain from using violent methods and means, as well as from 
preaching violence and threatening with violence, and to prevent 
the emergence of disorder and chaos in the country in any form. 
2. To view political confrontation as a competition between ideas, 
platforms, and programs; to demonstrate tolerance for the con­
victions and views of opponents that is characteristic of every 
democratic and civilized society; and to strive to reach agreement 
through constructive dialogue. 
3. To guarantee mutual noninterference in their political activity, 
to refrain from illegally interrupting or hindering any political 
manifestations including peaceful meetings and rallies, and to 
exclude any attempts against the propaganda methods of other 
sides. 
4. To refrain from using printed matter and the mass media for po­
litical provocation and instigation to violence. 
5. To prevent and intercept all acts of violence and to be politically 
and morally responsible for all illegal activities of parties' mem­
bers or adherents. 
6. To make maximum efforts to create the necessary conditions for 
the normal and peaceful preparation and conduct of elections in 
conditions of total democracy and equal participation for all. 
7. To prevent state organs from abusing power in favor of any 
single party. 
8. To demand an increase in the responsibility of law and order 
institutions in anything related to maintaining safety and public 
order, by making their activity fully conform to the democratic 
changes taking place in the country's Constitution and legis­
lation; decisively preventing and intercepting all attempts to use 
physical, moral, and psychological pressure and terror against 
Roundtable Agreements and the Grand National Assembly • 107 
both political leaders and individual citizens; demanding the as­
sumption of responsibility, including legal responsibility, by all 
those who had engaged in such actions in favor of any political 
party, including the employees of them, seizing illegal weapons; 
and ensuring equal protection of premises, buildings, and other 
property of legally registered political and public forces.6 
This declaration represents an article of peace among the leading 
political forces and is consistent with Di Palma's conceptualization.7 
It demonstrates the fallacy of reducing probability statements about 
the composition of aggregate phenomena to individual cases. Though 
Bulgaria did not have the structural and cultural prerequisites com­
monly thought necessary for democracy, this agreement represents a 
modus vivendi, making it possible for the Communist leadership and 
governing functionaries to transfer loyalty and bestow legitimacy 
peacefully in order to institute political change. For their part, oppo­
sition forces promised to recognize the BCP's right to exist and to 
compete in the political system. The uncertainties of rejecting this ap­
proach made peaceful coexistence the reasonable choice. 
The Political System Agreement laid the foundation for the new 
constitution that was completed sixteen months later. Roundtable par­
ticipants agreed that the political system should guarantee all the inter­
national rights and freedoms of man, social justice, and creation of a 
civil society. Government institutions were to include (a) a parliament 
elected by free and competitive elections, (b) separation of powers, and 
(c) a multiparty system. The Constitution would guarantee all forms 
of ownership. It called for a national election to be held halfway 
through the year (1990) with equal participation by all political parties. 
To insure fairness, authorities were to invite observers from around the 
world to monitor the elections. Moreover, draft laws facilitating fair 
elections were to be introduced at the forthcoming National Assembly 
session.8 On May 14, 1990, the Roundtable produced a detailed Code 
of Ethics for the Election Campaign.9 
The Economy Issue 
The Roundtable dealt separately with the economy. Both the BCP and 
the UDF accepted the need for serious economic restructuring and 
for infusing more private enterprise into the economy. However, 
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government forces wanted the economic transition to take place in 
stages, while the opposition forces favored "shock therapy"10 Govern­
ment participants at the Roundtable offered to cooperate with opposi­
tion forces in devising measures to reform the economy, including 
creating alternative forms of property, integrating the Bulgarian econ­
omy with that of Europe, and lifting price controls on 40 percent of 
the nation's goods and services. Opposition forces identified the need 
to provide constitutional protection of private ownership. They argued 
for radical agrarian reform and limiting government's exercise of eco­
nomic power, a new taxation policy, and creation of legal rules for the 
conduct of economic activity. Zhelyu Zhelev accused the government 
of failing to acknowledge the failure of the state-controlled economic 
system and alleged that the Communist Party was attempting to evade 
its responsibility for the economic debacle. However, he declared that 
the significant economic problems could not be resolved without 
resolving political ones first.11 He clearly recognized that economic 
policies flow from the allocation of political authority. Creating a polit­
ical system in which democratic forces could defeat the old regime 
would create the necessary conditions for meaningful economic 
reform. 
Di Palma reminds us that democracy was once thought to be 
the key to material progress.12 The notion is that by liberating individu­
als to do what comes naturally to them, namely, the pursuit of self-
interest, societies progress almost continuously. Yet, capitalism does 
not always have the promised results because the free market does 
not always operate as its proponents proclaim. Either private power 
subverts the market system or government intervention needlessly 
obstructs its operation. A stronger claim for democracy is that it 
protects human rights. However, many Bulgarians, like other former 
Eastern bloc inhabitants, embraced the view that a return to a sys­
tem of private property would rescue their bankrupt state-controlled 
economy. 
The Constitution as finally adopted in July 1991 provides for both 
private and public property. It declares that private property shall be 
inviolable, but it also allows for a regulatory role by the government.13 
Within the context of inflation and high unemployment, Bulgarians 
have debated, along with the rest of Eastern Europe, the relative value 
of gradualism versus shock therapy. 
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Reaching Final Agreements 
By the end of March 1990, Roundtable participants were close to a 
final agreement. But several thorny political questions remained. First 
was the matter of the election of a new parliament. This body would 
function as both an ordinary legislature and a constitutional conven­
tion. The second issue was the future constitutional role of a president 
of the Republic. Again, compromise solutions were necessary. 
The BCP first proposed a mixed system of representation: 175 ma­
jority and 75 proportional mandates with national party lists. The em­
ployment of a majority system whereby the election of legislators is on 
a winner-take-all basis in single-member districts makes it possible for 
one party to gain a majority of seats. Because the BCP was clearly the 
best organized party, such a system, even if only used in part, would 
clearly be to its benefit. The BCP could form a strong single-party 
government rendering coalition-making unnecessary. Predictably, op­
position forces proposed a system of proportional representation. 
Composition of the proposed Grand National Assembly would be 
based upon the proportion of votes received by each party. This system 
would favor opposition parties because it would assure parliamentary 
representation consistent with the parties' share of the electoral vote. 
Interestingly, the Roundtable compromised on a mixed system resem­
bling the BCP proposal. It provided for the election of two hundred 
members in one-mandate election districts based on the majority prin­
ciple of more than half the votes. An additional two hundred seats 
would be filled by proportional representation. Each voter had the 
right to two votes: one for a single-member election district and the 
other for multimember districts under a party list. Political parties or 
other groups with a membership of at least five hundred people had 
the right to nominate candidates.14 The Roundtable agreed to the BCP 
proposal for the Grand Constituent National Assembly elections. 
They were firmly set for June 10 and 17, 1990,15 although the same 
UDF forces that once argued for elections no earlier than November 
now urged that there be elections in September that same year.16 
Roundtable participants agreed that the duly elected Grand Na­
tional Assembly would prepare and adopt a new constitution within a 
year and a half and would hold a national referendum. The Grand 
National Assembly would also assume all the tasks of a working 
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parliament associated with a functioning government. Further releas­
ing this new body from Roundtable control, participants agreed that 
the Grand National Assembly could introduce amendments to the ex­
isting Constitution except for regulations relating to the head of state.17 
Few Roundtable participants disagreed that Bulgaria should have a 
presidential institution, or that the existing State Council was unneces­
sary. Government and opposition forces agreed in principle that future 
presidents of the Republic should be elected directly by the people. 
The BCP wanted the election of a president to take place simultane­
ously with parliamentary elections.18 If this happened it would guaran­
tee a four- or five-year period of control over the presidency. This could 
have happened because it was widely understood that Petar Mladenov, 
a prominent figure in the 1989 coup that removed Todor Zhivkov from 
power, would in all likelihood win a popular election. The UDF, how­
ever, thought that election details and presidential rights and duties 
should be left to the future Grand National Assembly to decide. 
BANU representatives supported the UDF proposal and threatened 
that if it was not accepted they would insist on retaining the State 
Council, an institutional hangover from totalitarian days.19 
The BCP proposed a compromise that was ultimately accepted by 
the Roundtable participants: the president was to be elected by the 
existing Parliament, and this person would have the mandate for the 
next National Assembly as well.20 A day later, Petar Mladenov, presi­
dent of the State Council, was made head of state, and the Roundtable 
participants agreed to leave it to the Grand National Assembly to de­
termine his functions and mandate.21 Later, Mladenov was forced to 
resign for an indiscreet remark captured on videotape, extolling the 
desirability of using force against street protestors.22 The Grand Na­
tional Assembly then elected Zhelyu Zhelev after several ballots.23 
Article 93(1) of the Constitution, adopted by the Grand National As­
sembly in July 1991, provides that the president shall be elected for a 
term of five years. Zhelev won the first presidential election. 
The Roundtable concluded its most important work on March 30, 
1990. The Agreement on the Basic Ideas and Principles of the Draft 
Law on Amendments and Addenda to the Constitution of the People's 
Republic of Bulgaria is a six-part document representing national con­
sensus on common principles with respect to the political system; the 
economic system; basic rights and freedoms of citizens; the organiza­
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tion of state power under the transition of parliamentary democracy; 
a strong, competent, and responsible government; and a call for 
elections.24 
Although Roundtable participants signed an agreement hailed as 
important evidence of national consensus, the memory of four decades 
of totalitarian rule remained. On April 4, 1990, the UDF protested 
that the government was violating agreements reached at the Round­
table. It indicated that Parliament had wrongly decided that the head 
of state had the right to declare martial law or a state of emergency 
and even to annul acts approved by the government.25 It is also true 
that although the proceedings of the Grand National Assembly re­
sulted in the adoption of a new Constitution, the proceedings were 
not without moments of high drama and tension. Nevertheless, the 
Roundtable proved a valuable consensus-building tool for forging co­
existence among powerful and potentially destructive forces. 
Election for Grand National Assembly 
The National Roundtable Talks represent an effective step in the de-
Stalinization of Bulgarian society, laying the foundation for creating a 
democratic constitution instrumental in nurturing a civil society. Yet, 
the Roundtable has been criticized because it failed to eliminate com­
pletely the power and influence of the Communist Party, which 
changed its name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party. 
The election for the four hundred-member body Grand National 
Assembly was held on June 10 and 17, 1990. Many Bulgarians regard 
this election as the first free and democratic expression of the people 
since 1931, when voters were last given a genuine opportunity to 
choose from among competing political parties. Four hundred depu­
ties were chosen under a mixed system of representation. Officially 
sanctioned by the existing National Assembly, the Roundtable agree­
ment on elections provided for a combination of proportional repre­
sentation and majority systems. In accordance with the election law, 
two hundred seats were apportioned consistent with the boundaries 
of the extant administrative units. An additional two hundred seats 
were apportioned by single-mandate constituencies. A Central Elec­
toral Commission as well as regional and local electoral commissions 
were created to oversee the electoral process. Forty political parties, 
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including three coalitions, registered with the Central Electoral 
Commission. 
Coming as a surprise to many observers, the renamed Communist 
Party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, won the Grand National Assem­
bly elections. It won 57 percent, or 211 of the seats (114 seats in the 
single-mandate constituencies and 96 seats in the multimandate con­
stituencies), with the opposition forces dividing among a variety of 
loosely defined parties. The main opposition came from members of 
the umbrella organization, the Union of Democratic Forces. They 
earned 144 seats (69 seats in the single-mandate constituencies and 76 
seats in the multimandate constituencies), or 36 percent of the total 
number of seats. The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union won 16 
seats, the Rights and Freedoms Movement won 23 seats (11 seats in 
the single-mandate constituencies and 12 seats in the multimandate 
constituencies), or 5.75 percent of the total seats. Assorted other indi­
viduals won six seats. More than half the deputies were between forty 
and sixty years old at the time of election, and the average age was 
forty-nine years. Men outnumbered women by a 12 to 1 ratio.26 
How did it come to pass that the thinly disguised former Communist 
Party won the election? Changing its name to the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party may have fooled some voters, but it is unlikely that its pedigree 
was unknown to most. If the voters had wanted to punish the Commu­
nists for forty-five years of repression, the election was a convenient 
device indeed. Several explanations for their failure to do so seem 
plausible. 
First, the Bulgarian Socialist Party was well organized. This was 
particularly true in the rural areas of the country. Although Article 1 
of the old Constitution making the Communist Party the leading force 
in society had been repealed, many Party functionaries and organiza­
tions remained intact. They possessed the political skills and expe­
rience necessary to get voters to the polls. Their opponents did not. 
Second, the inexperienced opposition was overconfident. They were 
guilty of believing their own propaganda. Trusting that the former 
Communist Party was widely despised and therefore could not hope 
to win the election, the opposition failed to make the effort required 
to win. As history attests, moral correctness does not necessarily trans­
late into victory at the polls. Finally, UDF leaders were ill-advised 
when they acceded to the request to hold the election for the Grand 
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National Assembly at an earlier date than they had originally thought 
prudent. In this respect, pressure, including that coming from the 
United States, may have impaired their better judgment. Leaders on 
both sides were queried for an explanation of events. In my interview 
with him, Andrey Lukanov of the BSP said:27 
Oh, to some extent it was inertia, of course. But on the other 
hand—there was a recognition that we were changing fast; that we 
were not the old totalitarian Party. We got quite a lot of trust— 
from that point of view. . . . 
Our platform was in some respects unrealistic. There were too 
many promises in it. And there were some differences, not funda­
mental ones, but . . . nonetheless nuances of differences, between 
what the government . . . said and what the party [promised]. This 
type of thing also happens in Western countries. You know that 
very well. . . . 
Extremism worked to the disadvantage of the UDF. . . . This was 
the first time that labels and all kinds of false accusations were used 
on a massive scale in Bulgarian politics. And we [BSP] did not do 
it. We were subdued; we were being reasonable. We said to the 
people: "Let us agree at least on some minimal national goals. We 
should not quarrel; forget about the civil war; unite to work together 
for Bulgaria." And this was the winning line, of course, and—I still 
think—the right path. 
AM: Yes, I see. 
AL: We did not take a demagogic line. And I remain a very ardent 
proponent of national consensus as a must for the transition period. 
I do not think that fighting one another helps to overcome the crisis 
and to solve the problems. 
AM: Several people told me they are quite convinced that within 
the UDF there were informers. . . . 
AL: . . . And then the party had a very good prime minister . . . ! 
[laughter] 
AM: Yes, that is right! . .  . Some people have said to me that . .  . 
within the UDF there were informers who told their opponents 
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what they were thinking. Without naming names, is there anything 
to that proposition? Or is that claim just a fabrication? 
AL: No, I don't think so. . .  . 
AM: There is something to it? 
AL: No, I would not say so. There were different people, but on the 
whole public life was cleaner than it is now . . . 
I think we had a fantastically successful election from that point 
of view. Of course, there were some who attempted to nullify the 
election results. These were people with extreme views or they were 
monarchists . . . they understood that if they cannot change the situ­
ation, they would instead challenge the legitimacy of the Grand Na­
tional Assembly. 
AM: Your party had great influence in rural areas, in the country­
side; that is, the UDF is strongest in the big cities. Is that true? 
AL: It is partly true. We are also strong in big cities. Sofia is a very 
special case. Sofia, by the way, has the greatest amount of restitu­
tion, so people are materially interested, socially interested in driv­
ing the social balance. This is legitimate and understandable.28 
AM: Yes. 
AL: And Sofia is very lumpenized.29 . .  . the negative social effects 
. .  . of alienation and rapid industrialization are mostly felt in Sofia 
and in the big cities. Therefore, there is a very strange element of 
voting power within the UDF and . . . this consists partly of people 
who are interested in getting back their positions. But they could 
not form a majority; they represent only about 15 to 20 percent of 
the population, not more than this. . . . This population has started 
to melt rapidly in the last two years. That is why the overall political 
strength of the UDF is coming down—because the lumpenized part 
of their electorate is not socially interested in their program, or even 
economically interested in their program. And they suffer from 
the shock-therapy and the monetarist approaches and mistakes in 
government more than the others. City dwellers bear the greatest 
burden of change. And that is why their [UDF] electorate is . .  . 
internally contradictory. They have two large sectors; they basically 
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can hardly live in the same bed or be in the same boat for a very 
long time. There are differences from the point of view of their social 
status and interests. . . . 
So, we [BSP] still have a rather strong position in Sofia—about 
35 percent which is a strong position, but less than the UDF. And 
also in the other big cities, when the UDF was stronger. . . . But on 
the whole, I think we still have strength in these cities and much 
more in rural areas, where our predominance was quite impressive 
and it still is. 
AM: . .  . I have been asking people about the social structure. And 
one of the things I am discovering is that apparently there is consid­
erable property ownership. Many Bulgarians own their own flats or 
homes, or whatever . . . 
AL: This is one of the Bulgarian specifics. Actually, I think 70 to 
80 percent of Bulgarians own a flat. And many—I mean hundreds 
of thousands of families—have more than one flat. Even before res­
titution! A villa, a house in the village from which they came, and 
the flat they bought. 
AM: I wonder: Is this a characteristic of a middle class? 
AL: In a way, yes. Mr. Kjuranov, my colleague, who is heading the 
Social Democratic wing of the Socialist Party, says that a Bulgarian 
middle class exists. It is a very strange middle class because it is not 
the means of production that matters. What matters is the means of 
consumption—a car, a villa, a flat or two. And from that point of 
view, he says, it is not true that a middle class does not exist in 
Bulgaria. In a way it does . . . 
And in general in Bulgaria—in the good sense—the petty bour­
geois has been preserved. Our socialism was a petty bourgeois so-
cialism—very similar to the Hungarian one. The ownership feeling 
is there, the entrepreneurial feeling, the love of land, the link with 
. . . land is still there. That is why especially small trade is flourishing 
in Bulgaria. It is not only because change was quick and radical, 
thereby providing small business opportunities, but also because of 
the preserved nature of the Bulgarian people. The Russians do not 
have it, coming as they do from a feudal to a socialist society—a 
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Bolshevik society. They do not have this spirit, or they have it to a 
lesser degree. 
AM: So privatization is not such a radical idea? 
AL: No, no, no. The young people are prepared mentally, intellec­
tually, and professionally. . . . 
Though Andrey Lukanov may be guilty of exaggerating the people's 
affinity for the BSP, there is little doubt that during the initial years of 
the transition to democracy the most competent political professionals 
were in the former Communist Party. Opposition forces were just 
learning the art and science of democratic politics. Stefan Gaitanjiev 
and others I interviewed believe that early elections were a tactical 
mistake. They blame to some degree the United States for the mistaken 
decision to go along with the BSP request for early elections. I asked 
Gaitanjiev:30 
Why did the UDF agree to early elections? At first, UDF leaders 
said they wanted elections to be held a little later and the Commu­
nist Party wanted them earlier and eventually the UDF compro­
mised. Why? 
SG: It was by the explicit insistence of the U.S. state secretary, Mr. 
James Baker. 
AM: Do you know this from firsthand knowledge? 
SG: There was a meeting at the Sheraton Hotel,31 where we ex­
pressed our thought that the elections should be held at a later date, 
because the opposition was not at the time sufficiently consolidated. 
AM: Right. 
SG: The State Department, however, was obviously misled by the 
election results in Poland. It might be that it had a plan to hold all 
elections in Eastern Europe at the same time. 
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AM: How many UDF leaders were at that meeting with Mr. Baker? 
SG: Konstantin Trenchev, Georgi Avramov, Petko Simeonov, 
Zhelyu Zhelev, Milan Drenchev, perhaps a couple more people. 
Georgi Avramov participated. If he comes [to the office] we could 
ask him who exactly was there. [Later in the interview Avramov 
appears. His illuminating comments appear below] 
AM: Did you argue with Mr. Baker about this or did you simply 
agree? 
SG: .  . . Mr. Milan Drenchev as well as the Social Democrats took 
the position that we were still unprepared, that this takes time. Actu­
ally there was a long internal debate within the UDF on the elec­
tions date. The issue was intensely discussed in December, January, 
and February 
The basic argument in favor of holding elections later was 
our unpreparedness. As a matter of fact, we in the opposition 
were most prominent and relatively influential in Sofia and some 
other big cities. I also supported this view because as chief of 
the UDF's all-union services, I knew the situation pretty well. I had 
regular communications with the countryside. I was aware that 
our local organizations were very weak and unable to run a seri­
ous election campaign. The proponents of the idea for early elec­
tions were mainly those leaders who gathered their information 
of the general situation by virtue of standing before rostrums at big 
rallies. 
AM: I am interested in the influence of outside forces, not only 
American, but others, such as Greek. What type of support did 
these outside forces gave to the UDF? 
SG: Foreign dignitaries, ambassadors, and foreign ministers estab­
lished contacts with the UDF. They expressed their appreciation 
and support for our democratic goals. Who specifically gave us sup­
port of real importance? The Greeks were helping us mainly 
through the New Democracy Party. They sent us campaign pro­
motion materials—in fact all such materials were printed there 
[in Greece]. They provided blue paint and even workers to install 
hi-fi stereo systems. The Americans and French sent advisers and 
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consultants. They explained the different ways to run election cam­
paigns. My personal opinion is that these instructions were not that 
informative or they were not applicable to the situation in Bulgaria. 
Anyway, as far as advisory work was concerned, I think that the 
most substantial help came from the Polish, Solidarity. Their advice 
was most practical; it concerned the tactics we needed to follow at 
the Roundtable and at the elections. I am aware that a great deal of 
promotional materials were donated by different foundations; we 
also received some office equipment—mainly computers and copy­
ing machines. But I should not underestimate the material support 
given to us by the [Bulgarian] state. Actually, I would say this aid 
was the most instrumental of all.32 
A couple of million leva were allocated for the UDF. We received 
about fifty brand-new automobiles. The Communist government of 
Lukanov was doing this very reluctantly . . . but nevertheless it 
stood by its obligations. We got offices to house our clubs all around 
the country. . . . 
And Robert Maxwell [the British publisher and business tycoon] 
supplied us with printing paper. It arrived a bit late, but better late 
than never. On balance, the Greeks or the Polish people provided 
the most helpful aid. Jacue Seigella delivered a couple of spectacular 
lectures, but they were not very practical. 
AM: . .  . do you still have the automobiles? Or did they make you 
return them? 
SG: No, we did not return them. Most of them are still at the 
UDF's disposal, but the condition of these cars is extremely bad. 
Some of them have had tires stolen, others are immovable. We re­
ceived substantial help from Bulgarian emigrants, too—mainly 
from Germany. Actually their donations came first—in January 
1990, when it was most needed. 
AM: How about the Bulgarian emigrants in the United States? Did 
they help? 
SG: Well, as far as I am aware, they did not aid the UDF directly, 
but they did help the Agrarian Union, Nikola Petkov. There were 
individual donations—mainly money. 
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AM: Was the outside influence well known in Bulgaria? Did you 
demonstrate it? Did you try to show you had Western support? 
SG: On the contrary, we were trying not to evidence the material 
support we were getting. Because the Socialists were criticizing us 
for selling out the national interests, our common understanding 
was to avoid making too much fuss about this aid. For propaganda 
purposes we preferred to use the statements of Western political 
leaders made during their visits here. . . . 
AM: Did you want to be seen publicly with some of them? 
SG: Yes, indeed. 
AM: But you did not want it known that you were receiving finan­
cial support from abroad? 
SG: There were legal restrictions. The agreement on political par­
ties approved by the Roundtable and then enacted into law by 
Parliament strictly limits the amounts of foreign aid that may be 
received. But, in fact, as a rule, the value of these donations ex­
ceeded the imposed limitations. . . . We were able to circumvent 
these restrictions, and actually nobody cared much about this. 
AM: Do you mean that authorities were not watching carefully? . . . 
SG: I think that in most cases they knew because everything came 
under customs' control. But as far as I know they were "advised" 
that if they behave too negatively with respect to this aid they would 
accordingly receive bad treatment from the West. Simply a sugges­
tion was made to them to turn a blind eye. . . . 
[Georgi Avramov enters the room. He is warmly greeted and 
introduced.] 
SG: Now that Mr. Avramov is here I would like to use the opportu­
nity to verify my story about Secretary of State Baker. This gentle­
man was among the participants. 
AM: Ah, I see, you were at the meeting held at the Sheraton Hotel! 
Georgi Avramov then said:33 
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I had a confidential meeting the day before with one of his [Baker's] 
advisers. He wanted firsthand information about the situation in the 
country. On the next day there was that official meeting with Mr. 
Baker at the Sheraton Hotel. 
AM: Can you give us a date? 
GA: It was sometime at the beginning of February. He was on a 
visit to Moscow and from there he arrived in Sofia on the fifth or 
sixth of February [1990]. Here he met first with the Bulgarian Com­
munist Party leadership, Lukanov and Mladenov; and, in fact, he 
came late from that meeting to meet the opposition. In attendance 
were all the UDF representatives, all leaders: Mr. Zhelyu Zhelev, 
Mr. Rumen Vodenicharov, Milan Drenchev, Petar Dertliev, Kon­
stantin Trenchev, Petar Beron, Mr. Petko Simeonov. Apart from 
these UDF people, Petar Gogov was also present. [At this utterance 
the room breaks into laughter.] 
AM: Why is that funny? 
SG: Because he is a very peculiar exemplar. [At that point others 
in the room explain that Petar Gogov is a "very special per­
son"; "marginal, you know: in fact he is ultra-right, a neo-Fascist 
leader."] 
GA: This was still the nursery age of the UDF. So all the opposition 
representatives got the chance to talk. And they discussed in detail 
such things as the lack of print paper or that the circulation of the 
newspaper {Democracy) is far from enough, and that the UDF did 
not have access to national television or that access was very lim­
ited. It was Mr. Zhelev who described the general situation in the 
country. He said the opposition is not ready for elections. As a mat­
ter of fact, the UDF had organizations only in Sofia and other big 
cities. Therefore, we were realistic enough to know that we were not 
ready to hold elections. 
It was then that Mr. Baker spoke. He said that in the whole of 
Eastern Europe the democratic process is progressing. There have 
been elections in Poland and Hungary and elections are nearing in 
Romania and Czechoslovakia. Consequently, we should not drag 
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our feet behind this process and we should not postpone the elec­
tions for the fall. What matters now is to have fair and democratic 
elections. 
At this point only Milan Drenchev showed his mature political 
instinct. He said if we have elections in the spring, we will surely 
lose and the Communists will win. 
Then Mr. Baker repeated his thesis that what matters is to have 
fair and democratic elections. With this statement the meeting 
ended, and it influenced the decision to have elections in June. 
SG: The Communists had wanted them in May, at the latest. 
AM: When was the decision made to hold the elections? Was it 
made at this meeting with Baker or was it made sometime after 
that meeting? 
SG: Oh, no, after that meeting, at a Coordinating Committee 
meeting. 
AM: But was it clear to everyone involved that Mr. Baker's influ­
ence was decisive? His view became the accepted view? 
SG: Well, see, we were people with no experience in government; 
we had been dissidents. 
GA: This was our first meeting with such a high-ranking foreign 
dignitary; he was representing, by the way, a great power. So I be­
lieve his opinion played a decisive role in our decision about the 
dates set for the elections. 
AM: Mr. Avramov, do you think it would have made any difference 
in the outcome of the June elections if they had been held six 
weeks later? 
GA: No, the option we were considering were elections in the fall. 
Our idea was to have them in October or November. And I knew 
the position of the U.S. Embassy at the time. It was the same as 
ours, namely, the UDF had no chance in spring elections. They were 
convinced that we are unable to . .  . 
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AM: Sorry, I am confused: the Americans were convinced that you 
were able to win the elections? 
GA: No, that we were unable to win them. This was the stated posi­
tion of the Embassy. 
AM: Okay. 
Some other participants at the Sheraton Hotel meeting corroborate 
the claim that Baker suggested to the assembled UDF leaders that they 
should agree to early elections. However, other persons I interviewed 
either discount the U.S. influence or deny it outright. Dr. Konstantin 
Trenchev, leader of the Podkrepa syndicate, is in the latter category. 
He said:34 
Mr. Baker wanted to acquaint himself with our opinion of the situa­
tion and with our forecasts for its further development and evolu­
tion. I think Mr. Baker did not defend any thesis of any kind. He 
was just listening to us. And I think . . . the more talkative person 
was Mrs. Margaret Tutwiler, not him. It was she who asked most of 
the questions. So, it would be incorrect in this case to speak about 
any suggestions. A similar position was taken by Mr. Genscher, 
whom we met in a seaside resort. Well, as far as I know—and I 
consider myself a front-line participant—as far as election dates 
or strategy is concerned—there was no direct influence by the 
West. .  . . 
AM: Well, what I have heard is that Secretary Baker indicated be­
cause the rest of Eastern Europe was going to have early elections, 
Bulgaria ought to be part of the process. 
KT: I did not get the impression that he insisted upon having early 
elections. I think his attitude on the elections was clear enough and 
he did not say anything about setting dates for elections. And if my 
memory serves me correctly, he came here in April. At that time the 
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Stefan Gaitanjiev, a founder of the 
Ecoglasnost Political Club, deputy of 
the Grand National Assembly, and 
leading member of the parliamentary 
group of the Democratic Left 
elections were already pending; there was a decision to have them. 
The date was fixed. . .  . Or maybe it was at the end of March. But 
still I do not think he influenced us on the date. 
Whether or not Trenchev is correct in his recollections,35 there exists 
in the minds of some UDF leaders present at the Sheraton Hotel meet­
ing the notion that the West wanted early elections. The election results 
are hardly shocking, given the euphoria of the day, the UDF's lack of 
political experience, and the former Communist Party's organizational 
capability. These combined factors resulted in a Socialist Party victory 
and with it the domination of the Grand National Assembly by the 
former Communist Party operatives and some of its allies. This fact is 
a major reason that some people cannot accept the deliberations of 
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Konstantin Trenchev, influential 
leader of the Podkrepa Labor 
Federation 
the Grand National Assembly as anything but a Communist plot to 
retain its hegemony. Then, too, if the opposition forces had won the 
election, they would have been charged with responsibility for what­
ever events might have gone wrong. 
It is tempting to assign at least partial blame for the defeat of the 
UDF at the hands of the BSP to Secretary of State Baker's suggestion 
that UDF leaders go along with early elections. It might be said that 
Baker's interference in the internal affairs of Bulgaria is yet another 
example of Western imperialism or simply another example of State 
Department incompetence. Yet, one may place a more charitable con­
struction on events. As Di Palma teaches, time is a tactical resource in 
the transition to democracy. In order to deter breakdown games by 
those who may possess vested interests in promoting an antidemocratic 
regime, pact members must give clear signals that the negotiated 
agreement is holding and the momentum for change is irreversible. 
Therefore, it is an advisable tactic to specify a speedy timetable for 
political reforms. Holding elections is among the clearest signals that 
democracy is a done deal.36 
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Thus, whether planned or accidental, Baker's admonishment, be it 
real or a misreading of events, contains considerable wisdom as a tacti­
cal tool in the hands of those who favored a successful transition to 
democracy. Though the decision to hold elections earlier rather than 
later may have been a contributing factor in the Socialist Party's vic­
tory over the UDF, this short-term result is outbalanced by the interest 
of all those seeking to secure democratic procedures for a nation-state 
that for forty-five years did not practice the fine art of political compe­
tition and parliamentary government. 

PART II

The Grand National

Assembly 
This particular Parliament does not matter much. The 
important matter is the principle of parliamentary 
anism. The fact that the Grand National Assembly 
exists is important by itself. Otherwise, we could get 
into the bad habit of disbanding parliamentary insti­
tutions by illegal means any time it suits us. 
—GINI O GANEV 

6

Adopting a New Constitution 
A GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY diflfers from an ordinary parliament 
in that it is both a constitutional convention and a regular parliament. 
Its mandate is to meet contemporary problems by enacting ordinary 
legislation and to write a constitution to serve for years to come. Be­
tween 1879 and 1947 Bulgaria had six such assemblies; in each case 
the voters elected the deputies on a nationwide ballot. After they were 
liberated from what the Bulgarians routinely term "five hundred years 
of the Turkish yoke," the Turnovo Constitution was promulgated on 
April 16, 1879. This was done with the inspiration and under the guid­
ance of their Russian liberators. By definition Grand National Assem­
blies have limited tasks, and they are relatively short-lived; for example, 
the Sixth Grand National Assembly that commenced in 1946 lasted 
three years. Roundtable participants agreed that the Seventh Grand 
National Assembly would complete its task of preparing a new con­
stitution within a year and a half. Upon completion of that task, 
there was to be a vote of the people by referendum. Instead, however, 
the new Constitution was ratified by a vote of the Grand National 
Assembly.1 
Convening Activity 
After the June 1990 elections for the Grand National Assembly the 
four hundred-member body dominated by the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party was ready to convene. The election result was important be­
cause by virtue of their victory the BSP was in a position to control 
the outcome of most ordinary legislation, and it was in a strong, 
though not commanding, position to guide the creation of the new 
129 
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Constitution. Thirteen months later on July 12, 1991, 309 members 
of the Grand National Assembly, with some rancor, ratified the new 
Constitution by more than the required two-thirds majority.2 
By presidential decree Petar Mladenov called to order the newly 
elected Grand National Assembly on July 10, 1990, at Velico Turnovo, 
the site of the first constitutional convention held in 1879. The eldest 
deputy, Josif Petrov, a veteran of the Nikola Petkov Agrarian Union, 
opened the constituent session. With the preliminary protocols com­
plete, the working parliamentary session commenced just a week later 
at the Parliament building located in Sofia, the nation's capital. On July 
17, by a majority of 217 votes, the Grand National Assembly elected its 
chairperson, the academician and Bulgarian Socialist Party member 
Nikolay Todorov. The following day the GNA elected his deputies— 
Nikodim Popov and Ginio Ganev. On August 1, parliamentarians 
elected the nation's leaders. They elected the chairman of the UDF 
Coordinating Committee, Zhelyu Zhelev, for president. For vice presi­
dent, the GNA elected Attanas Semerjiev, the BSP candidate and a 
widely respected army general put in charge of dismantling the 
dreaded secret police of the previous regime. The election of Zhelev 
and Semerjiev was necessary because Petar Mladenov, a leader of the 
BSP, tendered his resignation as the nation's president following revela­
tions of the unguarded remark he had made on video. 
On August 8, 1990, the Grand National Assembly enacted on its 
second reading its very first statute, the Law for Amendment of the 
Law for the Universal Military Service. On August 30, a leader of the 
reform faction within the old Communist Party and a chief architect 
of accommodation with UDF forces, Andrey Lukanov, was appointed 
chairman of the Council of Ministers. The GNA approved his cabinet 
choices on September 20, but Lukanov's one-party government col­
lapsed after only two months in power. A new cabinet was created on 
December 19 and 20, 1990. The government was headed by Dimitar 
Popov, a lawyer and former secretary of the Central Electoral Commis­
sion at the June 1990 elections, and a person without a party affiliation. 
Popov named as deputy prime ministers a UDF politician, a BZNS 
member, and a BSP member. 
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Drafting the Constitution 
On April 4, 1991, ten months after the June 1990 elections, the Grand 
National Assembly resolved that it would debate the matter of a new 
constitution by the beginning of May. It was stipulated further that the 
GNA would thereafter disband itself to conduct local elections and 
then a general one. The preliminary debates on basic constitutional 
principles began on April 12, 1991. 
Reflecting discontent with the likely course of events, on April 26, 
1991, the UDF parliamentary group issued a declaration insisting on 
the disbandment of the Grand National Assembly by May 15. They 
also wanted the GNA to set July 14 as the date for new general elec­
tions. Revealing a serious fracture within UDF ranks, the cochairman 
of its parliamentary group, Petar Dertliev (later dubbed the father of 
the Constitution) made a counterdeclaration. He proclaimed that the 
supporters of the first declaration were siding with surviving elements 
of the former Communist Party within the BSP and in the pro­
cess endangering the nation's still fragile democracy. Then, on May 
14, thirty-nine members of the UDF parliamentary group issued an­
other declaration, making clear their fears. The signatories stated 
that the Communist majority was getting an upper hand in Parlia­
ment. They complained that arm-twisting was being employed as a 
tactic by the leadership and that the goal of economic reform toward 
a market system was hopelessly deadlocked. In a dramatic move, 
the disaffected thirty-nine from the Radical-Democratic Party, the 
Democratic Party, and the United Democratic Center, boycotted the 
assembly's plenary sessions. On May 29 the Group of Thirty-Nine 
formed a new parliamentary faction called the National Move­
ment UDF. The remaining elements of the UDF coalition were stead­
fast in their support of GNA deliberations. But within the UDF par­
liamentary group, the split became permanent; it signaled the danger 
that the GNA might be unable to fulfill its mission to create a new 
constitution. 
Meanwhile, the initial debates on the draft constitution took place 
on May 16, followed by a first reading of the proposed constitution on 
May 29. The second and third readings of the new document took 
place on June 28 and July 9. A May 28 vote set the timetable for debat­
ing and voting on the draft constitution, including the signing of the 
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document on July 17 at Velico Turnovo. The deputies agreed that 
before the signing there should be a referendum on Article 1 concern­
ing Bulgaria's form of government: a republic or monarchy. Later, 
however, the GNA reversed itself on the need for a vote of the people. 
On July 10, twenty-three of the disaffected thirty-nine members of the 
National Movement UDF began a dramatic hunger strike that would 
last until the GNA's self-disbandment and would end only after com­
promise was reached on a few key contentious issues. 
Ratification 
On July 12, 1991, five days before the set date, the Constitution of the 
Republic of Bulgaria was enacted by an affirmative vote of 309 of the 
400 GNA members. The deputies also voted to disband the Grand 
National Assembly, with the proviso that it would continue to work as 
an ordinary National Assembly until a new parliament was elected. 
They envisaged the last session to assemble on September 13 and the 
election campaign to start right after it. 
Though the Constitution was passed by a wide margin, there was 
considerable argument about the advisability of ratification. The UDF 
leadership voted to expel parties from its ranks if its GNA members 
signed the new Constitution. They disagreed fundamentally over 
whether the electoral system should be a proportional or a majority 
system of representation. The Bulgarian Socialist Party did not express 
a preference. The Agrarian Party favored a system of proportional rep­
resentation. At the same time, the Union of Democratic Forces began 
its call for a referendum on the new Constitution.3 Further, the GNA 
voted to require all members to take an oath to support the newly 
adopted Constitution: this new declaration in addition to the one they 
had already taken upon their election to the body. But this action pre­
cipitated, to a significant extent, the hunger strike of twenty-three 
members protesting the "new Constitution which is consolidating the 
Communists' rule."4 
Despite the evident opposition within the GNA, most Bulgarians 
supported the new basic law. The National Public Opinion Center re­
ported that 57 percent of the respondents in the latest public opinion 
poll approved of the Grand National Assembly in ratifying the new 
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Constitution, 20 percent disapproved, and 23 percent expressed no 
opinion. The poll also indicated that Bulgarians could support the new 
constitutional order even if their favorite political party might lose in 
the upcoming national elections. The poll showed that 67 percent of 
the respondents would not join any form of political protest in such 
an eventuality. Thirty-two percent said they would take part in protest 
rallies, 14 percent were willing to take part in a strike, and 7 percent 
in a sit-in strike. Only 3 percent indicated they would be willing to 
engage in direct confrontation.5 
Within a few weeks after the adoption of the Constitution, face-
saving compromises were reached on several sticking points. This 
made it possible for those who found fault with the new Constitution 
to support it. A second oath to support the Constitution became en­
tirely voluntary when Parliament enacted a new law voiding the pre­
vious one, which had required all deputies to sign a new oath.6 In a 
public address to the nation, President Zhelev went on record in sup­
port of the new Constitution; he admonished his countrymen not to 
engage in disruptions that had included beatings of public officials. 
The mayor of Sofia was among the victims, illustrating that violence is 
one of the things that can go wrong in such emotional times.7 A few 
days later, addressing fears that a proportional election system would 
permanently advantage the BSP, the president expressed the hope that 
the new elections might be held under an improved proportional repre­
sentation system and that the National Assembly would decide how 
to divide Bulgaria's administrative state system.8 
Features of the New Constitution 
To facilitate their responsibility to write a new basic document, the 
members of the Grand National Assembly appointed a constitutional 
committee to draft a working proposal. Ginio Ganev was appointed 
by the GNA to head the committee. A respected member of the as­
sembly and its deputy chairman, Ganev was an experienced politician, 
the leader of the Fatherland Front, and not a person associated with 
extreme views. He appointed subcommittees to treat various major 
parts of the proposed new document. In all, fifteen complete drafts 
were presented to Ganev's committee. Political parties, groups of 
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The signatories to the July 1991 Constitution in front of the Parliament 
building in Sofia 
constitutional law experts, and individuals, including members of the 
GNA and constitutional law experts acting on their own behalf, spon­
sored these drafts.9 Constitution experts from Western Europe and the 
United States visited Sofia and offered suggestions during this period. 
Although their views were politely received and carefully considered, 
there is no evidence that any of the experts exercised dispositive 
influence. 
A Bulgarian think tank that reviewed each of the working drafts 
concluded that all the drafts emphasized certain commonalities: a re­
publican form of government; government by consent of the governed; 
a unitary rather than a federal government; declarations of freedom, 
justice, humanism, and equality; constitutional supremacy and di­
rect application of constitutional provisions; separation of powers; 
acknowledgment and guarantee of private property ownership; the 
existence of both private and public property; a market system of eco­
nomics; and state support for science, culture, and the arts. These 
drafts envisaged Bulgaria as independent from foreign domination, 
and a member of the international community compliant with interna­
tional law. A few drafts explicitly mentioned political integration with 
Europe and the rest of the world.10 
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Central Theme and Operating Principles 
As finally ratified, the Constitution of 1991 is a ten-chapter docu­
ment with human rights occupying a fundamental and central theme. 
In the preamble, the members of the Grand National Assembly 
pledge "loyalty to the universal human values of liberty, peace, hu­
manism, equality, justice and tolerance." It does so "by elevating 
as the uppermost principle the rights, dignity and security of the 
individual." 
Chapter 1 of the Constitution establishes fundamental operating 
principles. Bulgaria is a republic with a parliamentary form of govern­
ment. As anachronistic as it may seem that a discussion about monar­
chy versus a republic might occur in the last decade of the twentieth 
century, the discussion was nevertheless a lively one. There were many 
people, some of whom were GNA members, who sought the return of 
Prince Simeon, heir to the throne. His father, King Boris III, had fallen 
ill and died in August 1943, nine days after returning from Germany, 
where he had had stormy meetings with Hitler. The death certificate 
cites natural causes for Boris's death but many Bulgarians believe the 
Germans, the Soviets, or the Italians poisoned him.11 In any event, 
Boris, whose burial site was desecrated in 1954, reportedly by the Com­
munist regime, had become something of a symbol of national unity. 
Many sincere Bulgarians sought the return of Simeon from Spain, 
where he is a successful businessman. They wanted him to lead the 
nation in the transition period from communism to some form of de­
mocracy. Republicans became alarmed when Simeon's sister returned 
to Sofia for a visit in 1991; she was greeted by thousands of enthusias­
tic well-wishers.12 But by declaring Bulgaria a republic, members of the 
Grand National Assembly blocked the rebirth of the monarchy and 
with it Prince Simeon as head of state. Moreover, by reaffirming the 
Roundtable agreement and the action of Parliament in 1990, the refer­
ence to Bulgaria as a socialist state under the leadership of the Com­
munist Party was eliminated forever. 
Legislative Power 
The Grand National Assembly embedded within the Constitution 
Montesquieu's idea of protecting liberty by separating legislative, 
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executive, and judicial authority. Article 8 separates the power of the 
state "between a legislative, an executive and a judicial branch." 
Lawmaking power is vested in a single chamber body called the 
National Assembly (Narodno Subranie). The two hundred forty mem­
bers of the National Assembly are elected for four-year terms. Any 
Bulgarian citizen not holding another citizenship, twenty-one years or 
older, and not on trial or in prison is eligible for election. Once elected, 
the Constitution obliges members of the National Assembly to fol­
low their own conscience when performing their duties. Those candi­
dates for a National Assembly seat who also hold a state post must 
resign upon the registration of their candidacy In keeping with that 
separation-of-powers principle, no member of Parliament shall occupy 
another state post; if selected as a government minister, for example, a 
person must cease to serve as a member of the National Assembly. In 
these circumstances, the Constitution mandates that such persons are 
replaced for the period during which they function as ministers by the 
next person on the party slate for the National Assembly election. 
When such persons are dismissed as ministers they resume their parlia­
mentary duties and their replacements are relieved as members of the 
National Assembly13 
The Constitution empowers the National Assembly to pass, amend, 
and rescind laws; pass the state budget bill and the budget report; es­
tablish taxes and their size; schedule the elections for a president of 
the Republic; resolve on the holding of a national referendum; elect 
and dismiss the prime minister and, on his motion, the members of the 
Council of Ministers; effect changes in the government on a motion 
from the prime minister; elect and dismiss the governor of the Bulgar­
ian National Bank and the heads of other institutions established by 
law; approve state-loan agreements; resolve on the declaration of war 
and conclusion of peace; approve any deployment and use of Bulgar­
ian armed forces outside the country's borders; and approve, on a mo­
tion from the president or the Council of Ministers, the deployment of 
foreign troops on the territory of the country or their crossing of that 
territory. The National Assembly may introduce martial law or a state 
of emergency on all or part of the country's territory, grant amnesty, 
institute orders and medals, and establish official holidays. The Na­
tional Assembly also possesses considerable authority in the ratifica­
tion of international agreements and treaties. 
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There are two circumstances when the National Assembly may con­
duct a no-confidence vote. First, the cabinet itself may request that the 
National Assembly take a no-confidence vote on its overall policy or 
on specific grounds. The assembly's motion is carried if more than half 
of its members present and voting cast their vote for it. Second, one 
fifth of the members of the National Assembly may move a reasoned 
draft resolution of no-confidence either of the prime minister or the 
Council of Ministers. In this instance, the no-confidence resolution is 
carried if more than half of all members of the National Assembly 
vote for it. If a no-confidence vote fails, Parliament may not entertain 
another confidence motion predicated on the same reason for the next 
six months. Incumbent prime ministers may use the no-confidence de­
vice as a method to secure their governments against removal during 
the six-month period. 
Within the government itself, if the prime minister resigns, then the 
entire cabinet must also follow suit. The prime minister may ask for a 
change in cabinet ministers, but the National Assembly must approve. 
This constitutional mandate leaves the door open for fledgling minis­
ters to appeal to the broader Parliament to save their jobs. 
Council of Ministers and Administration 
In principle, there is a separation of powers between the legislative 
and executive branches of government. But as one thoughtful writer 
maintains, there is no balance of power between them.14 Politicians 
must give up their seats in Parliament when they accept a position in 
the Council of Ministers (Ministerski Suvet). But there is a lack of 
balance because the politicians in the National Assembly are in a posi­
tion to control the activities of the council through the exercise of their 
power to conduct no-confidence votes. 
The Constitution charges the Council of Ministers with the respon­
sibility to implement domestic and foreign policy consistent with the 
Constitution and the laws of the country. It serves, in other words, as 
the government with a prime minster and other ministers with particu­
lar portfolios. It is charged with the responsibility to maintain public 
order and national security and to provide overall leadership over pub­
lic administration and the armed forces. The council promulgates de­
crees, orders, resolutions, rules, and regulations. 
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Parliament has been slow to enact a civil service law providing 
working bureaucrats with the assurance that their jobs are not threat­
ened every time a new government is installed. Indeed, there is no men­
tion in the Constitution of the tasks of the central administration or 
about the status of civil servants. As constitutional scholar Tony Ver­
heijen points out, during the first years of regime change in Central 
and Eastern Europe, little attention was paid to the crucial role of 
public administration, especially with respect to its place in regulating 
a market economy.15 Verheijen offers several explanations for this con­
dition. First, reform leaders do not trust civil servants to carry out 
reforms, particularly those in the higher ranks of government. In the 
past, these bureaucrats served the communist regimes, and it is feared 
that they may harbor sentiments that favor the status quo ante. Sec­
ond, some civil servants are incompetent, and they find it difficult to 
change their habits consistent with the needs of the new era. If they 
are to be part of the solution and not part of the problem, they need 
incentives such as job security. Andfinally, the new political leaders are 
appointing public administrators, particularly at the top levels, with a 
view toward their political reliability and without adequate consid­
eration for their professionalism. This state of affairs is not condu­
cive for creating a professional bureaucracy that will openly provide 
feedback to policymakers in an effort to correct laws that are not 
working.16 
In Bulgaria, there has been no rush to create a comprehensive civil 
service law. It is said that the absence of such a law has made it difficult 
for the Council of Ministers to exercise effective control over adminis­
tration. Yet, government workers continue to be protected by the long-
standing labor code that pertains to all workers—meaning those who 
work in industry or public administration. The enactment of a thor­
oughgoing civil service law would be helpful, and no doubt the Na­
tional Assembly will pass legislation in the near future. However, the 
fundamental difficulty lies in the contemporary political situation. Po­
litical polarization and insufficient coalition building has made it 
difficult for politicians to bend government to their will. As there is 
greater movement toward democratic consolidation, then the task of 
the Council of Ministers to administer the government will become 
less daunting. 
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Presidential Authority 
The president of the Republic (Prezident na Republikata) is the head 
of state. Because the constitutional framers conceived Bulgaria as a 
parliamentary system, presidential authority is limited, especially 
when compared to the powers of the president of the United States. 
As head of state, Bulgaria's president embodies the unity of the nation 
and represents the nation in international relations. A vice president is 
elected on the same ballot with the president for a five-year term, lim­
ited to two terms. Bulgaria is the only parliamentary republic with a 
directly elected vice president. 
The institution of an elected head of state was unknown in Bulgaria 
until April 1990. Participants at the National Roundtable Talks agreed 
to an amendment to the existing Constitution as a way to alter the 
continuing one-party domination of the state by the Bulgarian Com­
munist Party. In part, reform elements within the old Bulgarian Com­
munist Party, by then renamed the Bulgarian Socialist Party, approved 
the creation of the office of the president because they believed that 
Parliament would elect their man, Petar Mladenov, as the first presi­
dent. On April 3, 1990, this came to pass. Unexpectedly, however, as 
has been explained in previous chapters, Mladenov was forced to 
resign on July 6, 1990. After three ballots, the National Assembly 
reached a compromise. Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, a leader of the UDF, was 
elected president. Colonel General Attanas Semerjiev, a popular leader 
of the BSP, was elected the nation's first vice president.17 In January 
1992, under the terms of the July 1991 Constitution, Zhelyu Zhelev 
won election for a full five-year term with Blaga Dimitrova as his run­
ning mate. Seven months later Dimitrova abruptly resigned, charging 
that the country was being prepared for dictatorship.18 
A weak head of state may function successfully as a symbol of na­
tional unity. It provides the primary benefit of a monarchy without the 
regal trappings. Some also argue that a presidential system of govern­
ment should be eschewed in favor of a parliamentary democracy be­
cause within presidential systems there is a tendency toward deadlock 
or authoritarianism. The United States is a good example of the for­
mer, and Latin America is cited in support of the latter. Evidence based 
on third world countries tends to support this view as well.19 
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There is, however, an obvious difficulty with an elected president in 
a parliamentary democracy. If parliament is the center of power there 
is little room for an additional locus of authority. Yet, because Bulgari­
ans elect their president on a popular ballot there is an expectation 
of independent authority; but in fact the presidency possesses little 
institutional power. Nevertheless, Bulgaria's constitutional framers, in­
sisting upon a separation of powers model, fused a predominately par­
liamentary model with some features of a presidential system.20 
Article 98 of the Constitution specifies some of the president's most 
routine duties as head of state, including scheduling elections for the 
National Assembly and for local self-governing bodies, issuing appeals 
to the people and to the National Assembly, concluding international 
treaties in the cases stipulated by law, promulgating laws, and sanc­
tioning changes in the borders and centers of administrative-territorial 
units when proposed by the Council of Ministers. At the request of the 
Council of Ministers, the president appoints and dismisses from their 
positions the heads of diplomatic missions and other international or­
ganizations and accepts the credentials and letters of recall of foreign 
diplomatic representatives. The president awards orders and medals 
and may pardon persons for their crimes. 
Among the most important roles of the president is as commander-
in-chief of the armed forces. Consistent with that role, the president 
appoints and dismisses the high command of the armed forces and 
awards high military ranks at the proposal of the Council of Ministers. 
The president heads the Consultative Council for National Security. 
When the Council of Ministers proposes, the president declares gen­
eral or partial military mobilization. Further, if the National Assembly 
is in recess, the president may declare a state of war in the event of an 
armed attack against the country or in response to the need for urgent 
implementation of international obligations. The president may also 
declare martial law or any other state of emergency. In such cases, 
the National Assembly possesses the ultimate authority because the 
Constitution requires it to convene immediately to vote on any such 
declaration. 
Because the president's constitutional authority in the legislative 
system is limited, there is little opportunity to affect the course of law 
making. By way of a suspensory veto, the president may return a law 
he or she disapproves of to the National Assembly for further debate. 
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However, the lawmakers may vote the law again by a simple majority. 
There have been notable occasions when President Zhelev has done 
so, as with the 1994 Judiciary Act21 and the 1995 Amended Land Law.22 
But such actions raise questions as to whether the president should 
exercise this authority in light of the fact that Parliament will simply 
pass the law again. There are also clashes between the president and 
the prime minister's government over foreign policy matters, including 
the conditions for Bulgaria's membership in NATO.23 
The president plays a formal role in the selection of the prime minis­
ter. After a successful no-confidence vote or a regular parliamentary 
election, the president must consult with the parliamentary groups 
when appointing the next prime minister. Article 99 of the Constitu­
tion spells out in detail the sequence of events that the president 
must follow. 
The president first asks the candidate for prime minister of the 
largest parliamentary group to form a cabinet. If within a seven-day 
period the candidate is unable to propose a list of members of the 
Council of Ministers, the president must ask the candidate nominated 
by the second largest parliamentary group to name a new government. 
If, once again, the process fails to create a new government then the 
president asks another parliamentary group to nominate a candidate 
for prime minister. If all of the above consultations should fail, the 
Constitution directs the president to ask the National Assembly to 
nominate the candidate for prime minister. More drastic action is 
taken if this procedure fails. The president appoints a caretaker cabi­
net, disbands the National Assembly, and schedules a new election to 
take place within two months. 
Local Government 
Chapter 7 of the Constitution provides for the existence of local self-
government and local administration within a unitary system of au­
thority. The Constitution divides the territory of the Republic into 
townships and oblasts. Citizens participate in governing townships 
through local self-governing bodies they have elected and through ref­
erenda and general meetings of the inhabitants. Township councils and 
their mayors are elected to four-year terms. Townships possess the 
right to own property, and they have autonomous budgets. The central 
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authority assists townships by contributing funds from the national 
budget and by other means. The oblast is an administrative-territorial 
entity that carries out regional policies and state administrative tasks 
in the localities and ensures that the national and local governments 
work together. The Council of Ministers appoints oblast governors. 
Finally, the central authorities of the state and their local representa­
tives exercise oversight concerning the legality of the laws passed by 
local self-government authorities as stipulated by law. 
The Judiciary 
Chapter 6 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of the 
judicial branch (Sudebvna Vlast). For three years, Parliament debated 
from time to time the details of a judiciary act to establish the new 
courts as provided for in the 1991 Constitution. Crises resulting from 
shifting coalitions and changes in government served to distract mem­
bers of the National Assembly from this task. But on July 22, 1994, it 
promulgated a new law on the judiciary. This system provides for re­
gional and district courts with original jurisdiction, an appellate court 
for cases appealed from the district courts, and the Supreme Court of 
Cassation. The law also provides for military courts of first instance 
and an appellate level court with final appeal to the Cassation Court. 
The 1994 law also created an administrative court system. It provides 
that cases originate in the regional and district courts with final deci­
sion in a Supreme Administrative Court. As is the case in other civil 
law systems of continental Europe, the various prosecutory functions 
take place outside the court system.24 This law also contained con­
troversial provisions aimed at removing certain jurists. The Constitu­
tional Court found specific provisions of this law at variance with the 
Constitution's tenure requirements.25 
Chapter 8 provides for the Constitutional Court (Konstitutsionen 
Sud). The twelve justices of the Constitutional Court are elected or 
appointed for nine-year nonrenewable terms of office. The National 
Assembly elects one-third of the justices, one-third are appointed by 
the president of the Republic, and one-third are elected by a joint meet­
ing of the justices of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme 
Administrative Court. Although all the Constitutional Court members 
are highly regarded for their professional abilities, it is widely under­
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stood that politics enter the selection process. Where constitutional 
courts exist such as in Italy and Germany, they are clearly understood 
as playing a vital role in the political life of the nation.26 
Chapter 8 provides for a Constitutional Court with the authority 
to (1) provide binding interpretations of the Constitution; (2) rule on 
challenges to the constitutionality of the laws and other acts passed 
by the National Assembly and the acts of the president; (3) rule 
on competence suits between the National Assembly, the president, 
and the Council of Ministers, and between the bodies of local self-
government and the central executive branch of government; (4) rule 
on the compatibility between the Constitution and the international 
instruments concluded by the Republic of Bulgaria before their ratifi­
cation, and on the compatibility of domestic laws with the universally 
recognized norms of international law and the international instru­
ments to which Bulgaria is a party; (5) rule on challenges to the consti­
tutionality of political parties and associations; (6) rule on challenges 
to the legality of the election of the president and vice president; (7) 
rule on challenges to the legality of an election of a member of the 
National Assembly; and (8) rule on impeachments by the National 
Assembly against the president or the vice president. 
There is no actual case or controversy requirement as pertains to 
the U.S. system of judicial review. Abstract review permits disputes to 
come to Bulgaria's Constitutional Court on the petition of no fewer 
than one-fifth of all members of the National Assembly, the president, 
the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Su­
preme Administrative Court, or the chief prosecutor. If during litiga­
tion the Supreme Court of Cassation or the Supreme Administrative 
Court should find a law and the Constitution in conflict, they must 
suspend the proceeding and refer the matter to the Constitutional 
Court for determination. Anticipating the possibility of attempts to 
limit the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, Article 149(2) of the 
Bulgarian Constitution specifically states that a law may not be en­
acted that would suspend its authority. 
The judiciary and particularly the Constitutional Court play an im­
portant role by checking any tendency by the nation to backslide into 
totalitarianism. More than a fifth of all the articles in the 1991 Consti­
tution provide for human rights. Chapter 2 (Articles 25 to 61) details 
rights of persons and citizens in very specific terms. These rights 
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include various well-known and universally accepted political free­
doms, and prohibitions against repressive police actions. Many rights 
provisions are written in absolutist terms. However, as is commonly 
the case in modern constitutions, there are qualifications. For example, 
Article 39(1) states: "Everyone shall be entitled to express an opinion 
or to publicize it through words, written or oral, sound or image, or 
in any other way." However, paragraph 2 of this article limits the free 
speech guarantee. It declares, "This right shall not be used to the detri­
ment of the rights and reputations of others, or for the incitement of 
a forcible change of the constitutionally established order, the per­
petration of a crime, or the incitement of enmity or violence against 
anyone." This and other similarly worded qualifications require con­
stitutional interpretation. In this context, the judicial function looms 
large. Article 117(1) states, "The judicial branch of government shall 
safeguard the rights and legitimate interests of all citizens" More­
over, to make the Article 117(1) charge meaningful, Article 117(2) 
of Chapter 6 declares: "The judicial branch of government shall be 
independent." 
The Constitution is declared the "supreme law, and no other law 
shall contravene it" Thus, while there shall be a parliamentary govern­
ment, its laws may not contradict the most basic law, the Constitution. 
This point is further dramatized by the Article 5(2) command that 
"provisions of the Constitution shall apply directly." This means that 
rights exist independent of and are superior to parliamentary enact­
ments, or the executive acts of national or local governments. 
Several court cases involving property expropriation serve as ex­
amples of direct application of the Constitution and the principle of 
constitutional supremacy. Clause 3(1) of the Transitional and Con­
cluding Provisions of the July 1991 Constitution provides that existing 
laws are "applicable insofar as they do not contravene the Consti­
tution" The old law, dating from the days of the communist regime, 
permitted taking of property with compensation promised after expro­
priation. However, Article 19(5) of the new July 1991 Constitution re­
quires that forcible expropriation of property for state or municipal 
needs may only take place "after fair compensation has been ensured 
in advance." Relying on the direct application principle, the Bulgarian 
Supreme Court in several cases abolished expropriation orders because 
compensation was not ensured in advance. Judicial officials, therefore, 
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need not depend on other branches of government to define rights. 
Rather, personal liberties and civil rights exist independent of and are 
superior to legislative or executive action or inaction. It is within the 
realm of judicial authority to define and protect these rights.27 
Human Rights Protections 
Chapter 1 "guarantees the life, dignity and rights of the individual 
and the creation of conditions in Bulgaria . . . conducive to the free 
development of the individual and the civil society." It also contains a 
provision that international instruments ratified by Bulgaria automati­
cally become part of the internal domestic law. Therefore, international 
conventions on human rights to which Bulgaria is a party supersede 
any internal law. Bulgaria is a signatory to a variety of international 
human rights conventions including those dealing with all forms of 
racial discrimination and the European Convention for Human Rights 
and Liberties. On December 10, 1991, the National Assembly ratified 
the optional protocol to the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights. Bulgaria ratified the international convention in 1970, 
but ideological factors militated against acceding to the protocol until 
the current political era.28 
Bulgaria's Constitutional Court has since affirmed a broad interpre­
tation and understanding of Article 5, section 4 of the Constitution. It 
held that international law is part of the national law and takes priority 
over internal law.29 Thus, Article 5 creates a further protection against 
the resurgence of repressive government. Although the issue generates 
internal disputes, there can be little doubt the framers of Bulgaria's 
1991 Constitution were serious about the human rights question. 
Chapter 1 of the Constitution declares all persons are "born free 
and equal in dignity and rights." It explicitly says that all citizens must 
be afforded equal treatment under the law and specifically prohibits 
"privileges or restrictions of rights on the grounds of race, nationality, 
ethnic self-identity, sex, origin, region, education, opinion, political 
affiliation, personal or social status or property status." This provision 
is something of an article of peace. It seeks to assure constitutional 
protection for the nation's diverse populations, including especially 
Turks, Jews, Armenians, and Gypsies. Bulgaria is seeking to avoid the 
ethnic unrest and separatist movements that currently grip several 
146 • Chapter 6 
Eastern European nation-states and many former Soviet republics. 
Yet, it is a matter that is difficult to resolve to the satisfaction of 
everyone. 
In the mid-1980s, the Zhivkov regime repressed the sizable ethnic 
Turkish Moslem minority. The old regime forced Moslems to change 
their names and limited the use of other languages besides the official 
Bulgarian language in everyday communication. As many as 350,000 
ethnic Turks left Bulgaria to escape the persecution after the Bulgarian 
authorities opened the border in May 1989. About half returned to 
Bulgaria after the Zhivkov regime fell. However, they found that it was 
difficult for them to regain their homes and property that had been 
lost, sold, or expropriated by local officials. The ethnic Turks fought 
back by organizing hunger strikes and school boycotts. In the end, the 
Turkish minority organized itself into the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms, a political organization headed by the charismatic Ahmed 
Dogan. It has been a force in Bulgarian politics ever since.30 The con­
stitutional status of this organization has occupied the attention of 
both the Bulgarian Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. In 
controversial decisions, these courts ruled in favor of MRF participa­
tion in the political process.31 Yet, Bulgarians are emotional about the 
Turkish minority issue. It remains a central question challenging na­
tional unity.32 
The Constitutional Court came to the rescue of the market economy 
cause when it was petitioned by President Zhelev and fifty-eight UDF 
members of the National Assembly. They asked the Court to declare 
unconstitutional the 1995 law amending the Agricultural Land Ten­
ure Act. The law passed by the Socialist parliamentary majority over 
Zhelev's suspensory veto provides for the restitution of agricultural 
land taken for purposes of creating collective farms during the Com­
munist regime.33 The objection raised against the legislation was the 
requirement that owners wishing to sell any of the restituted land must 
first offer it to neighbors and to the state before it could be sold on the 
open market to the highest bidder. The Constitutional Court found 
that controversial provision of the law inconsistent with Article 17, 
that private property is inviolable. 
Clearly, then, the Constitution imposes upon the judiciary the re­
sponsibility to safeguard rights, and grants it the authority to pursue 
this duty as an independent branch of government. Moreover, Article 
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117 of the Constitution requires that in the performance of their func­
tions, all judges, court assessors, prosecutors, and investigating magis­
trates shall be subservient only to the law. Within the Bulgarian con­
text, this means there shall be no attempt to unduly influence judges 
about matters before their courts. 
In sum, the July 1991 Constitution of Bulgaria is a document de­
signed to protect rights subject to the usual exceptions polities demand 
to guard the order and well-being of the general population. Because 
the Constitution reflects compromise, it is not perfectly logical in all 
its parts. For example, while the Constitution provides for political and 
religious freedom, it also limits the right of religious and ethnic groups 
to participate in the political process. While the Constitution estab­
lishes a parliamentary democracy, it provides for a president with some 
authority in the legislative process. Yet, a system of separation of pow­
ers with its checks and balances is inconsistent with the notion of 
parliamentary supremacy. Further, while the Constitution extols the 
virtues of judicial independence there is no prohibition on reducing 
judicial salaries, reassigning judges from one court jurisdiction to an­
other or moving judges from one venue to another. In the brief period 
since the adoption of the 1991 basic document, constitutional ambigu­
ities have been subjected to political and legal tests. There is little 
doubt that more challenges will be lodged in the future. 
Interpreting Events 
UPO N FIRST CONSIDERATION it may seem puzzling that the creation 
of a new constitution should be anything but a formality. After all, 
participants in the National Roundtable Talks had managed to reach 
fundamental agreements about the nature of the new political order. 
Upon closer inspection, however, several differences divided the nation 
and its deputies. First, some members of the Grand National Assembly 
were monarchists or had monarchistic sympathies. They sought a re­
turn of the dead king's son, Prince Simeon, from Spain, to take his 
rightful place as head of state. Second, it upset some anti-Communists 
that former Communist leaders and members of the nomenklatura had 
yet to pay an appropriate price for their past misdeeds; and, indeed, 
some leaders of the Bulgarian Socialist Party are said to be guilty of 
profiting personally from the political accommodation hammered out 
at the National Roundtable Talks. This result, incredulous opponents 
of the July 1991 Constitution maintain, is confirmed by the creation 
of a new basic document that allows former Communist Party func­
tionaries a place in what is purported to be a new political order. This 
accommodation remains a source of considerable irritation, resent­
ment, and political conflict. Third, many think the time devoted to 
creating a new Constitution was wasteful of the nation's energy. In­
stead, Parliament should have been occupied enacting laws restoring 
expropriated property to private persons, converting the socialist econ­
omy to a market system, and instituting democratic reforms through­
out society. By simply amending the existing Constitution, as was done 
in Hungary or the Czech Republic, for example, lawmakers might have 
saved valuable time to get on with the really important tasks facing 
the nation. 
148 
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There was also a related matter of practical political science. How 
might it be possible for persons with little if any experience at parlia­
mentary politics to function adequately in the new environment? While 
the former Communists had experience of a sort with parliamentary 
institutions, the oppositionists' main experience with democracy was 
in the streets as protesters. 
A final difficulty faced by the proponents of a new basic document 
was how to promulgate any new constitution. Should the people or 
their representatives ratify the document? The legitimacy question 
was a serious one. Many thought that there had been a preexisting 
agreement for a referendum to be held at the close of the work of 
the Grand National Assembly. Indeed, such an agreement did exist. 
Instead, however, members of the GNA fixed their signatures to the 
document, putting into place the new Constitution without a vote of 
the people. 
From the Roundtable to the Grand 
National Assembly 
Ginio Ganev, the deputy chairman of the GNA and the respected 
chairman of the parliamentary committee for the drafting and ap­
proval of the Constitution, explained to me the important linkage be­
tween the Roundtable Talks and the accomplishments at the Grand 
National Assembly.1 
GG: I belong to those people who consider the National Round­
table a great achievement of the democratic process in Bulgaria. I 
need to emphasize this fact now, although until very recently I 
thought it was implicit. Yet, presently I see that many people are 
trying to deny the necessity at the time to establish such a dialogue. 
In your letter on which the arrangement for this interview is 
based, you point to something that should be described as a su­
preme value for the Bulgarian transition to democracy—and this is 
its peaceful character. The National Roundtable was one of the ini­
tial forms it has taken; that is, to sit together and discuss the prob­
lems, never mind the obstacles created by the then existing balance 
offerees. And regardless of all the difficulties and the circumstances 
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of the day, the National Roundtable was able to work out compro­
mises and to reach decisions with long-lasting effect. 
It needs to be admitted that from a juridical viewpoint it was a 
somewhat peculiar situation: there was a functioning Parliament, 
but at the same time a National Roundtable was setting up its direc­
tion and telling it exactly what to do. We should not discount how 
difficult this was—both from a psychological and practical point of 
view. At the National Roundtable it was decided that the then acting 
Parliament should pass without delay a couple of laws that played 
an important role in promoting political democracy and made real 
the declared liberties like freedom of speech, of political organiza­
tion, of public meetings, rallies and so on. And the changes in the 
then existing Constitution were strongly influenced by the stand 
taken at the National Roundtable. 
In fact it was at the Roundtable Talks that the decision to have 
elections for a Grand National Assembly was made. In accordance 
with Bulgarian constitutional and political tradition, such an assem­
bly is called only when it is thought crucial changes in the governing 
of the country are necessary. . . . The political opposition stuck to 
this idea very persistently indeed. Originally, the Bulgarian Com­
munist Party and the Agrarian Union—the pro-Communist one— 
lacked the understanding why it was important to convene a Grand 
National Assembly. 
AM: Oh, are you suggesting that the Communists had other things 
in mind? 
GG: Initially, they were not convinced that it was necessary to call 
a Grand National Assembly. Indeed, I was among the three non­
party representatives at the National Roundtable who thought it 
unnecessary to start the democratic changes by electing a Grand 
National Assembly and by enacting a new constitution. I admit that 
this idea was alien to me. 
AM: I see. At the time you believed that it was unnecessary to cre­
ate a new constitution. Did you consider simply amending the then 
existing Constitution? 
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GG: An amendment was enacted, and we did need an ordinary Par­
liament because we wanted to change existing legislation. That idea 
reigned supreme at the moment.2 But that is not the point. 
It was Mr. Zhelyu Zhelev and his circle who came up with the 
idea that what we need is a Grand National Assembly to create a 
new constitution and by this to start the overall democratic process 
in the country. I had many discussions with Mr. Zhelev and his 
people about this issue. So I know for sure who was the father of 
this idea. In the end, none of the Roundtable participants opposed 
the decision to hold elections for a Grand National Assembly that 
would create a new constitution. We could have gone the other way, 
to follow the Hungarian experience, for example: there is a working 
Parliament, bills are passed and the existing Constitution is con­
stantly amended to suit the requirements of political development. 
That is why I used to quote the Hungarian example, as did other 
colleagues of mine. I pointed to the fact that there the democratic 
process is developing fine, that they make important laws, and the 
Constitution is not considered an obstacle to them. . . . So, at the 
end of the day, there is just one clause of the Hungarian Constitu­
tion left. Can you guess which one? 
AM: No. 
GG: That Budapest is the capital of Hungary! 
AM: Yes, Bulgaria [as well as Romania] remains the only Eastern 
European nation with a brand-new constitution. This is very inter­
esting, but can you tell me more about your personal role in crafting 
the Constitution? 
GG: . . . Yes, indeed. I will come to that. In other words, the deci­
sion of the National Roundtable to call elections, to create a con­
stitutional assembly and to pass a constitution is extraordinarily 
important for the Bulgarian democratic process. But you have asked 
me about my personal role in this process. At the time there were 
two confronting sides. If we were truly striving for democracy, it 
was necessary to try to invent a formula to make mutually accept­
able decisions. As it so happened, there was no objection from 
either side that I emerged as a kind of go-between person. I, there­
fore, became chairman of the editorial group charged with the 
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responsibility to prepare the texts of the decisions of the National 
Roundtable. And let me state openly that I felt for the first time with 
all my body and soul the greatest principle of democracy in its best 
definition: people who had not been on speaking terms at all met 
together and entered discussions with the goal of finding a com­
mon solution. 
In this sense the National Roundtable achieved several goals: that 
alterations in the then existing laws created the prerequisites for 
democratic political and economic changes; the parliamentary way 
to transform the society was declared supreme; and finally, the lead­
ers of the united opposition became public figures for the first time 
in their lives. The discussions at the National Roundtable Talks were 
covered live by the media. The people watched these proceedings 
and were getting used to a new scene. It was totally different from 
what in forty consecutive years was presented to them as inevitable. 
In its substance this was proof that dialogue is possible. Never mind 
the complexity of the situation as a whole and the different in­
tentions of the people who gathered at the National Roundtable. 
Inevitably, there were many attempts to break off the work of the 
National Roundtable. There were attempts to impose "street democ­
racy" (mob rule). . . . 
But we had to state that the street is unable to govern. It is ex­
tremely difficult to say this openly and at the same time to keep your 
influence. So this is in brief my assessment about the role of the 
National Roundtable. 
AM: Was there an idea early at the Roundtable to put the new Con­
stitution to a vote of the people? That is, to a referendum? Was that 
part of the agreement reached at the National Roundtable Talks? 
GG: True, such ideas were around. But we decided upon an ap­
proach that is closer to the traditions of Bulgarian constitution­
alism. The first constitution of the newly liberated Bulgaria from 
the Turks, the so-called Turnovo Constitution [1879], was enacted 
by a majority of the deputies in the Grand National Assembly and 
not by referendum. By contrast, the [1971] Constitution of Todor 
Zhivkov was enacted by referendum. Our memories of the referen­
dum for Todor Zhivkov's Constitution are not associated with de­
mocracy. Because of this, it was agreed that the new Constitution 
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shall be passed by a two-thirds majority from the total number of 
all deputies in the Grand National Assembly; in the context of the 
Bulgarian tradition and the actual representation at the Grand Na­
tional Assembly this meant a great number of people, because the 
Grand National Assembly had four hundred deputies. For a coun­
try the size of Bulgaria [nine million] there is no need for a Parlia­
ment with more than two hundred MPs. . . . The electoral law, 
which was passed [for the GNA election] was a relatively good one, 
and it promoted the so-called mixed system—a combination be­
tween the majority and proportional system. 
Street Radicals and Parliamentarians 
After elaborating upon the legitimacy of the Grand National As­
sembly, Ganev then talked about the problem of instilling a sense of 
parliamentarianism among the members of Grand National Assembly. 
That is, how might it be possible to convert stridently uncompromising 
street radicals to members of a parliamentary body wherein they must 
engage in dialogue, rule abiding, and compromise. Ganev said: 
We all came to the Grand National Assembly straight from the 
squares with our megaphones, so many of us believed that standing 
on the parliamentary rostrum is the same as speaking into a mega­
phone at a mass rally. But that has nothing to do with parliamentari­
anism. Everybody was trying to make their way to the rostrum; they 
were carrying letters and insisting upon reading them. . . . MPs did 
not speak to each other in the Parliament and so on. And as an 
active leader in this National Assembly, I must say that, although it 
was short, the experience was extremely important for the develop­
ment of Bulgarian democracy. Although my efforts were not un­
aided by others, my personal involvement prevented the Parliament 
from disintegrating. There were several attempts to do this. Well, I 
was once asked—"Mr. Ganev, if you leave the Parliament, it will 
break down for sure. So, why don't you leave it?" This became 
a topical issue especially after the so-called Group of Thirty-Nine 
disaffected members, including hunger strikers, emerged. But that is 
another issue. 
But I will tell you how I used to answer: This particular 
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Parliament does not matter much. The important matter is the prin­
ciple of parliamentarianism. The fact that the Grand National As­
sembly exists is important by itself. Otherwise, we could get into the 
bad habit of disbanding parliamentary institutions by illegal means 
any time it suits us. 
My efforts to find some kind of modus vivendi proved successful. 
I prevented any issue from entry into the parliamentary itinerary 
that could be voted "automatically," so to speak. This is an impor­
tant rule because in a divided society such as ours at that time— 
and it is divided still—automatic voting, passing bills with a narrow 
majority, is dangerous to democracy. 
AM: By "automatic" you mean without discussion. Therefore, you 
required debate? 
GG: Not only debate, but I required contact groups that would 
achieve some kind of understanding outside the plenary hall before 
the start of the official debates. Because in a divided society like 
ours, now and then, to put a bill to a quick vote and to pass it by a 
minimal majority is not democratic by definition. This is so because 
in the transitional period you need the largest possible support of 
good will and respect for legitimacy mobilized behind a law. I think 
that is clear, but not to all people. 
AM: So one might say in your official capacity as deputy chairman 
of the GNA you behaved as something of a classroom teacher for 
the pupils of democracy. 
GG: Well, I treated everyone evenhandedly; I was just an equal 
among equals and behaved very politely. One of the great demo­
cratic results of this first stage of our transition was that crucial 
bills were passed. They can make up a whole catalogue: the law for 
political rehabilitation and amnesty; laws to change the economic 
structure of the society—for the land, for foreign investments for 
the local government and so on. Plus the Constitution, of course. 
Who says there are perfect laws? There are no such laws. But the 
important thing is to have laws as such. In a country like Bulgaria, 
which just emerged from the totalitarian period, the most important 
thing is to get used to the idea that the state cannot be governed by 
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the ambition of people who just want to hold power. From now on, 
it shall be governed by rules [laws]. 
AM: Right. 
GG: I am more aware than many others that this Constitution 
could have been more sophisticated, but it is in no way a bad consti­
tution. It is by no means a Communist constitution—I state this 
openly and clearly in my capacity as chairman of the parliamentary 
committee for the drafting and approval of the Constitution. There 
were sixteen projects. Each parliamentary group had its own proj­
ect. Apart from these there were too many other projects, initiated 
by private persons and the public in general. The committee debated 
all issues by involving experts, and the public had full access to the 
discussions. We had at our disposal the most up-to-date constitu­
tional texts. In the end, a Constitution was passed where constitu­
tionalism in its modern form dominates as a principle: a developed 
parliamentarianism; a chapter for the rights and liberties is not just 
mentioned but is developed or fortified by the corresponding de­
tailed legislative and court procedures. We proclaim the supremacy 
of the principle that in all cases where Bulgaria is a party under 
international law that such acts are directly applied even if they con­
tradict the norms of the internal law. And so on. But that is an­
other story. 
The point is that the Constitution works. Even those people who 
were against it must read and quote from it—in accordance with 
their own interests, of course. That is natural. Let the Constitution 
be. As happens with every constitution in the world, let us prepare 
changes of particular provisions to better reflect developments in 
society. I make this extra pronouncement to point out that despite 
my initial opposition to the idea to create a Grand National Assem­
bly, later I did my best to help it function successfully. 
Writing a new constitution was thought an appropriate legitimating 
act, one that was consistent with precedent when the nation had under­
gone fundamental changes dating from the original Constitution 
promulgated after liberation from Turkish rule in 1879. Mr. Ganev's 
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The Grand National Assembly at work. Petar Beron and Deputy Chairman 
Ginio Ganev hotly discuss a point of order. 
observations are valuable because we learn that the idea of a Grand 
National Assembly that would function both as a regular parliamen­
tary lawmaking body and as a constitutional convention was an idea 
of the UDF leadership. It was not an idea of the leadership of the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party. Oddly enough, as the GNA was completing 
its task, the new draft constitution created internal conflict within 
UDF ranks, while at the same time the BSP embraced it. It is also of 
particular interest to learn that Ganev understood the importance of 
developing democratic habits. As a leader, he insisted upon full debate 
preceded by careful study of all the issues involved in creating the new 
Constitution. This action may have aided decision makers in learning 
the ways of democratic institutions. Then, too, the cathartic value of 
robust debate should not be underestimated. It is functional because 
with a full airing of arguments on all sides of an issue, people may 
view democratic forums as legitimate expressions of their will. 
Opponents of Ratification 
When speaking with Ginio Ganev one is impressed with his commit­
ment and sincerity. Yet, there are other persons of demonstrable good 
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will who view matters differently. Not everyone who opposed the pro­
mulgation of the new Constitution did so for the same reasons— 
including the hunger strikers who threatened the conclusion of the 
GNA's work. Then too, there were ninety-one members of the Grand 
National Assembly that for one reason or another did not sign the new 
Constitution. I asked Petko Simeonov why so many deputies decided 
to boycott the GNA at the end of its deliberations. Besides being 
a founder of the UDF and a leading figure of the Grand National 
Assembly, at one time, Simeonov boycotted the plenary sessions. He 
said:3 
There was an artificial slowdown of the activity of the Grand Na­
tional Assembly on behalf of the Communist Party, in which the 
conservatives began to regain their self-confidence. . . . 
AM: So, you mean they wanted to delay the ratification of the 
Constitution? 
PS: Well, not only to delay ratification, but to delay the work on 
the creation of the Constitution; they did so intentionally, by use of 
the procedural rules. By giving priority to the laws . .  . So this delay 
was the reason [for the boycott]. When they left [the Parliament] I 
also followed suit, because I was greatly dissatisfied with the slow­
down in the work of the National Assembly and with those deci­
sions imposed by force. And when they left I was with them. But 
when this protest took the form of a hunger strike, when they 
started to proclaim revolutionary slogans, I dissociated from them 
and stated outright that the Constitution should be signed, because 
this represents a step forward. I was torn to pieces for taking this 
stand. Nevertheless, because of the boycott of the National As­
sembly the work on the Constitution actually sped up. So it played 
a positive role in the creation of the new Constitution. 
AM: So, it was not a matter of disagreement with the decisions 
made by the Grand National Assembly, of particular provisions in 
the Constitution; it was a matter of how rapid the process should 
go. Is that correct? 
PS: No. The issue originally was that the Grand National Assembly 
worked with great difficulty. Then, some of those who left started 
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to proclaim revolutionary slogans. Simultaneously, they began to 
explain their behavior to the people by saying that they left [the 
Parliament], and that they are on a hunger strike because they dis­
agree with the [new] Constitution. But this was, so to speak, just a 
pretext. The heart of the matter, the basic motive of their actions, 
which was not stated openly, is that they disagreed with the Consti­
tution because it is a republican one. 
AM: Aha, they were monarchists, the hunger strikers? 
PS: Yes, those of them who were the leaders as well as the behind-
the-scene abettors. Because acceptance of the new Constitution 
would mean closing the door for the eventual return of the Tur­
novo Constitution. 
AM: Oh, from 1879. 
PS: Yes, of that one, which proclaimed Bulgaria a monarchy. 
AM: So, they wanted to go back to the Constitution of 1879. . . . 
PS: Exactly. 
AM: And the Communist Constitution created in 1947 was an ille­
gal act from their point of view? 
PS: Yes, indeed. 
AM: That is very interesting. 
PS: They did not say "we want the tsar back," they said instead: 
"We do not want this Constitution, it is a Communist one"; or 
sometimes they said: "We want the Turnovo Constitution," which 
in fact meant that they also want the monarchy. But this was said 
under their breath. 
AM: Do these monarchists believe in human rights? I ask this be­
cause much of the 1991 Constitution contains references to human 
rights. 
PS: I doubt it. I know a thing or two about some of these people. 
What they wanted was the restoration, to get back to the status quo 
of the prewar [World War II] days. 
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AM: Are the proponents of monarchy young or very old people? 
PS: People of all ages. 
AM: Would you say they are romantics? 
PS: There is nothing romantic in their motives. They seek only mer­
cantile interests or they desire to restore their former positions in 
the system of power. They believe in some absurd things. For ex­
ample, they call the anti-fascists bandits. They claim fascism never 
existed in Bulgaria. So I asked at a press conference, I appealed to 
the gentlemen from the UDF to kindly inform the ambassadors of 
the United States, Great Britain, and France that Roosevelt, 
Churchill, and de Gaulle were bandits and criminals. And this is 
true because their allies, people who fought along with them, were 
called these names. 
Simeonov's view of the hunger strikers is not universally shared. Stefan 
Gaitanjiev, another UDF leader and GNA member, and later the 
leader of his own political party, said there are other reasons that some 
people took part in the hunger strikes. That is, there were hunger strik­
ers who were not closet monarchists. Some strikers sought early elec­
tions, and some simply thought the new Constitution as it was shaping 
up was a procommunist document. But Gaitanjiev, an academic soci­
ologist with the Institute for State and Law, added a most interesting 
possible cause that might explain the radical actions of some hunger 
strikers. He said they wanted to bring to a halt the work of Parliament 
because that body had commissioned a study that would name persons 
who had cooperated in the past with the secret police; they feared re­
vealing the dossiers of former security service collaborators.4 
Clearly, then, there is a host of possible reasons advanced for why 
some attempted to block the work of the Grand National Assembly I 
asked Jordan Vasilev, a leader of the hunger strikers, about the justifi­
cation for their action and why the leaders of the Turkish ethnic move­
ment did not join them. He said:5 
Well, I can give you firsthand information, I witnessed the situation, 
for I was an MP at the Grand National Assembly. At that moment 
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The Socialist side at the Grand National Assembly 
they [the Movement for Rights and Freedoms] were absolutely close 
to us in the UDF. Our political ideas were almost identical. The 
most acute moment came when about forty UDF deputies came to 
the conclusion that this Constitution is riddled with dangerous 
traps. So we decided not to sign it and to leave Parliament. And 
because I was the initiator of this and author of the declaration of 
the hunger-strikers, I consulted a couple of times Mr. Dogan and 
some other men from the MRF leadership. Their reply was "we 
regard you as the right ones; the greater part of the UDF deputies, 
about one hundred, who said they will sign the Constitution, are 
wrong. Yet, it is politically embarrassing to leave the Parliament at 
the same time as you. We are going to wait a couple of weeks before 
following suit." And they did it. 
AM: They did it later. 
JV: Indeed. Of those one hundred deputies from the UDF who 
stayed and became signatories to the Constitution, you will not find 
any person who is in Parliament at the present moment [1993]. 
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The opposition side at the Grand National Assembly 
Politics as the art of the possible. The leader of the former Communists, 
Alexander Lilov, is engaged in discussion with UDF leader Zhelyu Zhelev 
during the Grand National Assembly. 
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When the work of the Grand National Assembly was complete, a large 
number of its members refused to sign the new Constitution. I asked 
Ivan Glushkov about the sources of the internal disunity within the 
UDF during these days. When I interviewed him in October 1993, 
Glushkov was the leader of the Christian-Agrarian Party. At the 
Roundtable Talks he served as a leader of the BZNS (the Agrarian 
Union or Agrarian Party, as it is sometimes called), and later he was an 
elected member and deputy speaker of the Grand National Assembly.6 
Explaining first that there was relative unity within the UDF during 
the days of the Roundtable Talks, Glushkov went on to say: 
This happened during the Grand National Assembly. A couple of 
months after the start of the Grand National Assembly, disunity 
began to show. 
AM: What were the first signs? In your capacity as a deputy speaker 
can you recall the first signs of disunity within the ranks of the 
UDF? 
IG: I believe that the first differences that became prominent had 
their formal cause in issues surrounding the Constitution. But the 
real cause was that part of the democratic forces wanted a harder, 
more definite and decisive stand against the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party. To put this clearer—this was the time when the UDF split. 
The divisive issue was whether it should accept some kind of "col­
laboration approach" toward the Bulgarian Socialist Party. The 
justification for this approach was to complete the work on the 
Constitution. But in the process it would be necessary to make more 
concessions. The other faction stood for a tougher stand and was 
against any concessions to the Communists. 
AM: Yes, but within the framework of the debate about the Consti­
tution, how was a more rigid line manifested? What did it look like? 
If a person was more anti-Communist than someone else, what posi­
tion would that person take on specific constitutional provisions 
that would distinguish him . . . ? 
IG: These differences took initially the form of sharp debates within 
the UDF and its parliamentary group. . . . 
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AM: I see, but I want to know what specific issues about the Consti­
tution, for example . . . 
IG: . .  . I would say there was no specific issue around which the 
disagreements were concentrated. Simply the UDF, the UDF's lead­
ership, and the hard-liners within the UDF insisted upon the inclu­
sion of certain clauses in the Constitution. These suggestions were 
absolutely unacceptable to the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Finally, 
these disagreements took their most outright form with the decision 
of thirty-nine MPs, in fact there were about forty, from the UDF's 
parliamentary group. They decided to leave the Grand National As­
sembly and to go on a hunger strike. . . . 
The Bulgarian Socialist Party had an absolute majority in the 
Grand National Assembly But the BSP was lacking the required 
qualified majority (of two-thirds of the total vote) to ratify the Con­
stitution. So if the UDF parliamentary group had stayed united un­
til the end, the Constitution could not have entered into force. The 
Agrarian Party [BZNS] had sixteen votes. If, theoretically, they are 
added to the votes of the BSP, the overall votes would not have 
been enough to make up a qualified majority. And yet in the Grand 
National Assembly, the BZNS voted more often, I would say almost 
constantly with the UDF. 
AM: Well, that is interesting, but I do not yet understand the spe­
cific issues they were arguing about . .  . I understand the general 
philosophy of the opposition to the Communist Party. . . . Let me 
give you an example . . . 
IG: . .  . At the time one of the basic issues discussed was the guilt 
of the Communist functionaries for the last forty-five years of rule. 
I am not a jurist, and so it is difficult for me to create a proper 
formula for this. The other reason that motivated the UDF hard­
liners to behave so resolutely was our conviction that the Commu­
nists wanted to pass the Constitution and then to treat the Grand 
National Assembly as an ordinary parliament for quite a long time, 
where they will keep their majority. 
AM: So it did, I mean, the Grand National Assembly tackled par­
liamentary questions. 
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IG: . . . The hard-liners in the UDF and two or three BZNS depu­
ties, including myself, insisted that the Grand National Assembly 
disband itself right after it passes the Constitution and to have gen­
eral elections for an ordinary National Assembly within a two- to 
three-month period. This was the substance of the demand of those 
from the UDF who left Parliament. They did not sign the Constitu­
tion and declared they would not be back in Parliament until the 
GNA makes a decision to disband itself, and to set a date for gen­
eral elections in the fall. 
AM: Did some hunger strikers—the thirty-nine—did they believe 
that a referendum should be held on the Constitution?7 
IG: Yes, the referendum question was advanced because there had 
been much talk that the new Constitution was undemocratic, a pro-
Communist one. So we put the issue, which was quite logical, to 
the National Assembly: well, we argued, if some claim that the 
new Constitution is pro-Communist and others maintain that it is 
a democratic one—although to be fair, they have not read it yet— 
it is wise to have a ratification referendum two to three months after 
the Constitution's vote in the Grand National Assembly. Let the 
people express their wish. That will put all the speculation to an end. 
But the Communists were definitely against this idea. They knew the 
new Constitution would stabilize their economic power established 
during 1990 and 1991. So the day of the Constitution's entry into 
force was a celebration day for them. 
AM: Let me summarize your point of view and see if I have it right. 
The Communist Party wanted to survive into the future. The 
UDF—some UDF leaders—agreed to allow them to continue to 
exist. So an agreement was made—either formally or informally. 
IG: The existence or nonexistence of the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
was not at the time considered an issue. The Communist Party was 
keen to assure for itself first of all to go scot-free for all the crimes 
committed during the past forty-five years; and, second, it wanted 
to further its existence, and by this I mean not just its survival but 
its good prospects. 
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AM: But some UDF leaders went along with this wish to allow for 
a peaceful transition. And there were some of you, such as yourself, 
who were against this accommodation. 
IG: Exactly. 
AM: What else could you have done, given the fact that the Com­
munist Party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, had the power, they had 
the military, the militia? 
IG: Nobody questioned the peaceful character of the transition. 
But we considered—and I am still convinced about this—Bulgaria 
made a mistake by electing in 1990 a Grand National Assembly, 
whose task it was to create a new constitution. Even now the leaders 
of the UDF are unable to explain to their followers where this idea 
to create a Grand National Assembly originated. Actually this 
idea was proposed by Mr. Stoyan Ganev, who served then as an 
[UDF constitutional] expert. Mr, Stoyan Ganev became later a 
UDF leader, and the party he founded—the United Christian-
Democratic Center—is still a member of the UDF coalition. Dur­
ing Mr. Philip Dimitrov's government [1991-92] he was appointed 
Bulgaria's foreign minister, and in this capacity he chaired the 
1992-93 session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
Meanwhile, he went out of favor and was expelled from the UDF 
and from his own party. Currently, [October 1993] he is in the USA 
and does not seem keen to come back. Nevertheless, some UDF 
moderates that survived the purges so far, or those who are already 
out of the coalition, place their hopes in him as a "savior" of the 
"original" and "true" UDF. Out of the blue, during the Roundtable, 
sometime in the middle of the discussions, Stoyan Ganev began to 
promote the idea that we should have a Grand National Assembly 
at any cost and that its mission should be to create a new constitu­
tion. I still believe that we would have gone much faster toward 
democratization and market reform if we had spent our time in the 
Grand National Assembly creating laws necessary for the transition 
instead of creating the Constitution. Such laws were really essential; 
for example: taxation laws, laws regulating the structural changes 
[in the economy]—we still do not have them—or privatization laws. 
In other words, we should have acted like Hungary and the Czech 
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Republic. They kept their old constitutions and altered their provi­
sions to such an extent, that, as the anecdote goes, the only thing 
left from the Hungarian Socialist Constitution is the name of the 
capital city, Budapest. They did not waste a year or more producing 
a new constitution. Some people here say it would have been fatal 
to carry on with the old, Zhivkov Constitution. But we could have 
changed a number of articles in it. Formally, it looked very demo­
cratic. We should have concentrated our efforts on changing the 
system, and we should have taken the power from the Communists 
by means of the law. And by this we would have sped up the transi­
tion of property ownership from state to private. This process is 
still deadlocked. 
AM: You present a very interesting interpretation. . .  . It occurs to 
me that at least one very important constitutional change was made 
by using the old constitutional system—that is, the Party's leading 
role in society. This proposal was introduced in the National Assem­
bly in December [1989], and a month later it became part of Bulgar­
ian law. Is that true? 
IG: We should have changed many more articles in that way! 
AM: Yes, I see. Let me ask another question: Are there any provi­
sions in the current Constitution that you find obnoxious? In other 
words, are there any provisions you think should not be there? 
IG: I do not regard it as a grave political mistake, but this Constitu­
tion has one fundamental weakness. When on the occasion of the 
second anniversary of the Constitution I participated in a TV pro­
gram along with the current minister of justice Mr. Petar Kornajev, 
who was at the time a UDF (leading) member, I said that the basic 
deficiency of this Constitution is the lack of balance among the 
three powers and that their prerogatives are not clearly defined. 
When we started work on the Constitution we invited a couple 
of times Professor Robert Baninter from France, who is a prominent 
constitutionalist, chairman of the Constitutional Council, and for­
mer minister of justice under President Mitterand. He drew our 
attention to the issue of separation of powers, placing special 
importance on the need for the precise prerogatives of each of the 
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three powers. Events since the enactment of the Constitution reveal 
that there are a great many ambiguities, omissions, and inconsisten­
cies in our Constitution. Almost every case involving a constitu­
tional matter must be referred to the Constitutional Court for a 
ruling. 
I will give you a very illustrative example to show you how far 
the Bulgarian Constitution is from perfection. The chapter stipulat­
ing the prerogatives of the president states there is a president and 
vice president. Under certain circumstances, like death or impeach­
ment, when the president is unable to execute his functions, the vice 
president takes over until the end of the given mandate. But there 
is not a single word about what would happen if the vice president 
resigns from office; it does not say there would be an election for 
vice president—such a provision is not logical, by the way, but it 
should be stated clearly. When Mrs. Blaga Dimitrova resigned [as 
vice president], there was much speculation in the mass media and 
by politicians: some said that President Zhelev should resign too; 
others retorted: no, he has to stay until the end of his mandate; 
and a third view insisted that only elections for vice president are 
necessary. I do not think there are such stupid things in the U.S. 
Constitution! 
AM: [Laughter] We had a similar problem until very recently. But 
your point is very interesting. Are you suggesting that political ques­
tions are being framed in legal terms—and this may not be good 
for the political life of the community. Is the political energy of the 
nation being sapped with these legal constitutional questions, rather 
than debating the substantive policy questions facing society? 
IG: I want to state once more my earnest belief that if we had used 
that year in the National Assembly to pass, say, ten laws: for taxa­
tion, for quick privatization, for a national audit chamber, et cetera, 
we would have achieved more to change the system and to achieve 
privatization. As I already have said, the Constitution, which is the 
basic law of the country, does not change the system. If the system 
has to change this should be done by laws . . . 
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Ivan Glushkov, vice chairman of the 
Grand National Assembly and leader 
of the Christian Agrarian Party 
Ivan Glushkov expresses a perspective shared by many of those I inter­
viewed on all sides of the issues. Despite the painstaking care taken by 
those at the National Roundtable Talks to work out an accommoda­
tion between the inheritors of the former Communist Party and their 
opponents, suspicion and fear of the possible motives and intentions 
of the former Communists made cooperation among the deputies to 
the Grand National Assembly very difficult to achieve. Bulgarian So­
cialist Party leaders' support of the new Constitution was a red flag 
for some deputies; it served as a cue to oppose the new document. 
Perhaps they did so reactively, that is, without careful analysis of the 
specific issues. They behaved in this way because they did not want to 
think of themselves or for others to think of them as guilty of collabo­
rating with the enemy. These people believed then and many remain 
convinced that the proper course was to severely punish the Commu­
nists for their past misdeeds. Like others I interviewed, Glushkov has 
some specific criticisms of the Constitution as finally ratified. But none 
of the criticisms are fundamental. His harshest criticism is that the 
GNA wasted its time by drafting a Constitution, time that could have 
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been better spent writing new laws that might have facilitated a more 
rapid transition to democracy and a market economy. 
Accomplishment  s of th  e GNA 
Though critics may be correct that the GNA's work on the Constitu­
tion delayed efforts to legislate dramatically in important areas of pub­
lic life, it is erroneous to conclude that the assembly accomplished very 
little. From the GNA's start on July 10, 1990, until September 20,1991, 
just before the new general elections, deputies introduced more than 
five hundred bills in their complete or draft form. Ninety-seven of them 
became law, twenty-nine were withdrawn, and the rest did not receive 
approval from parliamentary committees or were not subjected to a 
vote at the plenary sessions because they were too controversial. The 
GNA issued another two hundred decisions, declarations, and ap­
peals; seven of the twelve parliamentary declarations dealt with inter­
national or internal crises.8 
Though it is true Bulgaria was slow to move to a market economy 
because it failed to embrace the Western economic recommendation 
of shock therapy, it is incorrect to conclude that the GNA did nothing 
with respect to this matter. The GNA enacted on January 9, 1991, the 
Law for Accountancy; on February 22, 1991, it took the first legal step 
toward the restitution of the land to its former owners with the passage 
of the Law for Land Ownership and of the Use of Agricultural Land. 
On May 2, 1991, the GNA passed the Law for the Protection of Com­
petition. On May 16, 1991, it passed a Trade Law, and a day later it 
enacted the Law on Foreign Investments. On June 6, 1991, the GNA 
enacted the Law for the Bulgarian National Bank. And on July 19, 
1991, it enacted the Law for the Co-operative Societies.9 
The GNA passed other laws important for establishing a new politi­
cal infrastructure. These include the Law for the Ministry of Interior 
(July 3, 1991), the Law for the Constitutional Court (July 30,1991), the 
Law for Administrative and Territorial Restructuring of the Country 
(August 12, 1991), the Law for Election of the Peoples' Deputies, Mu­
nicipal Councilors, and Mayors (August 15, 1991), the Law for the 
Supreme Judicial Council (August 21, 1991), the Legal Profession Law 
(September 12, 1991), and the Law for Electing the President and Vice-
President of Bulgaria (September 17, 1991).I0 
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The GNA also ratified some important international agreements-
Ministers gave answers to nearly five hundred parliamentary questions 
in response to concerns about the government's policy. The Grand Na­
tional Assembly also established a half dozen study commissions.11 
Thus, critics must concede the GNA enacted important legislation, 
and by doing so, progress was made toward building a more demo­
cratic nation. Yet, it is also true, as a matter of logic, that greater prog­
ress toward a democratic and capitalist future might have been 
possible if the GNA had not directed its attention toward creating a 
new constitution. Obviously, time and energy saved in one area might 
be applied to another. But that conclusion assumes that the UDF re­
formers had the votes to bring about change. Because the BSP had a 
majority of the seats, such a scenario appears improbable. At the same 
time, one might hold the view that the new Constitution was an impor­
tant step toward guaranteeing a democratic future for Bulgaria; time 
spent on this project was well worth the delay. Petar Dertliev is a per­
son holding such a view. Some Bulgarians call him the father of the 
Constitution. My interview with him reveals a hopeful person with 
confidence that Bulgarians are capable of willing democracy into ex­
istence. Sitting in his office as the leader of the Social Democratic 
Party, we discussed a wide range of issues that surround the transition 
to democracy.12 
AM: Thank you for this interview. It is a particular honor for me 
because it is my understanding that you are a longtime dissident. 
PD: . .  . Half a century . . . 
AM: Half a century 
PD: .  . . More than half a century. Plus ten years in prisons and 
camps. . . . 
AM: Why do you think the leaders of the Bulgarian Communist 
Party were willing to participate rather rapidly in changing its lead­
ing role in the society? That is, in adopting the Article 1 constitu­
tional amendment that eliminated the Party's leading role? Why do 
you think the Party was forthcoming in that respect? 
PD: The Communist Party changed much during the fifty years of 
its rule. When they took power, they were almost entirely illiterate 
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revolutionaries. But gradually the necessities of life made them reli­
ant upon professional, well-qualified people for positions in the gov­
ernment. And because of changes in Russia brought about through 
Gorbachev's perestroika, the Bulgarian Communists realized that 
the era of communism is nearing its end, and if it is to preserve its 
influence it needs to adapt. . .  . Of the socialist parties all around 
the world, formerly the so-called socialist camp, I believe the Bul­
garian Communist Party was, perhaps, best able to adapt to the 
new social changes. It was very quick to declare its rejection of the 
communist ideas and adopted, at least formally, democratic and 
even some social democratic values. Of course, if you have lived 
with a totalitarian heart and mentality for quite a long time, it is 
not easy to become a democrat overnight. They were successful in 
keeping united the old hardcore Bolshevik guard, and the Party's 
intellectuals who know much about democracy, the market econ­
omy, and so on. This explains why they participated at the Round­
table with us, although not very enthusiastically, in the first 
democratic changes. 
They perfectly applied in practice the English proverb: If you 
can't stop the train, jump on it. They realized that communism was 
doomed. So, they decided to get on the train and take it. And they 
have been successful to a great extent. In the first place the Party 
nomenklatura established itself among the newborn [Bulgarian] 
capitalists, thanks to its national and international connections and 
positions in the economy and in the society generally. Along with 
these advantages, they were allowed to adapt to the new social phi­
losophy, and they did not oppose our demands for democratic 
change. Indeed, they created obstacles, some of them did not want 
to retreat, but this has never been a life-or-death issue. I am speak­
ing about the period when I was one of the UDF leaders and the 
Social Democratic Party was a leading force in the coalition. They 
[the Communists] accepted many ideas of social democracy as a 
way of mimicry. 
AM: To maintain themselves in power? 
PD: To keep their influence over the poor, the common people. Be­
cause of their willingness to institute democratic reforms we agreed 
to work with them—without compromising—and we achieved 
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democratic changes at the Roundtable, which were incorporated in 
the [new] Constitution. The documents we signed, including the 
Constitution itself, have no communist features at all. The Constitu­
tion is based on the example of all modern European constitutions: 
separation of powers and balance between them and guarantees for 
their proper function. Like every other human deed, the new Con­
stitution is not perfect. Moreover, everyone has his own subjective 
judgment about what is good or bad about the Constitution: the 
president wants more power for himself, while the National Assem­
bly wants this power too . . . But on balance, I consider this Consti­
tution a good one. And one of the greatest achievements of the 
Social Democratic Party is that it was able to convince most UDF 
deputies at the time to stay in Parliament and to create this Con­
stitution. There was an opposite opinion that if Communists par­
ticipate in the creation of the Constitution it is undoubtedly a 
Communist one. But even now it is impossible to have a Consti­
tution bypassing them because we need a two-thirds majority. But 
these claims against our involvement in the making of the Constitu­
tion were simply a demagogy born of party partisanship. The basic 
reason for such behavior was the monarchists' desire to bring the 
old Turnovo Constitution back. 
AM: Pardon me, may I interrupt with a short question? Did the 
constitutional provision that was eventually drafted declare Bul­
garia a republic? 
PD: .  . . yes. 
AM: . . . and that was a deliberately antimonarchist action or was 
it also a matter of eliminating "the people's democracy" phrase in 
the old Constitution? That is, was it a two-edged sword that applied 
not only to the monarchy—it prohibited monarchy and at the same 
time it prohibited the old form of Communism? Was that the think­
ing in the first place? 
PD: We eliminated the idea of people's democracy straightaway at 
the Roundtable. At the time when we were creating the Constitu­
tion, the monarchists were not brave enough to come out in the 
open. This subtle monarchism began to manifest its true nature only 
very recently. The Turnovo Constitution, which they want to re­
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store, is a document created right after the liberation of Bulgaria 
from the Turks. And it represents a marvelous achievement of the 
Bulgarian free spirit. But it contains an internal contradiction due 
to the timing of its creation. On one hand, there are guarantees 
for basic human rights, while on the other hand, it constitutes a 
monarchist regime; and all three monarchs, who reigned over Bul­
garia [since its liberation] infringed those particular rights. I am re­
publican, a bloody republican. [We laugh.] 
AM: Let me ask you about tactics. There were mass demonstrations 
in November and December [1989] and, I believe, in January [1990]. 
The Communist Party objected to these demonstrations. And when 
one reads the news reports, one gets the feeling that these mass dem­
onstrations were orchestrated by the UDF or the opposition forces 
in general. 
PD: You see, the public mood after the change [November 10, 1989] 
was very enthusiastic, and the people expected great improvement 
in their lives. I do not think I will ever see again such an impressive 
mass rally as the one I saw two days before the June 1990 election. 
Calling it a mass rally cannot describe it fully. It was a euphoric 
gathering, a festival of joy and happiness. Words are weak to express 
the feeling. But the immaturity of our political life, on one hand, 
and the communist infiltration, on the other, brought gradually a 
split within UDF ranks. In the end, all the founding formations of 
the UDF were thrown out by an internal coup. 
Nevertheless, we believe that we fulfilled our historic mission. 
The fact is that whatever confrontation may occur or political 
battles that might be fought, now and forever, they [the Commu­
nists] must stay within the law. That which has happened in Russia, 
in Romania, or in Yugoslavia cannot happen in Bulgaria. I consider 
myself a patriot. Therefore, I consider it my duty to preserve toler­
ance toward ethnic minorities. 
For example, here, in this place tonight, there will be a meeting, 
among others, with representatives of the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms. I have prepared for the occasion a draft charter for civil 
peace and rights, and I believe that the twelve formations, which are 
going to meet together, will approve it, although with some minor 
alterations. The basic principles in this charter are defined as 
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follows: patriotism means in the first place peacekeeping; the cre­
ation of a national culture mostly by the three main ethnic groups 
and not just by the dominant Bulgarian ethnic group; nonuse of 
religion for political purposes—which by the way is laid out in the 
Constitution; change in the national consciousness by force of any 
person or social group is unacceptable. You know that in 1986 there 
began a forceful "Bulgarization" of the Turks by changing their 
names. Well, you also know, perhaps, that in 1945-46 there was a 
similar forceful "Macedonization" [assimilation] of the Bulgarians 
who lived in Pirin's Macedonia to please Stalin and Tito. 
AM: Yes. 
PD: Currently all communist parties have changed from national 
nihilism to national communism.13 They all are fiercely nationalistic, 
hateful of all other nations and ethnic groups. I do not think I need 
to clarify this point. That is why we are so proud, I am particularly 
proud because this Constitution has been named after me; my polit­
ical opponents call it "the Dertliev Constitution." 
AM: Yes, I heard that. 
PD: This was a very great political battle. Many people believed 
that we had created the Constitution by compromising with the 
Communists. So, suddenly as one of the much loved leaders in the 
country I was denigrated as a person deeply hated by a great many 
people. But I consider the interests of the country superior to the 
interests of any one person. I have served this idea and my people 
for over sixty years, and nothing can make me become a traitor to 
the interests of this country as I understand them. It sounds too 
pathetic, but it is true. Now, after we [the Social Democratic Party] 
lost the second election [in October 1991], we are looking forward 
to the third one [December 1994] and hope we will be successful 
this time. A lot of things have changed. Many people have begun to 
think on their own and with their heads, not from their hearts. So I 
believe we will win. But whatever the outcome, I am pretty sure we 
avoided the worst thing that could have happened in this country. 
For there is nothing worse than a civil war. 
AM: I do not want to divert our attention from discussing the Con­
stitution. But you raise a very interesting issue with the declaration 
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on civil peace that you will be proposing tonight. Is there any provi­
sion in your working document to integrate Turkish ethnic minority 
people into positions of political power? For example, to make more 
of them judges? Would such actions help to alleviate the feeling that 
members of the Turkish ethnic minority are out of the mainstream 
of Bulgarian life? 
PD: Let us look at the problem from two different points of view: 
my personal opinion . . . and with respect to the realities in the 
country as they now exist. Bulgaria spent five centuries under the 
Turkish yoke, and it is very easy to create negative attitudes against 
the Turkish people. Additionally, fascists and the far right always 
base their propaganda on certain visual symbols like some minority 
groups: Jews, Arabs, etc. In Bulgaria, the group that can be ex­
ploited for such purposes is the Turks, the common people. This 
fact is going to be exploited by the Communists [BSP] at the next 
general election. Unfortunately, I suspect that the UDF may be 
tempted to use this cause too. The Left and the Right both will play 
that card. 
AM: The nationalist's card? 
PD: Yes. Currently, the ethnic party of the Turks [the Movement 
for Rights and Freedoms] balances the political life of the country, 
as well as in Parliament. That is why I openly say to them that in 
the name of the future and preservation of peace in this country 
that they should not push too fast to get certain rights. By the way, 
I regard their desire to press for rights a natural one. It is clear to 
me that sooner or later it is inevitable to have Turkish judges, mili­
tary officers, political statesmen, businessmen, and so on. From my 
perspective, which I believe you also share, it does not create a prob­
lem to have a Gypsy, a Jew, or a Turk as a prime minister or presi­
dent. As our greatest revolutionary Vassil Levsky used to say, "We 
belong to our time and it leaves its hallmark upon every one of us." 
We all are children of our time, and the wisdom of the politician is 
to know how to push things forward to the limit, while also avoiding 
potential collisions. It is in this context that the rights you just men­
tioned exist. It is my contention that we, Bulgarians, are the champi­
ons of human rights in the Balkans. You will not find such support 
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in either Greece or Turkey, nor in Yugoslavia and Romania. Well, 
it is quite possible that we represent an imperfect model of a tolerant 
polyethnic society. Nevertheless, it functions successfully. 
AM: I am reminded of the Spanish transition. Do you think Bul­
garia resembles the Spanish transition to democracy? 
PD: Yes, but not fully. I think the Spanish were wiser than we. Of 
course, they had in their history a bloody civil war—this happened 
at the time when I was actively involved in political life [as a youth]. 
In fact, in Bulgaria the great confrontations and the bloody events 
were, so to say, the result of foreign influence. There were atrocities, 
labor camps, and [political] prisons, but there was no civil war. And 
the curious thing was that the two organizations that suffered most 
from the Communist regime are the Agrarian Union and the Social 
Democratic Party. We are anti-Communists, but simultaneously we 
are for a sensible and prudent transition. The most fanatical anti-
Communists now are the former Communists, because they want 
to make a career of being anti-Communist. Some people cannot 
understand why those of us who suffered and lost their comrades 
behave in this way. It is because, as a teacher of mine used to say, 
suffering makes strong people wise and breaks the weak ones. We 
have suffered too much, and because of this we do not want revenge 
to create a new wave of terror and vengeance. 
AM: I mention the Spanish example because, as you know, from a 
theoretical perspective, one would not expect democracy to occur 
in Bulgaria. Theoreticians argue that you need first a middle class, 
you need a strong economy, you need functional political parties, 
and so on. But in Bulgaria you are going about building democracy 
differently. By creating a constitution, you are coaxing democratic 
or civil society into existence. 
PD: I think that the thesis for the existence of a middle-class as 
an absolute prerequisite for democracy has at least fifty different 
formulations. I tried to find the true answer by asking many of my 
friends, economists, and every one of them has given me a different 
answer. It remains unclear whether being middle class requires the 
possession of certain material things and, if that is the case, of what 
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kind. If you need to possess a house to qualify as middle class, then 
there is no other class in Bulgaria than the middle class. If the crite­
rion is the ownership of the means of production, then there are 
relatively few owners.14 Our social democratic idea is to combine 
two things: personal richness with the ownership of the means of 
production during a period of mass privatization. Namely, social 
privatization will turn a great many people into shareholders and 
owners in cooperative societies. 
AM: What is your interpretation of why certain members of the 
Grand National Assembly participated in a hunger strike? 
PD: I have two points of view. I am a doctor. So one explanation 
is as a doctor. The other one is that this hunger strike is just a funny 
or perhaps a tragic event. Because I cannot imagine that in a devel­
oped society this kind of reaction might exist. What was the reason? 
The reason was that the monarchists cannot declare that they do 
not want to have a republican Constitution. That is the first expla­
nation. The second one: it was the involvement of KGB agents, the 
Bulgarian KGB. The third one: there were some Communists, for­
mer Communists, who wanted to create a good political image by 
presenting themselves as fighters against Communism. 
AM: By claiming that the Constitution is not anti-Communist 
enough? 
PD: But, see, one of our parties whose leaders were going on a 
hunger strike because of the Constitution—the Radical Democratic 
Party—they were very proud that by the second reading of the pro­
posed new Constitution the document was very close to their own 
proposals. . .  . It is all demagogy. They wanted to make political 
profit, but they did not succeed. Why? Because of the first law of 
Pavlov's dogs. 
Petar Dertliev confirms the observations of others concerning the 
motivations of the leaders on both sides of the Communist/anti-
Communist split in Bulgarian politics. First, the reform leaders within 
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Petar Dertliev, father of the 1991 
Constitution, arguing a point in favor 
of the new basic law during the Grand 
National Assembly 
the old Communist Party are sophisticated persons. They represent a 
new generation of leaders who, unlike most of their predecessors, are 
well educated and widely traveled, both within the Eastern bloc nations 
and in the West. They understood that with the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the new openness it would be impossible to hold back the demo­
cratic tide. They willingly embraced a new democratic order with the 
knowledge that if they were part of the process of change they had a 
good chance to shape events and to preserve a place for themselves in 
the new order. As revealed by many persons I interviewed, including 
BSP members, this motivation was no secret to any of the participants 
in the constitution-making process. Secondly, many anti-Communists 
were relatively unsophisticated in the ways of democracy. They were at 
a tactical disadvantage because many of them had no experience in 
parliamentary systems. They were the radicals of their day. They took 
their mandate directly from the masses in the streets into the commit­
tee rooms and halls of the Parliament building. Leaders such as Petar 
Dertliev and Ginio Ganev insisted that the exercise of creating a new 
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constitution was an important learning experience in the ways and 
means of democracy. 
Resulting Democratic Institutions 
The post-Communist Constitution ratified on July 12, 1991, contains 
all the requisite features for its appropriate labeling as a democratic 
document. It is a republican document because proponents were able 
to defeat the monarchists. It allows for competing political parties, and 
it discards the Communist notion that one party should lead. It 
contains the principle of separation of powers with a strong parliament 
and a relatively weak president, and it establishes a strong judiciary, 
including a Constitutional Court designed to guard against backslid­
ing into totalitarianism. 
Though the Constitution is imperfect in several respects, especially 
how it treats political parties based upon ethnic or religious founda­
tions, it contains methods for working through these problems by the 
trial-and-error method of constitutional politics. In the years since the 
ratification of the Constitution, many challenges have been met suc­
cessfully; these include preserving the right of minorities to form politi­
cal parties, protecting the judiciary from institutional attacks, and 
supporting the concept of rights in private property. 
By enacting a new Constitution, Bulgarians created a basis for ac­
cepting the party class in the new order, and in the process avoided 
civil war. With this accomplishment, Bulgarians are in the position to 
avoid repeating their own history; it is a history riddled with violence 
and vendetta. 
The enlightened self-interest of the leaders of the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party operated to convince them that their future survival depended 
upon a new democratic form of government that forced them to com­
pete with opposing forces for the votes of the people. Given the alter­
native, there is little wonder that the leaders of the BSP participated in 
the creation of a new constitution. At the same time, opponents of the 
former Communist rulers sought the avoidance of civil war while also 
guaranteeing a democratic future. They agreed to accept the possibility 
that the former Communists might retain power by winning elections. 
In fact, after the BSP won a majority of the seats in the Grand 
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Josif Petrov, former dissident political prisoner and the oldest deputy (man 
in the white shirt), salutes his colleagues after the approval of the new 
Constitution by the Grand National Assembly 
National Assembly, their democratic opponents resolved to continue 
the process of democratization. They cooperated with the BSP in draft­
ing a new constitution, despite suffering disunity from within their own 
ranks. This was done with the faith that they can at some point dis­
lodge the BSP from control of the government. Indeed, the combined 
anti-BSP forces did just that at the next general election, only to lose 
control of the government a year later and a general election the fol­
lowing year. Many opposition leaders who participated as GNA depu­
ties suffered defeat at the polls. Parties led by such luminaries as 
Dertliev, Ganev, and Simeonov were unable to garner the requisite 4 
percent of the votes necessary for seats in the National Assembly. 
Thus, the voters relegated some important architects of Bulgaria's 
Constitution to the sidelines of a political system they are responsible 
for bringing into place. 
Finally, it is worth noting that although it may be a necessary con­
dition, all the hard work that goes into creating a constitution will 
not guarantee a continuing democratic system. Bulgaria's leaders of 
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all ideological stripes know it is necessary to work at the process by 
institutionalizing democratic procedures and inculcating democratic 
attitudes. It is a matter of coaxing civil society into a stable and vigor­
ous existence. Ginio Ganev's insistence that "automatic voting" must 
be eschewed in favor of full debate manifests the importance of creat­
ing democratic habits, which in turn contributes to the legitimacy of 
the system as a whole. Then too, Petar Dertliev made it his business to 
encourage the type of dialogue necessary to create and sustain demo­
cratic habits. Long after the GNA had finished its business and govern­
ments had come and gone, the father of the Constitution convened in 
October 1993 a meeting of a variety of political parties and movements 
to discuss how the nation should in the future treat ethnic minorities. 
Moreover, as the parliamentary system is institutionalized and the 
roles of the president, the Council of Ministers, and the judiciary are 
better understood, the concept of constitutionalism will become more 
deeply embedded within the psyche of the body politic. Though this 
process is fraught with peril, the prospects are encouraging. In part 3 
of this volume I explicate that history through the first few months 
in 1997. 

PART III

Consolidation Politics: 
Parliament and 
Interinstitutional Conflict

We are all children of our time, and the wisdom of 
the politician is to know how to push things forward 
to the limit, while also avoiding potential collisions. 
— PETAR DERTLIEV 

8

Bulgaria's Parliament and 
Democracy as a Work in 
Progress 
THERE IS A WIDELY shared view that democracy in Eastern Europe 
and the republics of the former Soviet Union is likely to be short-lived. 
This pessimism is borne of the political theory that, in the first place, 
these republics lack the prerequisites necessary for democracy. Second, 
the consequences of economic dislocation owing to the transition from 
command to market economies militate for a return to the certitude 
of the totalitarian days. Therefore, given their premises, the naysayers 
persuasively argue the movement toward democracy in this region of 
the world is not only theoretically impossible, it most certainly cannot 
be sustained. This view doggedly persists despite the reality of democ­
racies in these places and despite the fact that in the short run these 
formerly communist states have survived difficult trials. 
The obvious bankruptcy of development theory seems to have little 
impact on our collective thinking. For example, Howard 1 Wiarda, in 
his leading textbook on comparative politics, expresses the view that 
while no one doubts the end of authoritarianism in southern Europe 
and the permanency of democracy there, we cannot be sure for Eastern 
Europe and Russia. He writes: "In societies lacking consensus, lacking 
well-established institutions, lacking civic culture, but with a plethora 
of severe social and economic problems, almost any outcome is pos­
sible. Uncertain and potentially violent means can yield a great variety 
of ends."1 Adam Przeworski insists: "The durability of the new democ­
racies will depend . . . not only on their institutional structure and the 
ideology of the major political forces, but to a large extent on their 
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economic performance. Profound economic reforms must be under­
taken if there is to be any hope that the deterioration in living con­
ditions experienced by many nascent democratic countries will ever 
cease."2 Samuel R Huntington asks: "How long?" Just because there 
are free and fair elections after years without them, that does not mean 
democracy will endure. He asks: "Do the new systems consolidate or 
collapse?"3 
The skeptics fail to consider adequately two important points. First, 
where there exists a negotiated agreement among the major competing 
forces in society, as in Bulgaria and other east European venues, de­
mocracy became a practical reality upon the consummation of the 
agreement to change. Second, though Bulgaria—and other similarly 
situated states—is undergoing difficult economic times, there is in­
sufficient reason to conclude that Bulgarians will revert to a command 
economy with totalitarian controls. Rather, they are likely to continue 
the trend toward a market economy because there is no real alterna­
tive. The realities of international economic life require these states to 
find their place within the world capitalist order. The only real choice 
is how rapidly they are willing to progress down this path, not whether 
they will take such a course. 
So then, Giuseppe Di Palma's orientation is preferable. The glass is 
not half empty. It is half full! With the forging of agreements among 
the dominant forces in society for democratic procedures, the transi­
tion from totalitarianism to democracy is already complete.4 This situ­
ation is much different than where no agreement exists in the mutual 
self-interest of the leading factions in society—for example, a violent 
coup d'etat or the intervention of an outside power imposing a new 
order. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, the participants at the National 
Roundtable Talks and the Grand National Assembly agreed on the 
rules for an enduring democracy. But is the agreement of the sort 
achieved in Bulgaria a sufficient condition for the maintenance of de­
mocracy? Slightly at variance with Di Palma's minimalist view, my an­
swer is that the proof is in the practice. If Bulgarians are practicing the 
fine art of democracy, then indeed the consolidation of democracy is 
taking place. If this is the case, there is every reason to believe that 
Bulgarians will not backslide into the dark days of their totalitarian 
past. 
The emphasis is on the word practice. Democracy is about the ob­
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servance of procedural norms wherein the rules of the political game 
are followed. In such an environment, the process affords sets of candi­
dates a regular constitutional opportunity to have their ideas enacted 
into law, and the voters may express their policy desires through elec­
tions. At the same time, rights of the losers in policy debates are re­
spected and permanent minorities are afforded protection from the 
potential tyranny of the majority. With every passing day, democracy 
proves superior to dictatorships of all sorts. As Di Palma states: "It 
. .  . is superior as a system to curb oppression; to reassert, as a matter 
of self-interest, mutual coexistence; to reconstitute a community; and 
to reestablish a sense of personal worth and public dignity."5 Though 
the way certain crises have been resolved is cause for concern, there is 
insufficient justification to believe that a return to Bulgaria's totali­
tarian past is imminent. Admittedly, if citizens are to maintain their 
democracy they must work at it. The possibility always exists that 
democracy may be lost to forces demanding order. 
New democracies should not be judged in terms of the achievement 
of substantive ends, including, for example, the achievement of a high 
standard of living and the elimination of human misery. If that is the 
case, few democracies around the world would pass the test. It must 
be granted that in democracies undergoing movement from a com­
mand to a market economy there will be unemployment, crime, and 
other afflictions. And in contemporary Eastern Europe, there is plenty 
to go around. Nonetheless, these states are democratic. Democracy is 
not a magic bullet: it cannot promise instant material progress. But 
as Di Palma puts it, "democracy has gained dramatically for delivering 
something else: mutual security in diversity.5'6 
Since they agreed to the rules at the National Roundtable Talks and 
the Grand National Assembly, Bulgarians have an in-principle agree­
ment that they will conduct their affairs in a democratic fashion. Thus, 
the remaining pertinent question is an empirical one: Are the principal 
political actors abiding by the agreement to conduct their affairs demo­
cratically? To discern the answer, it is necessary to investigate whether 
government institutions are performing in a democratic fashion. If 
the political institutions display democratic attributes and not anti­
democratic tendencies, we can say that Bulgaria is a practicing 
democratic state and that Bulgarians are living by their democratic 
agreement. 
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The legislative arena is the centerpiece of parliamentary democracy. 
It is the locus of competition among various forces in the struggle for 
power. Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate first the practices of 
Bulgaria's Parliament. Then, in a separate chapter, I investigate how 
other government institutions, most particularly the Constitutional 
Court, correct the policymaking institutions when there are impermis­
sible transgressions of constitutional boundaries of authority. I assume 
that in any democracy with a written constitution there will be conflicts 
among the various political authorities about the exercise of power. 
Because the Constitution manifests the principle of separation of pow­
ers, there is every reason to anticipate interinstitutional conflict among 
the various branches of government. Moreover, because Bulgaria's 
July 1991 Constitution expressly declares its support for human rights, 
and because the rights of individuals and of the community will at 
times conflict, how Bulgarians are resolving those issues is central to 
answering the question. What is revealed in this part of the book are 
the workings of a democracy put to the test. It is not a perfect picture 
of efficiency and good order. But democracy everywhere is anything 
but tidy. The Bulgarian experience is no exception. 
Parliamentary Structure and Organization 
Bulgaria's July 1991 Constitution vests lawmaking power in a single 
chamber body called the National Assembly (Narodno Subranie). 
Consisting of 240 members elected directly by the people through a 
system of proportional representation, Parliament conducts its busi­
ness in the picturesque center of Sofia at Narodno Subranie Square. 
The Parliament building itself is a handsome, architecturally eclectic, 
rectangular structure located near the imposing National Cathedral 
and the country's most prestigious university. 
Members of the National Assembly may form parliamentary groups 
by party or political affiliation. The rules of the National Assembly 
originally required that with certain exceptions at least twenty mem­
bers are necessary to form a parliamentary group. Later this number 
was cut in half. At the end of 1995, the number was reduced again to 
permit parliamentary groups of no fewer than seven members.7 The 
National Assembly sits in permanent session but takes time off three 
times per year. It does not sit during the Christmas holiday season 
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from December 22 until January 10, for ten days during the Easter 
holidays, or during the month of August. It normally sits on Wednes­
days and Thursdays from 3:00 P.M. until 8:00 P.M. and on Fridays from 
9:00 A.M. until 1:00 P.M. National Assembly sessions are held in public, 
excepting circumstances involving important state interests. Though 
members of the public may be admitted to the building, they require a 
special pass to do so and must clear armed police and metal detectors. 
The media are present during sessions, and Bulgarian radio and televi­
sion frequently carry live broadcasts throughout the country. Private 
sessions are held upon a motion of the chairman of the National As­
sembly, upon agreement of one-tenth of the members of Parliament, 
or upon a request from the Council of Ministers. After listening to the 
justification for the motion, the National Assembly then takes a vote 
to decide whether a private session should be held.8 
The chairman of the National Assembly is elected by a secret ballot 
on the nomination of any member of the body or by a parliamentary 
group. The chairperson's formal powers include announcing and as­
signing bills and other motions to appropriate committees; ensur­
ing that the committees and members of the National Assembly are 
afforded appropriate working conditions; adopting standing orders for 
the premises of the National Assembly; administering the budget of 
the National Assembly; authenticating by his signature the verbatim 
records of the National Assembly sittings; determining the seating ar­
rangements for the members by parliamentary groups, for the mem­
bers of the Council of Ministers, and for the president and the vice 
president; administering the rules of the National Assembly; determin­
ing the schedule of positions; and appointing and dismissing the staff 
of the National Assembly. Assisting the chairman of the National As­
sembly in the performance of duties is an advisory body consisting of 
the deputy chairman, the parliamentary group leaders, and the chairs 
of the various legislative committees. 
There are both standing and special committees of the National 
Assembly. The eighteen standing committees are the Legislative Com­
mittee; the Economic Committee; the Budget and Finance Committee; 
the Administrative Division and Local Government Committee; the 
Foreign Policy Committee; the National Security Committee; the La­
bor and Social Security Committee; the Human Rights Committee; 
the Committee on the Political Parties' Revenue, Expenditure and 
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Property; the Agricultural Committee; the Committee on Culture; the 
Committee on Education and Science; the Committee on Religious 
Affairs; the Committee on Radio and Television; the Environmental 
Committee; the Health Care Committee; the Youth, Sports, and Tour­
ism Committee; and the Complaints, Suggestions, and Petitions 
Committee.9 
No member may belong to more than two committees simultane­
ously and no member may be a chairman or deputy chairman of more 
than one standing committee. One is assigned standing committee 
membership based on proportional representation of the parliamen­
tary groups. The leaders of each of these committees are designated by 
the members of the National Assembly on an open ballot on the mo­
tion of the chairman of the National Assembly in consultation with 
the leaders of the various parliamentary groups. Each standing com­
mittee may contract for expert services to conduct studies and to aid 
in its task performance. Moreover, the standing committees may create 
subcommittees and working committees. The Legislative Committee 
has the special responsibility to consider all bills introduced in the 
National Assembly and to render an opinion on their compliance with 
the Constitution. 
On those Fridays when the National Assembly is in session, each 
member of the National Assembly has the right to address no more 
than two questions at the same sitting to the prime minister or to other 
members of the Council of Ministers. Notice of the questions is given 
forty-eight hours in advance. Ministers must answer the questions put 
to them within fourteen days of their submission. This may be done 
either orally or in writing. After the question has been answered by the 
minister to whom it was directed, the asking parliamentarian is entitled 
to ask two supplementary questions. The answer is undebatable, mean­
ing no reply may be made on it. The member, however, is granted two 
minutes to indicate whether he or she is satisfied with the response. 
Individual deputies lack the staff and research facilities to act inde­
pendent of their parliamentary group. Also, because Parliament lacks 
a sufficiently large staff of its own it is in a relatively weak position 
to challenge the information provided to it by the executive and the 
bureaucracy. There is no tradition of holding public hearings on pend­
ing legislation, and little public discussion about pending legislation, 
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including visible interest group activity of the variety often observed 
in Western democratic legislatures. Thus, members of Parliament per­
form their representative function through the medium of parliamen­
tary groups. Within these groups the struggle over issues is negotiated, 
after which members are expected to dutifully follow the party line 
regardless of their own views. This is the case despite the constitutional 
mandate of Article 67(2) that requires deputies to represent their own 
convictions.10 
Socialist Party Hegemony 
On November 17, 1989, the National Assembly was still safely in the 
hands of the Communist Party It elected Petar Mladenov, then secre­
tary general of the Central Committee of the BCP, as president of the 
State Council of Bulgaria. He replaced Todor Zhivkov, the longtime 
dictator. In short order, the cabinet underwent a shake-up, replacing 
several key members. But these changes were criticized as not going 
far enough. Critics from within and outside the Communist Party 
called for radical changes, including the abolishment of Article 1 of 
the Constitution that granted the Communist Party the leading role in 
society BCP functionaries hotly debated this matter, and there were 
several leadership changes in the months following Zhivkov's ouster. 
For a short period, Georgi Atansov replaced Mladenov as chairman 
of the Council of Ministers, and Andrey Lukanov succeeded him in 
early February 1990. Anticipating the inevitability of a multiparty sys­
tem, the new leadership, anxious to align itself with the forces of 
change, moved to eliminate the Party's political monopoly. The Polit­
buro and the Council of State also disbanded the Party's propaganda 
agency within the armed forces.11 Leaders of the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party are quick to point out that their party introduced and had leg­
islation enacted to encourage fundamental changes in Bulgaria's eco­
nomic life. Nora Ananieva, leader of the parliamentary group and 
member of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and 
a former deputy prime minister, made this point during an October 
1993 interview with me.12 She asserts that the economic program of the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party was a serious attempt at economic reform. 
Ananieva said: 
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This is the so-called Program Lukanov. It was rejected in Parliament 
not because of its content but because of Lukanov, and because 
of the former Communist Tomov [Alexander Tomov, then deputy 
prime minister, responsible for the economy]. Now he is the leader 
of the intellectually influential centrist Civic Union for the Republic 
[GOR]. It openly split with the BSP a couple of months ago, but it 
kept at the same time its parliamentary presence as a separate group. 
But Program Lukanov was quite good. Today, most of its ideas are 
the basis of the whole economic reform. If you now read this pro­
gram three years after it was first presented to Parliament you will 
see that the whole economic and financial strategy is contained 
there. We first proposed financial stabilization entailing monetary 
steps. It was followed by new economic reforms and then privatiza­
tion. That is why we, the majority party in the Grand National As­
sembly, voted for not only the new Constitution but also the Law 
on Privatization. This law was followed by the Foreign Investments 
Law. . . . and then we proposed agrarian reform that provided prop­
erty restitution. . . . All of these changes were consistent with our 
principles. Our ideology was oriented in new directions; but maybe 
we were coming back to the roots of the Party. Because, you under­
stand, the Party was founded as a social democratic party. 
AM: You are saying the party is coming back to what? 
NA: Yes, that is very strange. It is coming back to its roots. . . . That 
is why the Socialist Party has 250,000 members. Within the Party 
there is a Left, a Center-Left, and a Right. Today in Bulgaria there 
are four communist parties. All four are official legal entities with 
papers. But they are not in Parliament! So, if somebody wants to 
stay with the old ideology and dogma—for example, proletarian 
dictatorship, leading role of the Party with one-party system, demo­
cratic centralism, and centrally planned economy—he has a home 
in one of the communist parties. That is why we have now 250,000 
members in the party. One fourth of the party comes from the for­
mer Communist Party. A third of our party are persons who joined 
after the change. A third of our membership is new. You see all this 
mixture creates places for different personalities. For example, we 
have in our parliamentary group Professor Stefan Stoilov, who was 
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Nora Ananieva. As a member of the 
Grand National Assembly she was a 
member of the commission for 
drafting the constitution. As a leading 
member of the BSP she has served in 
a variety of capacities in Parliament. 
minister for economic reform in our government. As a professor he 
was one of the first in Bulgaria to write on the necessity to create a 
market economy. One of his collaborators was Mr. Ventzeslav Dimi­
trov from the other side; he is an influential UDF member of Parlia­
ment and is currently chairman of the Economic Committee of the 
National Assembly. 
While it may be true that there is diversity within the former Commu­
nist Party, there is ample reason to believe that there are numerous 
divisions within the ranks of the opposition. 
By May 7, 1990, no fewer than fifty-six political parties and move­
ments registered for the national election that was held on June 10 and 
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17, 1990. These parties included spin-offs from the old Communist 
Party and many so-called democratic parties with a variety of plat­
forms for changing Bulgarian society.13 
During Roundtable negotiations, BSP leaders pushed for early elec­
tions, ostensibly to hasten reform. Yet, this was also a tactic to capi­
talize on its political strengths. At first UDF forces resisted this 
suggestion. Finally, however, it acceded to the wishes of the former 
Communists—but there is evidence that it also complied with the de­
sire of the official representative of the United States government, Sec­
retary of State James Baker.14 
To the consternation of the many political novitiates in the opposi­
tion, the Bulgarian Socialist Party won the election. In electoral terms, 
the BSP profited from the mixed electoral system. While it received 47 
percent of all votes, it obtained 57 percent of the seats in the National 
Assembly. There was a sizable divergence between the votes in the large 
cities where the UDF had its greatest strength and in rural Bulgaria 
where the former Communists were still strong. Because the BSP was 
the best organized party, it could garner more seats in the single-
member districts than its competitors. Nevertheless, there was also bad 
news for the BSP. In all thirteen districts where there were runoffs, 
UDF candidates defeated their BSP opponents.15 
For the second time since the ouster of Todor Zhivkov, the leader 
of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, Andrey Lukanov, was called upon to form a government. 
Once again, he headed a one-party government. Although Lukanov 
appealed for a cabinet consisting of representatives from the other po­
litical forces, opposition forces refused to join his government. They 
claimed that the Socialists were too reluctant to accept radical change. 
There was also a widespread belief that the Socialists had no intention 
of dismantling existing totalitarian structures.16 
Consequently, Lukanov's government closely mirrored the previous 
one. But the prime minister insisted that his government would not be 
a partisan one. Instead, his government would be guided by the desire 
to seek national consensus. Lukanov's tenure was short-lived, lasting 
just a few months before falling on November 28, 1990. Parliamentary 
and public forces, including the major trade union organizations, cre­
ated a situation in which the Lukanov government found it difficult 
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to function. The Socialists faced criticism for the activities of the late 
totalitarian regime because many anti-Communists demanded retribu­
tion for past misdeeds. The severe economic conditions common to all 
of Eastern Europe at the time were also central to the collapse of the 
Socialist government. Politicians of all persuasions, including Luka­
nov, thought that a new government, enjoying the support of all the 
national political forces, was necessary at this juncture. 
On December 7, 1990, President Zhelyu Zhelev proposed to the 
Grand National Assembly a new prime minister. A lawyer of high 
standing and without a party affiliation, Dimitar Popov was thought 
an appropriate person to form a coalition government. Many in the 
Popov cabinet had not served in government before as head of a minis­
try. Popov named as deputy prime ministers a member of the BSP, a 
member of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party, and a UDF politician. The 
task was monumental. 
The Grand National Assembly, together with the government, was 
charged with the responsibility of tackling the nation's problems, in­
cluding the transition to a market economy, while simultaneously de­
vising a new constitution. As noted earlier, some politicians believe 
that because constitution-making so preoccupied the attention of the 
Grand National Assembly, it unduly sacrificed progress toward priva­
tization of the economy and solving the nation's other problems. Yet 
despite protests, walkouts, and hunger strikes, the Popov government 
managed to remain in power until after the promulgation of the new 
Constitution in July 1991 and the successful parliamentary elections 
held in October 1991. 
Meanwhile, the fragile UDF coalition composed of parties and 
movements with different agendas and flamboyant leaders underwent 
a crisis. The accusation was made that its charismatic leader Petar Be-
ron was an informer for the secret police in the days of the old regime. 
The charge came from the forceful leader of the Podkrepa Labor Con­
federation, Dr. Konstantin Trenchev. Many persons believe that this 
charge was inaccurate and grossly unfair to the biology professor and 
respected progeny of a famous academic family. Only a few UDF no­
tables came to Beron's defense, and the result was the effective retire­
ment from politics of one many believe to be a gifted leader. The 
UDF leadership role then went to Philip Dimitrov, a relatively obscure 
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lawyer in his thirties but a person of enormous energy, passion, and 
considerable intellect. Dimitrov stressed a desire to hold parliamentary 
elections as early as May 1991.17 
UDF Victory 
Elections for the new Parliament were held in October 1991. For the 
first time since World War II, when the Communists seized control of 
the government, an opposition won an election. Abandoning the 
mixed system of representation under which the Grand National As­
sembly was elected, the new election law provides that only parties 
receiving at least 4 percent of the votes are entitled to representation 
in Parliament and allots all seats based on proportional representation. 
Although thirty-eight parties and coalitions registered for the 1991 
parliamentary elections, only three succeeded in entering the National 
Assembly. The UDF received 34.36 percent of the votes and 110 of 
the 240 seats. The BSP received 33.14 percent of the votes and 106 
of the parliamentary positions. Finally, the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms received 7.55 percent of the votes and 24 of the legislative 
seats.18 
One result of the 4 percent rule is that the nation was deprived of 
some of its most gifted leaders. Some losers were instrumental in the 
National Roundtable Talks and played key roles in the creation of the 
July 1991 Constitution. This includes Dr. Petar Dertliev, leader of 
the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party and a person often spoken of 
as the father of the Constitution. Also defeated were thoughtful public 
figures such as Petko Simeonov, the leader of the Liberal Party; Milan 
Drenchev, the head of Nikola Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian Party; and 
Ivan Glushkov of the Christian-Agrarian Party. 
The October 1991 parliamentary election results signaled the rise to 
political prominence of the Turkish ethnic party, the Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms. It figures heavily in the ability of the two major 
parties to form a government. The BSP hoped to keep the MRF off 
the ballot for the October elections. Its supporters claimed that Article 
11(4) of the Constitution forbids political parties of an ethnic, racial, 
or religious nature. In a series of judicial opinions, the courts permitted 
the Turkish ethnic-based political organization to remain on the ballot 
and to participate in the elections.19 
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There was good reason for the BSP to fear the influence of the 
MRF. The Zhivkov regime attempted to abolish the names of the 
Gypsy minority in the 1960s and the names of the Rhodope Turks in 
the 1970s. In the 1980s there were attempts to prohibit the use of the 
Turkish language in schools and other public institutions, and many 
ethnic Turks left Bulgaria fearing persecution. This led to the creation 
of the National Turkish Liberation Movement in 1985. Subsequently, 
many of its leaders went to jail, including Ahmed Dogan. MRF offi­
cials claim that its activities were one reason that the totalitarian re­
gime fell in November 1989. It turns out that the BSP fears were 
warranted, at least with respect to the creation of the new government 
after the October 1991 elections. Dogan's parliamentary forces sup­
ported the election of a UDF government. 
Despite the UDF victory, Philip Dimitrov's government suffered not 
only BSP opposition but, within a year, serious fractures within UDF 
ranks. "Center-oriented parties" gradually reappeared within the Na­
tional Assembly. Various deputies from the three parliamentary groups 
initially declared themselves independent and then started establishing 
organizational structures for their own "independent" parties. The 
UDF had twenty-nine defectors, while the more disciplined BSP and 
MRF had far fewer. Because of these defections and the attendant lack 
of party discipline, the UDF lost its parliamentary majority, and the 
BSP actively supported the clamor for a new cabinet. 
I conducted an interview with Stefan Savov, who was the chairman 
of the National Assembly during the period of the Dimitrov govern-
ment.20 When I interviewed Stefan Savov in 1993 he was the floor 
leader of the UDF and the leader of the Democratic Party in 
Parliament. I asked this dignified gentleman in his late sixties to ex­
plain the sources of factionalism within the UDF. Savov said: 
The first split, or I should put it rather differently, the first big purge 
in the UDF occurred because of the ratification of the Constitu­
tion. . . . This happened during the Grand National Assembly. Then 
people like Mr. Dertliev, Mr. Drenchev, Mr. Petko Simeonov, who 
were in fact among the grand figures of the UDF, made moves 
which led practically to collaboration with the Communists. And 
they were punished for this political blunder simply by not being 
elected in the last general election; they received too low a percent of 
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the votes [below 4 percent], so they could not enter the Parliament. 
Actually the group that had left the Grand National Assembly— 
this was our group, the hunger strikers—won the elections by a vote 
of 35 percent. Now, during the term of this National Assembly there 
has been, if I may say so, a second dismissal and further division in 
the UDF. A second splinter group of about twenty-five people 
emerged in the UDF after our government had been toppled from 
power. It needs to be pointed out that these were mainly representa­
tives of one very peculiar and ludicrous organization, the so-called 
Social-Liberal Party. It was created under the name of the Alterna­
tive Socialist Party (ASP). It was formed not only by former Com­
munist members but also by secretaries of the former Communist 
Party. 
Well, I would not say there are currently no problems in the UDF. 
But do not forget there are sixteen parties and other organizations 
and movements in the coalition. We share many common ideas that 
unite us in the fight against communism and for democracy. But we 
also have natural differences. For example, there is a Social Demo­
cratic Party in the coalition; it is somewhat left-wing. There is 
the Democratic Party led by me. It is very close ideologically to 
Christian-Democratic and Conservative Parties in the West. We are 
even a member of the International Organization of the Conserva­
tive and Christian-Democratic Parties and of the European Demo­
cratic Union. . .  . In general, I regard our internal divisions as 
typical for the underdeveloped democracies. But it is also a result 
of a certain "bad blood" in our national character. It manifested 
itself even when we had a period of democracy in our political life. 
The problem is that there are always too many overambitious people 
who are keen to become leaders. And, of course, this also leads to 
disunity, friction, and infighting. 
AM: As we say in America, there are too many chiefs and not 
enough Indians. 
SS: Yes, that is it! As a friend of mine cracked a joke about another 
friend of ours: "His party is comprised of himself, his wife, and . . . 
his briefcase." 
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AM: Yes, I have that impression. The question of internal disunity 
is important because theoretically your opponents—the Socialists, 
namely, the former Communist Party—are in a position to exploit 
this disunity. 
SS: I think, Professor Melone, they do not just exploit certain op­
portunities, they inspire disunity. The Communists are renowned 
masters at this. 
AM: They are able to create it? Do you mean by persons within the 
organization . .  . or sympathizers? 
SS: By using infiltrators, by suggesting certain ideas. The Commu­
nists are very tricky; they are masters of conspiracy. 
AM: How about turning this analysis on its head, upside down? 
There are reasons to believe disunity exists within the Communist 
Party. There is the reform wing led by Lukanov and others and then 
there are hard-liners. Have the leaders of the UDF tried to exploit 
that difference? 
SS: It is very difficult for us to exploit differences within their ranks. 
Of course, there are many differences within the Socialist Party. 
I will give you an example. A month ago we put to a vote at the 
National Assembly a moratorium on the privatization of the 
military-industrial complex. There are a great many modern factor­
ies in Bulgaria able to produce weapons. Presently in Bulgaria there 
exists a real Mafia and Mafia-style structures. These people are rich 
enough and eager to take a chance with privatization to buy those 
factories. We, therefore, proposed a three-year moratorium. And 
something very interesting happened. We of the UDF voted with 
the hard-liners from the Communist Party who supported us. While 
Mr. Lukanov, who considers himself a liberal, . . .joined forces with 
the UDF splinters against this moratorium. I believe Lukanov is up 
to his neck in a number of affairs connected with the smuggling of 
Communist Party money abroad. 
So, there are ways for differences within the Socialist Party to 
show up. . . . But you need to know I am one of the very few people 
left from my generation. I had the benefit of knowing what the 
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democratic life was like before the imposition of the Communist 
regime. I come from a family with a political pedigree: my father 
was a minister in one of the last governments during the second 
World War and an MR My grandfather was elected ten times to 
Parliament; and so on and so forth. Let me tell you: to be a profes­
sional politician in Bulgaria is a very risky affair. I have documen­
tary proof that four of the five generations from my family that were 
involved in politics professionally—some of them as early as the era 
of the Turkish yoke—have spent part of their lives in prison, includ­
ing myself. My father was in fact killed by the Communists; he 
suffered two heart attacks in prison and was sent to a labor camp 
in Belene. I am saying all this to illustrate that there are few people 
in the UDF who have the required political experience. It would be 
fair to admit that we are now in the process of learning the trade of 
politics. This is the case because during the past forty years there 
has been no chance whatsoever for normal political life. 
Amidst the disunity and inevitable confusion there were calls for a 
government of experts that might deal with the nation's problems in a 
nonpartisan way. And there developed a growing consensus for pre­
term general elections. Dimitrov's government managed to survive its 
first no-confidence vote on July 24, 1992. The MPs of the ruling UDF 
in cooperation with the members of the MRF unanimously voted 
against the no-confidence motion sponsored by the BSR21 Yet, there 
were perceptible cracks in the UDF armor. A representative of the 
MRF proclaimed that the UDF should not take its support for 
granted; it demanded that progress be made toward democratization 
of Bulgarian society. Further, Stefan Savov, the UDF chairman of the 
National Assembly, barely survived a vote to oust him from that posi-
tion.22 On September 17, the MRF made a motion for his early dis­
missal. At the same time, President Zhelyu Zhelev, an original UDF 
leader, expressed dissatisfaction with the UDF leadership in the Na­
tional Assembly. The rift between the popular Zhelev and members of 
his own party in Parliament not only became a matter of disagreement 
about policy and tactics, it also became personal.23 
In a wide-ranging interview, I asked Philip Dimitrov about the prob­
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Andrey Lukanov (left) and Stefan Savov (right) enjoying a cordial moment 
together. These fierce political opponents, each with a political pedigree, had 
family members suffer from Fascist and Communist regimes, respectively. 
They have been unanimous in one thing: the vicious cycle of political 
vendetta in Bulgaria's history must be broken once and for all. 
lems he had with retaining the support of the Turkish minority party 
and the difficulties he had with maintaining cohesion within the UDF. 
Sitting in his office at 134 Rakovsky Street, almost one year after his 
removal as prime minister, Dimitrov said:24 
The Freedoms and Rights party of Dogan was endorsed by the 
UDF. And that is the reason we never competed with them in some 
regions of the country and we entered into the Parliament with the 
idea that we had a [working] majority. 
AM: I see. . . . 
PD: And this was something that was pretty well understood by the 
Turkish and Moslem people in the country. That is the reason for 
their tremendous disappointment today with the activities of their 
representatives in Parliament. 
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AM: But since then, of course, the MRF has split with the UDF. I 
mean, it has gone its own way, and this has caused grave problems 
with the coalition. 
PD: It has not gone its own way. It went the way of the Commu­
nists, and this is something that should be absolutely understood. 
Otherwise, the entire picture of the Bulgarian political situation as 
it presently exists is absolutely distorted. The point is that, with . . . 
many excuses, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms as well as 
the MPs who left the Union of Democratic Forces—both of them 
inspired by the tremendous efforts on the part of the president 
[Zhelyu Zhelev]—practically joined the Communist Party in Parlia­
ment. You will see if you go through the votes . . . there is a stable 
majority of 140 or so. Therefore, on all critical points they are voting 
with the Communists. So, I ask, what sort of going their own way 
is it? 
AM: Well, my only point is that they [MRF] shifted from one al­
legiance to another presumably in their own self-interest, as they 
see it. 
PD: I would not say that is in the best interest of the Turkish minor­
ity And I hope that the Turkish minority now understands this 
pretty well. . . . 
The justifications for UDF conduct offered by Stefan Savov and Philip 
Dimitrov notwithstanding, there is at least one other interpretation of 
events that requires attention. In a book published in 1994, Charles 
Moser of the Sofia-based Free Initiative Foundation formally ex­
pressed the view of many others with whom I have spoken. Moser is 
critical of the UDF because of the commission of what he calls 
"cardinal sins."25 
First, the UDF expected members of its parliamentary group to 
take instructions from the UDF's National Coordinating Council 
(NCC) in the same way that the old Politburo once gave instructions to 
the BCP organization in Parliament. Predictably, some UDF members 
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Philip Dimitrov, controversial prime 
minster of the UDF government, 
1991-92 
resented this transmission belt theory of representation; it smacks of 
the old Communist system they were pledged to dismantle.26 
Second, Moser argues that the UDF leadership took its coalition 
partner for granted. They believed that the MRF had no place to go 
because of the known history of Communist persecution of the Turk­
ish minority in Bulgaria. Instead, Dogan's party was willing to negoti­
ate with the BSP, skillfully playing the middle role in the delicately 
balanced parliamentary system. 
And third, Moser points out the obvious fact that UDF leaders 
found it hard to accept internal criticism. Those who disagreed with 
the leadership were sometimes spoken of as traitors, and there were 
purges that led to a reduction in its parliamentary group of more than 
30 percent. The UDF became less a party of the big tent, to use the 
American metaphor, and more a party of the ideologically sound.27 
These negative stylistic traits of the UDF leadership do not speak 
well for building parliamentary government. Moser's keen observa­
tions apply not only to when the UDF was in power but also when it 
was placed in the role of the loyal opposition. 
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Government of "Experts  " 
Late in October 1992, the Dimitrov cabinet resigned under strong pres­
sure from both the BSP and the MRF. On November 20 the National 
Assembly repelled an attempt to reinstate Philip Dimitrov as prime 
minister. The vote was 124 against and 104 for his return to power. The 
BSP then attempted but failed to form a government. This was fol­
lowed by attempts within the UDF to propose a candidate for prime 
minister that the MRF could abide. Finally, the MRF proposed Lyu­
ben Berov, a professor of economics, as the new government leader. 
Ahmed Dogan explained to the National Assembly that Berov's aca­
demic background made him well suited for the task of putting to­
gether a competent government to deal with the nation's serious 
economic problems.28 Berov later reported that the MRF did not ask 
for any cabinet positions in return for its support.29 
Berov proposed a government of so-called experts. The leadership 
of the BSP expressed a willingness to support Berov, but Philip Dimi­
trov objected. In the end, 23 of the 110 UDF members of Parliament 
bolted party ranks to support Berov, and with the support of the BSP 
and the MRF, Berov was elected prime minister on December 30, 
1992. The small group of UDF parliamentarians that had defied Dimi­
trov later formed a separate parliamentary group, the New Alliance 
for Democracy.30 
While criticizing Dimitrov's government for making mistakes, Berov 
expressed his commitment to the program of the previous government. 
He lauded the UDF because it was the political force behind the tran­
sition to democracy and a market economy. Nonetheless, Philip Dimi­
trov denounced the Berov government for distancing itself from UDF 
policies. He also announced that the UDF would act as stiff opposition 
to the government in Parliament.31 
Thus, from the very beginning, the UDF viewed Berov's government 
with great suspicion. The government was subjected to a no-
confidence vote after sixty-nine-year-old UDF floor leader Stefan 
Savov was beaten by police in front of the Parliament building. Many 
believe that the incident was entirely accidental. The BSP floor leader 
Nora Ananieva said that the UDF leadership used this incident be­
cause it wanted to destabilize the government and that the UDF action 
was irresponsible. The New Alliance for Democracy also issued a 
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statement condemning their former UDF colleagues. The MRF called 
for a thorough investigation.32 
By late June 1993, the Berov government found it necessary to make 
some cabinet changes. Though the government was able to win parlia­
mentary endorsement of these changes by a 126 to 84 vote, the UDF 
group voted against the cabinet because the changes were the result 
of bargaining with the BSP. The UDF leadership declared that the 
parliamentary group would boycott the plenary sessions as a sign of 
protest and that it would only take part in meetings of parliamentary 
commissions and in voting on certain laws dealing with dismantling 
the totalitarian system of the past.33 Moreover, it expelled from its 
ranks Marin Todorov Dimitrov, who was relieved of his post as minis­
ter of science, education, and culture in the Berov cabinet.34 
The boycott action also increased tension between the UDF leader­
ship and President Zhelev, the former UDF leader. He condemned the 
boycott as a serious mistake that would only heighten tensions, and 
pleaded that greater tolerance was required. Viewing him as something 
of a traitor to the prodemocracy cause he once championed, some 
UDF activists demanded Zhelev's resignation.35 This schism was never 
repaired and was a factor in Zhelev's failed bid for reelection in 1996. 
Socialists Back in Power 
In July 1993 the UDF called for early general elections. Dimitrov ar­
gued that since the start of the boycott of plenary sessions on June 23, 
the National Assembly was functioning without adequate representa­
tion. As it presently functions, Dimitrov pointed out, Parliament 
makes decisions without a quorum and MPs vote using absent MPs' 
cards.36 Nothing came immediately of this suggestion for early elec­
tions. Yet, it was plain that the Berov government would continue to 
have difficulties maintaining power. 
MRF leader Dogan complained publicly that the Turkish ethnic 
movement was tired of balancing parliamentary forces. Its aim was to 
prevent political dominance by either of the two large political forces, 
the BSP and the UDF. For a year following the parliamentary elections 
in 1991, the MRF aligned with the UDF. When relations between the 
MRF and UDF became strained, however, Dogan's forces then sup­
ported the nonpartisan government of Berov; it did so in concert with 
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the BSP and the UDF breakaway faction, the New Union for Democ­
racy. Remaining true to its original position, the MRF through Dogan 
expressed concern that if it became clear that the BSP had gained con­
trol over the government and Parliament, the MRF would react 
negatively.37 
By November 1993, the UDF had initiated four no-confidence votes 
in the Berov government. But each time the government survived, al­
though its support in Parliament continued to erode. One appealing 
explanation for the survival of the Berov government is that no single 
party wanted to take control of the government because of the difficult 
economic and social problems facing the country. No party wants to 
be blamed for failure. Indeed, the Berov government carried on until 
the National Assembly accepted its resignation on September 8, 1994, 
by a vote of 219 to 4 with 1 abstention.38 
Under the terms of the Constitution, Parliament has three chances 
to form a government. If it is not possible to form a new government, 
the president must appoint an interim cabinet and call elections within 
two months. President Zhelev first met with BSP leaders. The BSP 
declined the opportunity. Its leaders said that while they were not 
afraid of governing the country, Bulgaria needed instead a strong and 
resolute government. They said this would be impossible with the cur­
rent partisan configuration of parliamentary seats.39 Perhaps, too, BSP 
leaders were aware that public opinion was beginning to swing in their 
direction. The results of a public opinion survey released to the press 
on September 29 indicated that the BSP was in a good position to win 
a majority of the parliamentary seats.40 
Zhelev then turned to the most vociferous opponent of the Berov 
government. The UDF coalition was divided on the issue because 
some favored the strategy of new elections. On September 21, the UDF 
rejected Zhelev's offer to form a new government.41 
President Zhelev turned finally to a small centrist group, the New 
Choice Party. On September 29 this group proposed former defense 
minister and presidential adviser Dimtar Loudzhev as prime minister. 
Loudzhev looked for coalition partners. But the two major forces re­
mained in support of early elections. This decision forced the third 
parliamentary election since the downfall of the Zhivkov regime, and 
it tested again the resolve of Bulgarians to proceed along a demo­
cratic path.42 
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General elections were held on December 18, 1994. The Bulgarian 
Socialist Party gained eighteen additional seats, giving it an absolute 
parliamentary majority. It formed a parliamentary group with left-
wing Agrarians and Ecologists called the Democratic Left.43 The 
Union of Democratic Forces lost forty-two seats and the Movement 
for Rights and Freedoms lost eight seats, or 33 percent of its seats. 
Two new parties gained access to Parliament by obtaining the requisite 
4 percent of the popular vote: the Popular Union won nineteen repre­
sentatives in Parliament and the Bulgarian Business Bloc acquired 
thirteen seats.44 
Zhan Videnov, a thirty-five-year-old economist, was elected prime 
minister on January 11, 1995. This time the BSP was able to form a 
coalition government. In the cabinet, Videnov named representatives 
of the Alexander Stamboliiski Bulgarian Agrarian Party and the Eco-
glasnost Political Club.45 During its first six months the Videnov gov­
ernment enacted eighty-two laws and ninety-six resolutions. Videnov's 
government centered its attention on economic matters designed to 
deal with production problems and reform. The Securities, Stock Ex­
changes, and Investment Companies Act and the National Accounting 
Office Act are regarded as the most important. His government also 
sought the repeal of what was described as repressive and restora­
tionist legislation while the UDF was in power from November 1991 
to December 1992. Videnov's government engineered a new criminal 
procedures act and a central administration for dealing with organized 
crime. The National Assembly also enacted a number of laws that 
would govern the procedures for local elections held during the fall 
of 1995.46 
As democratic theory presupposes, when governments fail to satisfy 
public demands it is likely that specific support for incumbent institu­
tional actors will wane. In 1996, Bulgarians experienced a serious grain 
shortage, rampant inflation, banking irregularities, growing crime, and 
a dispute about the military's role in the NATO alliance. These prob­
lems and issues contributed to the serious weakening of Videnov's 
Democratic Left coalition government. Attacks from the UDF and 
other opposition parties intensified during 1996, and within the BSP 
itself some party leaders became critical of their own government. 
On January 11, 1996, the Videnov government survived a no-
confidence vote by a 130 to 105 margin. Five Socialists voted against 
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the government, and ten deputies affiliated with other parties sup­
ported the government.47 At the end of January, appeals to constitu­
tionalism were used to demand the resignation of Blagovest Sendov as 
chairman of the National Assembly. Because he expressed to Russia's 
president Boris Yeltsin that Bulgaria should not become a member of 
NATO, leaders of the UDF, the MRF, and the Popular Union casti­
gated Sendov. They objected that because Sendov had expressed his 
view of NATO without the approval of Parliament he violated the 
Constitution. But by a vote of 124 to 92, the motion for dismissal 
failed.48 
By spring 1996, the Democratic Left government of Zhan Videnov 
drew fierce criticism from the parliamentary opposition, trade unions, 
President Zhelev, and quarters within the ruling BSP itself.49 Though 
there was talk about another no-confidence vote, the UDF indicated 
that it would instead seek early parliamentary elections as a method 
for toppling the cabinet.50 Interestingly, however, a Gallup poll showed 
that at the time, Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski was the most popu­
lar politician, followed by Prime Minister Zhan Videnov; BSP critic 
President Zhelyu Zhelev ranked third in the poll.51 That same survey 
also indicated that the public gave Parliament low marks. During this 
period, President Zhelev called for an overhaul of the parliamentary 
system, arguing that a strong presidency was needed to get the country 
out of its present crisis.52 He said that amending the Constitution was 
necessary because, without a strong government headed by a president 
with sufficient executive power, the current political and economic 
chaos would most likely result in a return to dictatorship. Zhelev ar­
gued that changing the political system from a parliamentary to a pres­
idential republic would prevent that dire possibility.53 
On May 28, 1996, the UDF announced plans to file another no-
confidence vote against the Socialist government. At the same time, 
BSP members successfully pressured Videnov to reshuffle his cabinet. 
He acquiesced in part by sacking the agriculture minister, the industry 
minister, and the culture minister.54 Yet, BSP power brokers, former 
prime minister Andrey Lukanov and the former BSP chairman Alex­
ander Lilov, criticized these moves as "inadequate, partial, and in-
sufficient."55 To make matters worse for the government, the two 
largest unions, the Confederation of Labor Podkrepa and the Confed­
eration of Independent Trade Unions, organized mass demonstrations 
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against the government.56 Despite the rhetoric, however, on June 12 
the Democratic Left government survived its third no-confidence vote 
by a margin of 99 for and 135 against.57 
Without question the economic and social problems facing Bulgaria 
during 1996 were real. But these problems alone do not explain the 
difficulties the Videnov government encountered from the opposition 
in Parliament. The presidential election held on October 27, 1996, was 
an additional factor in the political environment. First, Zhelyu Zhelev 
sought reelection, but he failed to win the support of the UDF co­
alition he once headed. Stemming from Zhelev's quarrels with the 
Dimitrov government, the UDF backed and, by a 65 percent margin, 
the voters selected Petar Stoyanov in the primary election held on June 
1, 1996.58 Second, the election commission denied Foreign Minister 
Georgi Pirinski, Bulgaria's most popular politician, a place on the Oc­
tober ballot for president of the Republic. As I explain fully in the next 
chapter, the Constitutional Court ruled that under certain circum­
stances persons not born in Bulgaria are ineligible to become presi­
dent. (Pirinski was born in New York City.) Seven weeks prior to the 
general election, the BSP selected a much weaker candidate than Pirin­
ski, the former vice presidential candidate on the Pirinski ticket, Cul­
ture Minister Ivan Marazov.59 
Thus, BSP leaders clearly sensed danger.60 At the end of a twenty-
two-hour closed-door meeting of the BSP Supreme Council and BSP 
members of Parliament held on November 12, 1996, Zhan Videnov 
was given a vote of confidence by a slim 87-to-69-vote margin. It was 
clear that many party leaders, including Georgi Pirinski, were dissatis­
fied with the Videnov government.61 Finally, the intraparty showdown 
took place at the Forty-second Extraordinary Congress of the BSP 
held December 21-24, 1996. Zhan Videnov tendered his resignation as 
party leader and the resignation of his entire cabinet. A thirty-nine-
year-old member of Parliament, historian Georgi Purvanov, was 
named the new party leader. The BSP assumed another Socialist-led 
government would be formed sometime in January 1997.62 The Vide-
nov government was in office for two years, a longer tenure than that 
of any of its six predecessors. Moreover, at the beginning of 1997, the 
BSP stood a good chance to retain its parliamentary control for at least 
an additional two years, when the next general elections are scheduled. 
Nevertheless, parliamentary government continued to be put to the 
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test. Outrageous inflation, bread shortages, banking and currency cri­
ses, poor health care management, and soaring crime rates created 
public pleas for positive government action. Given these wretched con­
ditions, would responsible leaders continue to insist upon democratic 
procedures as an act of political will! 
Constitutional Crisis 
On January 3, 1997, opposition forces in the National Assembly com­
posed of deputies of the Union of Democratic Forces, the Popular 
Union, and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms introduced a draft 
resolution titled "Declaration on National Salvation." Deputies de­
bated the issue for five hours while the people of the nation heard it 
broadcast live on radio and television. The proposed declaration had 
three demands: first, the appointment of a new governing board of 
Bulgaria's National Bank; second, the commencement of negotiations 
with the International Monetary Fund on the creation of a currency 
board; finally, and most important from the point of view of compro­
mising regular constitutional processes, the Declaration on National 
Salvation called for the immediate dissolution of Parliament and set­
ting a date for early general elections.63 
The Socialists and their parliamentary allies had a legitimate claim 
to resist the last demand contained in the declaration, and they had 
already pledged to work toward a parliamentary consensus on the first 
two points. With the resignation of the Videnov government, the Dem­
ocratic Left had the constitutional right to remain in power unless one 
of two events occurred: the BSP failing to obtain the necessary votes 
in the National Assembly to put a new government in place or a new 
BSP prime minister losing a no-confidence vote. From any perspective, 
neither scenario seemed likely. Thus, the BSP was likely to stay in 
power unless they were forced by other means to relinquish their au­
thority. In fact, their opponents used mass demonstrations and other 
irregular tactics in an unabashed effort to dislodge the Democratic Left 
coalition from power. 
The same day the National Assembly debated the Declaration on Na­
tional Salvation, opposition forces participated in a mass rally and pro­
test march organized by the powerful trade union amalgamations: the 
Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, the Podkrepa 
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Confederation of Labor, and the Promiana (Change). It is reported 
that protesters shouted slogans: "Communists ruined Bulgaria," "A 
new socialist government will bury Bulgaria," and "Elections, Elec­
tions!" The protesters finished their march in front of BSP headquar­
ters. Some hurled stones and eggs at the building, smashed windows, 
and broke through protective railings. More than one hundred police­
men were called to guard the building, and one officer was wounded 
in the head when a stone was thrown. When asked about the street 
violence, BSP leader Georgi Purvanov said, "We shall not give in to 
the street pressure, not because we stubbornly want to keep the power, 
but because we do not see a real alternative to preserve the stability of 
the institutions"64 But this incident was only the opening salvo in a 
series of shots that would batter and test the durability of democratic 
institutions. 
Within Parliament, Yordan Sokolov, the UDF floor leader, said that 
the UDF might do more than ask the people to express disapproval 
for the Socialist government by demonstrating in the streets. He ex­
plained that the UDF reserves to itself the option to walk out of the 
National Assembly if the Democratic Left majority does not accept 
demands for early parliamentary elections. Stefan Savov, onetime 
chairman of the National Assembly and now cochair of the Popular 
Union, stated that no matter who might head a second Socialist cabi­
net, that person will be unable to cope with the situation. And MRF 
leader Ahmed Dogan said, "I am convinced that a new cabinet of the 
Socialist Party will be a Cabinet-Kamikaze and whomever the new 
prime minister may be, he will be a victim."65 
By January 6, 1997, the protests that began in Sofia spread to the 
city of Plovdiv where the UDF mayor addressed more than thirty 
thousand people. Mayor Spas Garnevski is reported to have said: "If 
we have to die, we'll die on the squares."66 Protests then spread to other 
cities. Especially in Sofia, protestors mimicked tactics employed by 
demonstrators in Belgrade, where for weeks demonstrators flooded the 
streets protesting the official nullification of election results in Serbia. 
In Sofia, workers, students, and others conducted mass demonstra­
tions for seven straight days. Clearly exemplifying the role modern 
media can play as facilitator of demonstration effects, student street 
demonstrators in Bulgaria borrowed many of the gestures of their Ser­
bian counterparts; in a festive mood, they walked in circles like chained 
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"Two years of total failure" 
prisoners, flashed the V for victory sign, and joked with the police.67 
However, on Friday, January 10, 1997, there was serious violence. 
Demonstrators surrounded the Parliament building, breaking win­
dows and trapping deputies in the building. Almost one hundred 
people were injured when, in an effort to free the trapped parliamentar­
ians, police fired guns and waved batons to break through the demon­
strators' lines.68 By the following Monday, the BSP agreed in principle 
to early elections. Yet, this expression did not satisfy their opponents. 
Consistent with constitutional rules, BSP leaders sought to form a 
new government. Suggesting compromise with their vociferous oppo­
nents, they sought to retain power for only one of the two remaining 
years left on their mandate. The UDF alliance, however, insisted that 
elections be held sometime in the summer, eighteen months before the 
expiration of the four-year term of office.69 Article 99 of the Consti­
tution requires that the president ask the candidate of the largest par­
liamentary group to form a cabinet. During his last week in office, 
however, President Zhelyu Zhelev refused to carry out his constitu­
tional responsibility as prescribed. Although he consulted with leaders 
of the smallest parliamentary group, the Bulgarian Business Bloc, and 
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with the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions, Zhelev claimed 
it would be inappropriate to ask the BSP to form a government be­
cause the country was being swept by demonstrations for early elec­
tions and the opposition had walked out of the National Assembly. 
Indeed, on Wednesday, January 15, the first day of the winter session 
of the Thirty-seventh National Assembly, only 123 of the 240 members 
of Parliament were present in the debating hall: 119 members of the 
BSP-dominated parliamentary group of the Democratic Left and 4 
members of the Bulgarian Business Bloc. The opposition UDF, the 
MRF, and the Popular Union continued the boycott they had begun 
on Friday, January 10, because the Democratic Left refused to put to 
a vote the Declaration on National Salvation.70 
Meanwhile, president-elect Petar Stoyanov met with Socialist and 
UDF leaders in an effort to resolve the impasse.71 After his inaugura­
tion on January 22, and consistent with his constitutional responsi­
bility, President Stoyanov on January 28 gave the BSP the mandate 
to form a new government. But he urged the leadership not to accept 
it. Instead, he asked the Democratic Left coalition to agree to early 
parliamentary elections. He also urged the UDF-led opposition to end 
its boycott of Parliament.72 On February 4, 1997, after a month of 
mass demonstrations and random acts of civil disobedience, President 
Stoyanov successfully brokered an agreement. The Socialist Party 
leadership agreed to return the mandate to form a new government 
and to hold general elections in April. It was also agreed that, pending 
the outcome of those elections, President Stoyanov would appoint a 
caretaker government.73 
Sofia's youthful mayor, Stefan Sofiyanski, was named on February 
12, 1997, to head the caretaker government. This government was 
warmly received by the international community, and Sofiyanski and 
his colleagues enjoyed wide public support leading to the new elections 
conducted on April 19, 1997. As anticipated, the UDF did well: it 
captured over 52 percent of the vote and 137 of the National Assem-
by's 240 seats. The BSP fell to 58 seats, while the Union for National 
Salvation won 19 seats, the Euro-Left Party took 14 seats, and the 
Bulgarian Business Bloc won 12 seats. 
Does the successful demand by the UDF and their allies for early 
elections represent a rejection of the agreed-upon rules for the estab­
lishment of parliamentary government and democracy generally? 
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The anti-Democratic Left forces violated the specifics of the demo­
cratic agreement as laid out in the 1991 Constitution. Elections for 
Parliament were not scheduled for two years. The BSP was able to put 
together a parliamentary majority, thereby satisfying constitutional re­
quirements. Nor could the UDF win a no-confidence vote. No doubt 
the demonstrations, acts of violence, and the walkout in Parliament 
were all irregular and extraconstitutional tactics. In this sense, the anti­
government forces' behavior was inconsistent with the development of 
stable parliamentary government. They had repeated their own his­
tory: both at the Grand National Assembly and in the regular National 
Assembly some factions within the UDF failed to fulfill the expecta­
tions of how a loyal opposition in a democratic political culture should 
conduct itself. 
Despite the dysfunctional aspects of this particular set of events 
for the creation and maintenance of norms supportive of the regular 
conduct of parliamentary government, there is no evidence that any 
of the principal participants displayed nostalgia for the totalitarian 
days. The infliction of bodily harm by the police against demonstrators 
is the first in the post-Communist era. It was the type of confrontation 
that General Semerjiev studiously avoided during the potentially un­
stable period of the National Roundtable Talks in 1989 and 1990. But 
the use of force in this case does not support the conclusion that the 
police state has been or will soon be reinstated in Bulgaria. Although 
violence is unprotected expression, the people's right to peacefully 
demonstrate is constitutionally guaranteed. There is no in-principle 
reason that citizens may not be mobilized to petition for a change in 
their government. No one doubts this constitutional truism. BSP op­
ponents seized the moment of severe economic bad times to wrest con­
trol of the Parliament and government. It had won the presidency just 
a few months earlier. It seemed to them that citizens would support 
new parliamentary elections, the results of which would produce a gov­
ernment willing and, they hoped, able to deliver on the unfulfilled 
promises of democracy. While this may be asking too much from de­
mocracy as a set of procedures, because the BSP had failed to produce 
material progress and community well-being, many Bulgarians felt that 
change was necessary. The change sought is consistent with the goals 
of the democratic regime created in the aftermath of the November 
1989 coup d'etat. Although the irregular actions of the UDF and their 
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allies are troubling, such conduct does not represent a rejection of the 
basic agreement: that all factions in Bulgarian life should coexist 
within the framework of electoral competition. 
President versus Parliament 
President Zhelev laments the staying power of the BSP. He argues a 
constitutional amendment is needed that would grant to the president 
the authority to dissolve Parliament or appoint the prime minister. In 
this way, so the argument goes, failed governments would be more 
responsive to popular will. Zhelev's criticism is part of his larger plan 
that Bulgaria become a presidential system. Though such ideas merit 
study, Bulgaria's history of authoritarian leadership would seem to ar­
gue against concentrating power in the hands of a single figure. More­
over, there is considerable evidence that presidential systems tend to 
suffer from either deadlock or dictatorial tendencies.74 
Whether the current president, Petar Stoyanov, will eventually come 
to the same conclusion as Zhelev is difficult to predict. There is little 
doubt, however, that Zhelev's view is borne of experience. 
President Zhelev openly clashed with the Socialist-dominated Na­
tional Assembly over a number of laws. He exercised the power of 
the suspensory veto on several occasions, and each time Parliament 
overrode Zhelev's action. A disagreement of considerable constitu­
tional importance involved the amendments to the Agricultural Land 
Tenure Act. President Zhelev won the case in part when the Constitu­
tional Court ruled that a provision of the law requiring landowners to 
offer their property for sale to municipalities and the state before offer­
ing it to other buyers is a violation of the constitutional principle of 
the inviolability of property. The Court also struck down a provision 
of the new law that restricted the rights of former owners when their 
land had been improved upon. Other provisions restricting the rights 
of property owners were likewise invalidated by the Constitutional 
Court.75 
When the UDF was in power under the leadership of Philip Dimi­
trov, President Zhelev had expressed disapproval of his own party. 
However, the conflict with the BSP government of Zhan Videnov took 
on a sharper adversarial tone. In large part, this controversy is due to 
the personalities and policies of the principal antagonists. Yet, it is also 
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a result of the somewhat awkward position of the presidency within 
the institutional framework of separation of powers. 
For most of their first year, President Zhelev accused Videnov's So­
cialist government of attempting to bring back communism; he re­
ferred to it as re-communization. The president claimed that the BSP 
was up to the old Communist Party practice of dividing people to get 
their own way. In the interest of democracy, Zhelev argued, the BSP 
should seek compromise and mutual understanding with all the state 
institutions controlled by different political forces. At the same time, 
Zhelev was heavily criticized for vetoing acts passed by the National 
Assembly His actions are said to evidence a disrespect for the will of 
the people, because, after all, the Socialist government was elected by 
the people. His rejoinder is rooted in electoral politics: "I could ask 
the BSP the same question: Why is it not respecting the vote of the 
people who elected me? The people who voted for me exceed those 
who voted for the BSP and its Government by 600,000 [votes]."76 
Consistent with the re-communization theme, the president and the 
government also battled over the leadership of the armed forces. In 
late 1995 the Council of Ministers attempted to shift military person­
nel from one assignment to another. The president accused the gov­
ernment of seeking to repoliticize the army by attempting to regain 
control over its personnel.77 
Zhelev's activity in Bulgarian politics was at the constitutional fault 
line between the Parliament and the president. Besides employing the 
court of public opinion, the president's most potent weapon against 
the Socialists is the use of his constitutional right to petition the Con­
stitutional Court. In 1995, it declared no less than six parliamentary 
acts or parts thereof null and void. As a reaction against various deci­
sions, court-curbing measures were taken by the National Assembly 
against the Court. In an address to the National Assembly on the 
fourth anniversary of the Constitution's adoption, the president was 
jeered when he said, "Calls for a war against the Constitutional Court 
are calls for war against the Constitution itself."78 
The Socialist government responded to Zhelev's criticism in strong 
terms. Prime Minister Videnov charged both Zhelev and the Constitu­
tional Court with attempting to obstruct the rule of the Democratic 
Left. He said Zhelev "behaves more like a candidate 'for' opposition 
leader than as . .  . a head of state," and the Constitutional Court "be­
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haves like an alternative parliament."79 Continuing to act out the 
drama with considerable bravado, Zhelev strongly endorsed the win­
ning anti-Socialist candidate for mayor of Sofia in the November 1995 
runoff. Subsequently, fifty-six Socialist MPs played their part by taking 
him to the Constitutional Court. They argued unsuccessfully that 
Zhelev had violated Article 92(1) of the Constitution that the president 
"Shall embody the unity of the Nation." In what will not be the final 
curtain call, the Court accepted the argument that although the presi­
dent embodies the unity of the nation, the Constitution also mandates 
political functions under the rubric of "Head of State." As such, the 
president is entitled under the Constitution to express political 
attitudes.80 
In the next chapter, I explore in greater detail the role of the judi­
ciary and its conflicts with other institutions. For now, however, it is 
fair to conclude that the six years following the transition to democ­
racy were marked by interinstitutional conflicts. If these institutional 
boundary-defining battles were not entirely predictable, they are cer­
tainly understandable. Boundaries of political authority are often am­
biguous and uncertain in systems featuring separation of powers. Lines 
of authority need definition. Given this situation, political parties be­
have as might be expected. Party leaders try to capture government 
institutions and define institutional authority with the goal of shaping 
public policy consistent with their own designs. Opponents often yell 
foul. They charge that the other side has transgressed institutional 
norms, as indeed, sometimes they do. Yet, this behavior is not too 
different from what political actors experience in other constitutional 
systems, including the United States. Often constitutional arguments 
are really about something else, including a concern over whose ox is 
being gored. 
Democracy as a Work in Progress 
When the strongman communist regime of Todor Zhivkov fell on No­
vember 10, 1989, after forty-five years of one-party dominance, the 
Bulgarian Communist Party possessed a constitutional monopoly on 
political power. At the time, there was little reason to expect the rapid 
development of strong competing political parties capable of orga­
nizing public discourse and laying the groundwork for effective 
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government. Yet, the events occurring between the November 1989 
peaceful coup d'etat and the collapse of the most recent government 
at the end of 1996 evidences the commencement of a durable but not 
always responsible party system. The creation of the Union of Demo­
cratic Forces represents a powerful, though at times unwieldy, counter­
force to the politically sophisticated former Communists, now calling 
themselves the Bulgarian Socialist Party. During this six-year period, 
a third party—the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, a primarily 
Turkish ethnic organization—often played a broker role between the 
two major parliamentary forces. Not only did the MRF help to take 
the rough edge off the dysfunctional bipolarized party politics caused 
by the two major groups in Parliament, but the mediating role played 
by the MRF helped to mollify ethnic tensions in Bulgaria.81 
The political parties in Parliament are functioning to organize de­
bate and educating the public about the issues at the national level. 
Yet, they are doing more for the consolidation of democracy. The elec­
tions held for local officials throughout Bulgaria in October and No­
vember 1995 illustrate the successful functioning of the party system 
in another important respect. The parties in Parliament have inte­
grated the population in the political system by extending their influ­
ence throughout the nation. Parties have done so by articulating local 
issues within the context of the national debate. Generally reflecting 
their influence in the National Assembly, the prominent national par­
ties demonstrate similar support at the local level. With a voter turnout 
rate in the 55-60 percent range, the BSP received 42 percent of the 
vote in the first round of the local elections, the UDF won 24 percent 
of the votes, the People's Union (NS) gathered 13 percent, the MRF 
won 9 percent, and the Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB) received 6 per­
cent of the total vote.82 Bulgarian political leaders also displayed the 
ability to forge tactical alliances—in this case against the dominant 
BSP. The leaders of the UDF met with the People's Union and the 
ethnic Turkish movement MRF to establish a nationwide strategy for 
the runoffs held on November 5. In some places, including Sofia, 
the NS withdrew its candidates in favor of the better-situated UDF 
candidates.83 
The National Assembly is a raucous yet fragile institution. Party 
unity, particularly of the UDF forces, exhibits serious fractures that 
bring into question the long-term viability of parliamentary democ­
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racy in Bulgaria. Yet, given the perseverance of Bulgarian politicians 
in and out of the National Assembly a negative prognosis is at this time 
premature and unwarranted. Indeed, there is justification for guarded 
optimism. Realism, however, demands that positive conclusions be 
tempered with the knowledge that the creation and maintenance of 
democratic institutions is anything but an automatic process. 
Legislative systems everywhere require a modicum of trust and re­
spect among their participants to carry on their daily business in a 
fruitful manner. The transgressions of the past make it difficult for 
many Bulgarians to accept a working relationship with the former 
Communists, because they believe that adequate retribution has yet to 
take place. Yet, the genius of the National Roundtable Talks is that it 
provided for accommodation without repeating the regrettable cycle 
of bloodshed and vendetta central to Bulgaria's political history. To be 
sure, self-taught lessons in democracy are not always well-understood 
while participants in the process are experiencing them. Certainly, boy­
cotts by parliamentary groups do not speak well for the institutional­
ization of democratic rules of the game. It may be that the concept of 
a loyal opposition is not yet fully appreciated. 
Moreover, the constitutional and political crisis of December 1996 
and early 1997 provides evidence that democratic consolidation re­
mains problematic. On one hand, the BSP concession for early elec­
tions violates the regularization of parliamentary processes, and to 
that extent the agreement sets back the cause of parliamentary govern­
ment and of a law-governed state. But ironically, at the same time, 
the agreement among the competing forces signifies the resiliency of 
democracy. Rather than imposing authoritarian measures on the pop­
ulation and the suppression of their opponents, the incumbent Social­
ist government agreed to give up power. It succumbed to the demands 
of the opposition for testing their legitimacy at the polls. This is, after 
all, a democratic response to crisis. If the BSP had responded with 
draconian force, it might be concluded that Bulgaria had reverted to 
its authoritarian and totalitarian ways. But the Socialist response was 
one of reconciliation and a willingness to take their chances at the 
polls. In this sense the competing forces reaffirmed the most basic prin­
ciple of the original Roundtable agreement. They would take their 
chances with democracy as a direct reflection of the will of the people. 
When all is said and done, the National Assembly is performing its 
220 • Chapters 
legislative functions, albeit at times imperfectly, while integrating the 
various social, economic, ethnic, and political cleavages that threaten 
national unity. Continuing economic hardships for the population at 
large make the task all the more difficult. Nonetheless, political parties 
regularly compete and, in the process, define areas of agreement and 
disagreement. There has been not only interparty competition but 
turnover in power. The Bulgarian Socialist Party won control of the 
first free elections in the post-Communist era with its victory at the 
polls in June 1990 for the election of a Grand National Assembly. 
The voters turned the former Communist Party operatives out of 
power in October 1991, with a plurality of the parliamentary seats go­
ing to the Union of Democratic Forces led by Philip Dimitrov. Then, 
in December 1994, the Bulgarian Socialist Party regained an absolute 
majority in Parliament. In the April 1997 elections, the Socialists once 
again lost power to their parliamentary opponents. As Samuel Hun­
tington correctly argues in a work of great heuristic value and timely 
importance, anti-incumbent and antiestablishment responses by voters 
are classic democratic reactions to policy failure and disillusionment.84 
Selecting rulers is at the heart of democracy, and the willingness of 
Bulgarian leaders to turn over power to their opponents is a sure indi­
cator that democracy in Bulgaria is becoming an institutionalized way 
of conducting public affairs. 
The very existence of Parliament may be helping to produce atti­
tudes among relevant publics and elites that the constitutional system 
adopted by the Grand National Assembly in July 1991 has earned their 
support and that democratic institutions have a moral right to exist. In 
this sense, the democratic regime is made more secure by a functioning 
though imperfect legislature. 
9

The Struggle for Judicial 
Independence 
IT IS FAIR TO CONCLUDE tentatively that Bulgarians are practicing the 
art of parliamentary government sufficiently well to be labeled demo­
cratic. Yet, there is more to democracy than this. An important feature 
of constitutional democracy is the procedural mechanisms for insuring 
that political actors play within the rules of the game. Within this con­
text, a major role of the judicial institution is to correct the other gov­
ernment institutions when they fail to honor constitutional mandates 
and guarantees. The judiciary's fundamental goal is to aid society in 
the avoidance of backsliding into the totalitarian abyss. In the modern 
lexicon of east Europeans, the role of an independent judiciary is to 
insure a law-governed state. I identify in this chapter the problems 
and prospects of an independent judiciary in Bulgaria since the adop­
tion of the 1991 Constitution. The evidence illustrates an aspect of 
the consolidation of democratic institutions that is central to the cre­
ation of a law-governed state. Legal professionals find it necessary at 
times to protect judicial institutions in the struggle for visibility and 
independence. 
As Carl Pinkele aptly points out, the intention of authoritarian 
communist regimes was to "dejudicialize and to deprivatize" political 
conflict.1 Conflict resolution in such a system took place within the 
parameters of party or state bureaucracies of which the judiciary was 
an integral but dependent part. Given this historical context, the rule 
of law concept has an important operational consequence. It is a way 
to remove political and interpersonal conflicts from the domination of 
party or bureaucratic structures with a specific ideological content. It 
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would be a mistake, however, to assume that within the new so-called 
democratic order, decision makers will resolve conflicts without ideo­
logical influences. Legalism is a subtle yet pervasive ideological influ­
ence. Legal absolutists often express this view in terms of neutral 
principles and objective rules. This view promises the attractive advan­
tage of equal treatment for equals. It fails, however, to explicitly ad­
dress questions of substantive justice, the answers to which the former 
socialist legal system purportedly resolved in favor of the working 
class. By officially depolitizing dispute resolutions with the hope of 
resolving them, to use Tocqueville's characterization of nineteenth-
century America, "into judicial questions,"2 legal professionals are in 
an ideal strategic position to give meaning to the law's content. This 
point is especially significant given the contemporary worldwide phe­
nomenon of converting political issues into judicial questions.3 
The Constitution and Judicial Independence 
As an alternative to the old totalitarian ways, legalism as an ideology 
could serve to move society toward greater observance of democratic 
values. This idea presupposes that today judges in Bulgaria should 
enjoy independence that judges in the past were not free to exercise. 
One private attorney expressed the view of many when he said: "Judges 
have been viewed by the public as part of the old regime."4 Yet, most 
of the jurists I interviewed suggested that it is probably inaccurate to 
label the former Bulgarian system as telephone justice. A judge who 
had served during the old regime and under the new system summa­
rized the viewpoint of many of those I interviewed. He said: 
I would say there wasn't a need for telephone justice, since the justice 
before, under the Communist rule, dealt only with insignificant ques­
tions. In fact, those from the Communist nomenklatura were not 
afraid of justice, since they were out of the system of justice, of the 
system of courts. And that's why I say that the telephone calls were 
very, very rare and were for some insignificant cases. . .  . I remember 
only one or two times a party leader called me and said: "Well, 
there's a civil lawsuit of this guy, he's a good guy; see whether you 
can do something!" But you know, all these issues were insignificant, 
because they [the Party nomenklatura] were not afraid of justice; 
The Struggle for Judicial Independence • 223 
they were outside of justice . . . there was no reason for telephone 
justice. 
No person I interviewed denied that telephone justice was occasion­
ally practiced. It is likely, however, that because judicial officials were 
members of the nomenklatura, they shared political attitudes with 
other officials; and, furthermore, they viewed themselves as bureau­
crats and not independent actors outside the governing system. There­
fore, it was usually unnecessary for Party leaders to pick up the phone 
to suggest what might be favorable dispositions of cases. In most in­
stances, the judges knew what was expected of them. 
The framers of the 1991 Constitution understood that if the ideal 
of an objective rule-oriented judiciary is to take root, it would be nec­
essary to create an independent judiciary. Consequently, they incor­
porated into the basic document institutional mechanisms to assure 
judicial responsibility in the protection of newly established demo­
cratic processes and institutions. 
The establishment of the Supreme Judicial Council (S JC) is an inte­
gral part of Bulgaria's constitutional scheme to guarantee judicial 
independence. Yet, the idea for such an organization to aid in the selec­
tion of judges has a precedent. Bulgaria first established a judicial 
council in 1910; it was a consultative body to the minister of justice on 
personnel policy. When the Communist Party came to power after 
World War II, it dissolved the judicial council in favor of Party control 
over judicial appointments. Article 129 of the July 1991 Constitution 
provides that the SJC shall elect, promote, demote, reassign, and dis­
miss justices, prosecutors, and investigating magistrates. This council 
consists of twenty-five members. Eleven members are elected for five-
year terms by the National Assembly; they may not be immediately 
reelected upon the completion of their terms. Eleven additional coun­
cil members are elected by bodies of the judicial branch. Also among 
the council are three ex officio members that include the chief prosecu­
tor, the chair of the Supreme Court of Cassation, and the chair of the 
Supreme Administrative Court. The minister of justice serves as chair 
of the meetings of the Supreme Judicial Council, but this person has 
no voting privileges. On September 10, 1991, the National Assembly 
enacted a law intended to make council members as independent as 
possible. It specifies only three circumstances when members of the 
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judicial system may be relieved of their duties before the end of their 
terms: retirement, the enforcement of a prison sentence, or because of 
a disability lasting more than one year.5 
A separate budget for the judiciary is an additional constitutional 
measure to support its independence. Under the provisions of Article 
117(3) the Supreme Judicial Council submits a separate budget for the 
judicial system to the National Assembly. In this way, the judiciary is 
not dependent upon the consent or largesse of the Council of Minis­
ters; the Supreme Judicial Council need not secure in advance approval 
from the Finance Ministry of its budget requests laid before the Na­
tional Assembly. 
Life tenure is unavailable to Constitutional Court justices; it is avail­
able, however, to jurists in the ordinary law courts. As such, life tenure 
for most Bulgarian judges is another constitutional guarantee support­
ing the goal of judicial independence. After the third year in office, 
judges, prosecutors, and investigating magistrates are removable for 
three reasons—retirement, serving a criminal sentence, and disability 
as specified under Article 129(3) of the Constitution. For those judges 
holding office since before the adoption of the new Constitution, the 
applicable constitutional section was clause 5 of the Transitional and 
Concluding Provisions. These judicial officers who served under the 
previous regime were removable solely within three months of the for­
mation of the Supreme Judicial Council, and only if the council found 
they lacked professional qualifications, meriting their dismissal. 
The council promulgated regulations for the review of the judges 
held over from the old regime. Each judge found unacceptable had 
the opportunity to file written objections with the council. Within this 
procedural framework, the SJC reviewed the credentials of eighty-
three legal professionals and dismissed forty-four from the judicial sys­
tem. This number includes twenty-three judges, or about 2 percent of 
the total of all Bulgarian judges. Eighteen, or 3.2 percent, of the public 
prosecutors were dismissed, and three, or less than 1 percent, of in­
vestigating magistrates were removed by the actions of the Supreme 
Judicial Council. Seventy-seven persons voluntarily retired, and 243 
persons left the system without explanation.6 Although it is difficult to 
know with certainty, evidently the large number of persons who retired 
voluntarily or left the system without explanation must have included 
those who felt that self-removal from the scene was better than the 
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alternative. Then, too, some may have left the bench without fear of 
reprisal for past misdeeds. Instead, they may have answered the call 
to the greener pastures of private law practice that the transition to 
democracy and a market economy promise. 
Fear of Political Interference 
How confident can Bulgaria's judges be that the Constitution provides 
mechanisms for their independence? Despite the constitutional powers 
of the Supreme Judicial Council, is it naive to rule out the potential 
for the politicization of that body? Can the National Assembly under­
mine the life tenure guarantee? Is it possible that politicians may pun­
ish judges for their unfavorable rulings? 
My informants warn that politics will continue to motivate some 
judicial appointments. According to one judge, campaigning for posi­
tions on the Supreme Judicial Council goes on both in the National 
Assembly and among legal professionals, with some judges chosen for 
ideological reasons, specifically, that they do not harbor communist 
sympathies. The 1991 Constitution does not contain any criteria for 
judicial selections, and several legal professionals confirm that the 
council does not have objective criteria. These jurists believe that with­
out guiding criteria some members of the judiciary will continue to be 
chosen for political and ideological reasons. They lament that because 
professional qualification is not always the sole factor in determining 
appointments, the belief that the judicial branch is an objective and 
neutral forum for resolving conflicts may be undermined. 
Most legal professionals I interviewed at all court levels expressed 
some fear that events may unfold to frustrate constitutional protec­
tions. One Supreme Court justice was particularly adamant about the 
vulnerability of the judiciary to interference by sister government insti­
tutions and other political and economic interests. Prophetically, when 
I interviewed him, in 1993, he said that political officials would try 
to intimidate the judiciary; he feared that the opponents of judicial 
independence might try to interfere with the life tenure of judges guar­
anteed in the July 1991 Constitution. The politicians, he exclaimed, 
might attempt to interfere with the activities of the Supreme Judicial 
Council, a body created under the Constitution to oversee the fair 
workings of the judicial system. He said: 
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There is a trend, especially in the executive branch of the govern­
ment to influence the courts, and sometimes they find supporters 
in the mass media. I wouldn't say it's rare even for the American 
democracy, but it's also a question of habits, and from the viewpoint 
of the judge it's also a question of morality and dignity. . . . 
But I think that because we have done the first step, we can do 
the next. I mean now the judges are elected for life, appointed for 
life by this special body—the Supreme Judicial Council. . . . But I 
am afraid they'll try to politicize the program in the adoption of this 
law [the judiciary act]; I am afraid that they'll try to change . . . the 
staff of the Supreme Judicial Council, change the personnel of the 
Supreme Court, and the politicians will try to influence [courts] by 
making personnel changes in all the bodies of the judiciary . . . 
After probing the justice with additional questions, I discovered that 
he was especially concerned about the possibility of legislatively mov­
ing judges from one court to another. Under the Constitution, it is 
theoretically possible, for instance, to move a judge from the Supreme 
Court in the nation's capital to a regional court in the hinterland. This 
has not happened as of the end of 1996, but it is possible. The impor­
tant point is that a lack of protection could wear on judges' resolve to 
render decisions free from fear of political retaliation. 
Some legal professionals I interviewed believed attempts to diminish 
or interfere with the judiciary were a real possibility because some poli­
ticians fear the potential influence of the judiciary. But why? One ex­
planation seems particularly perceptive. It draws our attention to the 
motivations behind the accommodations worked out for the transition 
to democracy between the functionaries of the former Communist 
Party and their democratic opponents. It is the view that the former 
Communists do not want a strong judiciary. At this early moment in 
the post-Communist era, they have an opportunity to make a large 
amount of money by employing money laundering and other illegal 
schemes. Legal chaos is their ally, the argument goes, and therefore the 
former Communist Party functionaries resist an independent judiciary 
capable of enforcing the law. Perhaps, after these profiteers are secure 
in their ill-gotten gains, they will then cynically argue, consistent with 
their self-interest, for a strong judiciary. 
The uncertainty associated with what the future structure and 
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organization of the judicial system may become was on the minds of 
all the jurists I interviewed and spoke with over the years. They con­
veyed a sense of being watched by others. One Supreme Court justice 
put it this way: "This situation is indirect, you understand . .  . it indi­
rectly reflects upon the brain of the judge" Delivering judicial opinions 
that elected officials of government find unacceptable could result in 
setting back the cause of an independent judiciary and a "rule of 
law" state. 
Given this concern, there is little reason to expect bold decisions 
from the ordinary courts. Yet, there is no suggestion that Bulgarian 
jurists exhibit an unwillingness to confront thorny political issues. For 
example, a three-judge panel of the Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
the right of the Turkish minority party to register for participation in 
national elections. This was a courageous but carefully crafted opinion, 
placing the judiciary on the side of political freedom and against popu­
lar sentiment.7 
There is a more optimistic assessment of the state of judicial inde­
pendence in Bulgaria. Thanks to the control imposed by the Supreme 
Judicial Council on the selection of judges and by the more careful 
scrutiny given applicants for judgeships because of a new system of 
competitive examinations, the quality of those acceding to the bench 
is improving. A supervisory judge said, "The courts secure indepen­
dence not only thanks to statutory rights, but also by the selection of 
the candidates. And thank God we have currently a lot of capable 
young people in the profession." 
Fear of financial strangulation is a real one for any judiciary that 
charts an independent course. In a system of separation of powers, the 
duty of legislative authorities to authorize government spending may 
result in subservience by other branches of government. By statutory 
enactment, the Supreme Judicial Council asks the National Assembly 
for funds on behalf of the judiciary. Yet, this has not resulted in the 
third branch of government being absolutely independent from the 
others and has occasioned two opinions of the Constitutional Court. 
The Supreme Judicial Council drafts a budget for the judiciary. This 
draft then goes to the Finance Ministry and, according to a ruling of 
the Constitutional Court, the Council of Ministers has no right to cut 
recommendations proposed in the draft budget. The Finance Ministry 
introduces the draft budget to the Parliament with no alterations. In 
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the end, it is the responsibility of the National Assembly to approve a 
budget with alterations in the original budget as it sees fit. Of course, 
there is no guarantee that the judiciary will get what it needs or wants. 
Almost all the legal professionals with whom I have spoken express 
the view that the judiciary is underfunded. Judicial salaries are low, the 
support staff and equipment are inadequate, and the workload is 
heavy Judges share offices and use antiquated typewriters to prepare 
draft opinions and memoranda. Since other institutions are also un­
derfunded, all agree the judiciary is not a particular target for ill-
treatment. Yet, this matter bears close scrutiny. Sometime in the future, 
the National Assembly could use its budgetary authority to send the 
judiciary a political message. On the other hand, it is possible to make 
matters better by expending court fees differently from the present 
practice. One judge suggested that if the Ministry of Justice and the 
penal system were not part of the budgetary process, the judicial sys­
tem could finance itself through court fees alone. Fees are the most 
secure source of income for the government because they are paid in 
advance. This is not so in the trade sector of the economy, where taxes 
are paid after the transaction and therefore subject to nonpayment. 
Although it is possible to improve the fiscal management of the judi­
cial system, there is no doubt that the fundamental task of the Su­
preme Judicial Council is difficult to manage. Council members may 
work hard to identify well-qualified persons to occupy positions within 
the judiciary, but sometimes conditions beyond their control frustrate 
their best efforts. I asked an important figure of the Sofia District 
Court about the role of the Judicial Council in selecting judges. This 
person is also a proud member of the Supreme Judicial Council. He 
worries about the recent trend resulting from the transition to a market 
economy. The greater emphasis upon private property and rights 
places greater monetary rewards on the private practice of law than 
existed under Communism. Back then, the more prestigious service 
was as a judge or prosecutor in the government's judicial system. One 
result is that the well-intentioned judicial selection process is not bring­
ing to the bench the best qualified persons. He also laments the consti­
tutional provision granting judges life tenure. He thinks that instead 
of life tenure judges should have renewable five- or ten-year terms. He 
is uncertain whether professional competence should be demonstrable 
by professional record or examination. Nonetheless, he expressed the 
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view that every magistrate should be able to defend their competence. 
He put it this way: "Otherwise we'll go to this lifetime sinecure for 
judges and not to making justice" 
Thus, one way to interpret whether the system of selecting judges 
through the Supreme Judicial Council is functioning well is to affirm 
that council members are doing the best job possible under unfortu­
nate circumstances. To the extent there are unqualified judges, blame 
the transition to democracy. Privatization of the economy makes the 
services of private lawyers more valuable than that of judges. Alterna­
tively, one may identify the life tenure system as an extreme reaction 
to the patronage system under the old totalitarian regime. Eliminating 
life tenure would require a constitutional amendment, and no doubt 
any such proposal would raise serious questions about the motivations 
of those promoting the change. Supporters of life tenure might natu­
rally appeal to the norm of judicial independence in a "law-governed 
state." As we have already seen, however, it is now theoretically pos­
sible to devalue life tenure by moving judicial personnel from one posi­
tion to another and by reducing their salaries. Again, though some 
fear this might happen, thus far neither the National Assembly nor the 
Council of Ministers has tried it. Yet, other attacks on the judiciary 
have been mounted. 
Attack s o n th  e Judiciar  y 
The first outward and visible warning sign that the judiciary may be 
subject to political maneuvers is that the National Assembly failed for 
several years to enact a judiciary law establishing the court system as 
outlined in the July 1991 Constitution. Members of Parliament had 
introduced legislation since the early days under the new Constitution. 
However, action was put off with the explanation that the National 
Assembly had to deal with more pressing problems. Therefore, al­
though the Constitution provides for a Supreme Court of Cassation 
and a Supreme Administrative Court, the National Assembly failed to 
create either one; that is, until the enactment of the Law on the Judi­
ciary in June 1994. At one point, the Constitutional Court ruled that 
the existing Supreme Court possessed the jurisdiction allocated to 
the constitutionally mandated Supreme Court of Cassation and Su­
preme Administrative Court.8 Consequently, with some confusion and 
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modification, including the creation of the Constitutional Court and 
the law on the Supreme Judicial Council, the organization of the judi­
ciary continued in its pre-July 1991 form until June 1994. 
A second indicator that the independence of the judiciary is at issue 
was the attempt by the Council of Ministers to clear the budget re­
quests of the Supreme Judicial Council. Obviously, if the executive 
could directly control the budget request of the judiciary, the Coun­
cil of Ministers could dictate how it performs its function. The Con­
stitutional Court, however, came to the rescue of the Supreme Ju­
dicial Council. It declared the Constitution mandates that although 
the Council of Ministers will submit the budget of the judiciary to the 
National Assembly, the executive branch may not alter the orig­
inal budget request of the Supreme Judicial Council without its 
permission.9 
A more important decision favorable to SJC independence was ren­
dered in 1995. Prosecutor General Ivan Tatarchev challenged a pro­
vision in the National Budget Act denying the SJC independent 
budgetary authority. Pursuant to this act, the Ministry of Finance had 
insisted that the SJC budgetary accounts be given to the Justice Minis­
try. This act also located the administrative servicing of the SJC in 
the Ministry of Justice.10 The Constitutional Court held that the SJC 
is entitled to independent budgetary authority without executive 
branch control.11 
As potentially damaging as the tardiness of installing the judicial 
system and the attempts to interfere with the budgetary process may 
seem, the event of June 17, 1994, is clearly the type of frontal attack 
on the judiciary that many persons I interviewed feared most. The 
National Assembly passed on its second reading the long-awaited Law 
on the Judiciary. The new law contains two features that affect judicial 
independence and a third section that impacts the participation of pri­
vate client lawyers in the Supreme Judicial Council. President Zhelyu 
Zhelev returned the June law to Parliament with his objection that 
parts of the statute were unconstitutional.12 The National Assembly, 
however, passed the law again and, as required by the Constitution, 
Zhelev signed the law. For each controversial statutory provision, the 
Constitutional Court was then asked to render judgments crucial to 
the role of jurists in the creation of a law-governed state. 
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A contentious element of this law is that every person occupying 
top positions in the judicial system must have at least five years of 
prior judicial experience, either as a judge or as a prosecutor. On its 
face, this provision requires high qualifications for office and, in the 
abstract, should not elicit opposition from those in favor of a profes­
sionally oriented independent judiciary This is consistent with the idea 
that important judicial officials ought to be chosen on a merit basis. 
But the practical effect of this law is to purge the judiciary of anti-
Communists. This is true because the only jurists meeting the five-year 
requirement must have necessarily come to their judicial posts during 
Communist Party rule, that is, before the November 1989 coup d'etat. 
Only members of the Communist Party or individuals acceptable to 
the ruling oligarchy could become judges, magistrates, or prosecutors 
during the years of the old regime. It is widely thought that this quali­
fying provision was written into law so that two well-known figures 
who at the time lacked five years of previous experience could be 
ousted from office.13 
The first is Ivan Grigorov, the chair of the Supreme Court. He is 
widely seen as the symbol of an independent judiciary and considered 
a staunch anti-Communist. This law also applied to Chief Prosecutor 
General Ivan Tatarchev. He is a highly visible opponent of illegal 
money-laundering operations and other white-collar criminal activity. 
Many Bulgarians believe that former and present leaders of the Com­
munist Party, renamed the Bulgarian Socialist Party, are linked to 
these nefarious, self-serving activities. The most celebrated trial was 
that of Todor Zhivkov, the former president and Communist Party 
leader. But the net was cast wider to include contemporary politicians 
associated with the former Communist Party.14 The chief prosecutor, 
appointed by the National Assembly before the anti-Communist bloc 
split and lost majority control of the National Assembly at the end of 
1992, has also prosecuted three prominent BSP members of the Parlia­
ment for their activities in the years of the Communist rule. Andrey 
Lukanov, a leading member of the reform element of the Communist 
Party and a prime minister in the post-Communist era, and former 
interior minister Alexander Lilov have been subjected to criminal pros­
ecutions. It is alleged that they used their official positions to provide 
weaponry and ammunition to countries with terrorist and totalitarian 
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regimes.15 Dimitar Velev was prosecuted for his connection with the 
regeneration process, the coercive change of ethnic Turk names during 
the 1980s.16 
Members of the Bulgarian Socialist Party view these and other pros­
ecutions as transparent attempts to exact revenge. They believe these 
actions represent a violation of earlier agreements for a peaceful tran­
sition to democracy; it was agreed that all sides would live together in 
a humane state without repeating the cycle of revenge and violence 
characteristic of Bulgaria's history. They assert the prosecutions are 
cynical attempts to cover up illegal activities in the years 1991-92 by 
the anti-Communist forces when the Union of Democratic Forces was 
in power. Lukanov contested his prosecution unsuccessfully in the 
Constitutional Court. He argued that it was a denial of his parliamen­
tary immunity guaranteed under the July 1991 Constitution.17 After 
Lukanov's death, the case was won, in November 1996, in the Euro­
pean Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg.18 
Without specifying the targets of the legislation, the 1994 Judiciary 
Act, as fashioned by BSP members in cooperation with members of 
other parliamentary groups, required the immediate removal of both 
Supreme Court Chairman Grigorov and Chief Prosecutor Tatarchev. 
Neither person met the five-year prior experience requirement. 
The Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) objected to the statutory provi­
sion requiring that its members have at least five years of professional 
experience as judges, prosecutors, investigating magistrates, or aca­
demics and that new elections for the SJC should be held within one 
month of the promulgation of the act. This statutory provision also 
provides that private lawyers shall not be eligible as SJC members. The 
latter provision is widely believed to be aimed at particular SJC mem­
bers viewed as BSP enemies. The SJC complained about these provi­
sions in the strongest possible terms, and the leader of the opposition 
UDF termed this situation a constitutional crisis. Days before the final 
vote on the 1994 Judiciary Act, Philip Dimitrov, then the leader of the 
opposition Union of Democratic Forces, said that the judiciary law 
represents a constitutional crisis because, under the Constitution, 
judges are permanent.19 
The Council of Europe (CE) issued a memorandum criticizing 
the Judiciary Act as part of a larger assessment of Bulgaria's perfor­
mance of its responsibilities under CE conventions and agreements. 
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Predictably, Bulgaria's CE representatives who were delegates of the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
defended the new law. The UDF representatives walked out during the 
defense of the new law. Later, however, they issued a separate statement 
explicitly agreeing with the observations of the CE memorandum.20 
President Zhelev petitioned the Constitutional Court for a ruling 
on the constitutionality of those sections of the act limiting the tenure 
of members of the judicial system and of the inclusion of private law­
yers among the ranks of the Supreme Judicial Council. The Court 
ruled in favor of the proponents of judicial independence.21 It found 
that paragraph 8 of the act requiring the dismissal of judges and prose­
cutors who lack five years of prior experience violates Article 129, sec­
tion 3 of the Constitution, providing for life tenure of judges. Once 
appointed to the judiciary and having served the probationary period, 
the jurists' tenure cannot be violated but for the reasons specified in 
the article. 
The Court also ruled that section 11 of the act, calling for new elec­
tions for members of the SJC, contravenes Article 130(4) of the Consti­
tution requiring five-year terms of office. It is unconstitutional because 
section 11 of the Judiciary Act reduces the terms of office for SJC 
members by requiring elections within one month after promulgation 
of the act. 
Finally, the Court addressed the issue of prohibiting private lawyers 
as SJC members. The decision refers to an earlier one decided on April 
3, 1992.22 The Court held that Article 130, section 2 of the Constitution 
determines in detail the requirements for SJC membership. It precludes 
the possibility of lawmakers narrowing the definition of the term jurists 
to exclude practicing lawyers other than judges, prosecutors, magis­
trates, or academics. 
The election of the new Socialist government in late 1994, and the 
subsequent legislative enactments of the new Parliament in 1995, led 
to tensions between the Constitutional Court and the National Assem­
bly. As I indicated in chapter 8, during the first nine months of the 
Socialist government, the Constitutional Court struck down six new 
laws.23 During this period a disagreement of considerable constitu­
tional importance involved the amendments to the Agricultural Land 
Tenure Act. President Zhelev, the petitioner, won the case. The Con­
stitutional Court ruled unconstitutional that provision of the law 
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The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1994 term. From left 
to right: Seated: Tsanko Hadhystoyehev, Mladen Danailov, Assen Manov 
(president), Professor Milcho Kostov, Stanislav Dimitrov. Standing: Nikolay 
Pavlov, Alexander Arabadjiev, Georgi Markov, Ivan Grigorov, Professor 
Todor Todorov, Pencho Penev, Dimitar Gotchev 
requiring landowners to first offer their property for sale to municipali­
ties and the state before offering it to other buyers. The act violated 
the constitutional principle of the inviolability of property. The Court 
also struck down a provision of the new law that restricted the rights 
of former owners when their land had been improved by subsequent 
owners. Other provisions restricting the rights of property owners were 
similarly invalidated by the Constitutional Court.24 
The press reported mass protests in the countryside against the deci­
sion of the Constitutional Court that invalidated nineteen amendments 
to the Land Act sponsored by the Socialist Party.25 In a move viewed 
by the opposition Union of Democratic Forces as "a very dangerous 
signal," National Assembly chairman Blagovest Sendov met with the 
president of the Constitutional Court, Assen Manov.2(1 Within weeks. 
President Zhelyu Zhelev and Prime Minister Zhan Videnov exchanged 
bitter remarks about the role of the Constitutional Court in the politi­
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cal life of the nation, and about the respective roles of Parliament and 
the presidency in the controversy27 
The interinstitutional conflict became less theoretical when, on Au­
gust 3, 1995, the Council of Ministers evicted the Constitutional Court 
from its offices. This move was said to be temporary. The government 
explained that this was a necessary move to accommodate the space 
needs of the Central Electoral Commission in the building. However, 
commission members reportedly said that they did not need that much 
office space and that the decision was a "purely political act." The 
Court was told by the government to ask Parliament for new offices in 
the former Communist Party headquarters. But Justice Georgi Mar­
kov commented to the press that the government has "declared war on 
the Constitutional Court."28 
Members of the Constitutional Court then unanimously decided to 
appeal the matter to its sister institution, the Supreme Court. But be­
fore the disposition of this matter was resolved, President Zhelev initi­
ated an action before the Constitutional Court. He asked for an 
interpretation of an article in the Constitution that governs the author­
ity of the Council of Ministers to manage state property29 On Septem­
ber 12 the Court rendered its predictable decision. It unanimously 
found that the Council of Ministers may not dispose of state property 
occupied by the president, the National Assembly, or judicial authori­
ties without the consent of each.30 
With the leasehold secure, the Constitutional Court survived the 
institutional attack. Nevertheless, Court members continue to find 
themselves entangled in the political thicket. Among other controver­
sies coming before it in 1996, it adjudicated the respective authority 
of the president and Parliament in the appointment of judges. It also 
effectively disabled a popular BSP nominee to be placed on the presi­
dential ballot. 
The Supreme Judicial Council acted in anticipation of a parliamen­
tary enactment that would finally resolve the processes and procedures 
of two constitutionally mandated courts. On June 26, 1996, this body, 
by majority vote, named chief judges of the Supreme Court of Cassa­
tion and the Supreme Administrative Court. Because these judicial in­
stitutions had not yet come into existence, the Socialist press dubbed 
them "phantom courts." Twenty-one of the twenty-five members of the 
236 * Chapter 9 
SJC took part in the vote by secret ballot. But the elections were held 
after its ex officio chairman, Justice Minister Mladen Chervenyakov, 
had left the room and declared the meeting adjourned. Chervenyakov 
and BSP parliamentarians declared that this action was a transparent 
attempt to pack the courts with antigovernment cadres.31 
A day after the SJC action, President Zhelev signed the two judicial 
appointments, but Justice Minister Chervenyakov refused to counter­
sign the decrees. Within twenty-four hours, the BSP-led Democratic 
Left parliamentary majority enacted a resolution declaring impermis­
sible the actions taken by the SJC and President Zhelev. The National 
Assembly resolution obligated Zhan Videnov's BSP government to 
introduce by October 1996 a Supreme Administrative Court bill and 
other acts regulating a three-tier court system. A week later, Parlia­
ment enacted amendments to the Judiciary Act; the law mandates that 
the presidents of the courts in question may not be named before their 
creation and the passage of procedural laws regulating the three-
instance judicial institutions.32 President Zhelev issued a suspensory 
veto, which the National Assembly later overrode by a comfortable 
majority vote. 
There was also an apparent attempt to foil by bureaucratic means 
President Zhelev's decree. The editor of the State Gazette caused the 
official announcement to appear in only some undistributed copies of 
the print run.33 Zhelev publicly proclaimed that this action was a fla­
grant violation of the Constitution. He said: "Nobody can presume to 
halt the promulgation of an instrument issued by the head of state, 
even the chairman of the National Assembly, who is enjoined with the 
implementation of the 'Official Gazette' act. . . . Today's case sets a 
dangerous precedent which deals a blow to statehood and calls into 
question the functioning of the institutions of state."34 
On July 25, 1996, the Constitutional Court rendered an opinion 
reminiscent of John Marshall's U.S. Supreme Court decision in Mar-
bury v. Madison (1803). By a 11-1 vote, it held that after the president 
signed the decrees in question, the effect was immediate. The fact that 
the promulgation of the decrees in the official State Gazette was cir­
cumvented by a failure to circulate that document is of no consequence 
because the "Official Gazette" is only important as an announcement 
device; it does not concern the validity of any particular appoint-
ment.35 The Court also ruled that the National Assembly exceeded 
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its constitutional powers by attempting to limit the authority of the 
Supreme Judicial Council in naming the judges. Despite the obvious 
in-principle victory for the SJC and President Zhelev, the Constitu­
tional Court did not rule on whether the two controversial persons 
named to the new courts could serve. That question awaited future 
adjudication.36 
This controversy illustrates again the resolve of members of the 
Constitutional Court to use their authority to settle interinstitutional 
conflicts. It demonstrates how a Constitutional Court may employ its 
authority to settle conflicts among separate branches of government, 
and in the process contribute to the overall stability of the political 
system. Yet, at times, the exercise of constitutional authority may pro­
duce a negative response. To the extent that courts render controversial 
decisions that are difficult to explain, popular and elite support for the 
judiciary may erode and possibly undermine the level of legitimacy 
necessary for courts to function effectively. 
The Constitutional Court's decision to interpret Bulgarian law in 
such a way as to invalidate the candidacy of a popular figure for presi­
dent of the Republic presents such a problem. Foreign Minister Georgi 
Pirinski was the designated BSP candidate for president for the Octo­
ber 1996 elections. He was born in New York City in 1948 to an Ameri­
can mother and a Bulgarian father. The Constitutional Court 
interpreted Bulgarian law in force at the time of Pirinski's birth to 
mean that because U.S. law regards persons born in the U.S. as citizens, 
such a person is not a Bulgarian by birth. Therefore, under Article 
93(2) of the 1991 Constitution, individuals born in such circumstances 
are ineligible to be president, although the Constitution contains no 
citizenship limitations on who may be a candidate for the presidency.37 
From beginning to end, election politics engulfed the proceedings 
surrounding this case. Public opinion polls showed that Pirinski was 
either a likely winner or a serious contender in the elections to be held 
in late October 1996. It is therefore not surprising that fifty-four oppo­
sition members of Parliament filed the petition asking the Constitu­
tional Court to rule on the citizenship question. In response, the BSP 
rushed through the National Assembly a bill stipulating that Bulgarian 
nationals by origin are persons who have one Bulgarian parent, no 
matter where they are born.38 
The day after the Court's July 23, 1996, ruling, the BSP and the 
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UDF exchanged strident attacks on national television. The Socialist 
spokesperson charged that the UDF was trying to disqualify Pirinski 
and that they were "making a cat's paw of the Constitutional Court."39 
Later Pirinski and other BSP leaders denounced the decision as a po­
litically motivated act. And they claimed that "the ruling heightens the 
tension and can destabilize the society."40 
In the complaint the Constitutional Court was asked by the peti­
tioners to rule on the abstract question of when citizenship obtains. In 
a rather awkward display of judicial self-restraint, the Court's rappor­
teur emphasized that the majority did not rule on the particular case 
of Georgi Pirinski. He indicated that if Pirinski should win the presi­
dential election, then upon proper application the Court could rule on 
his eligibility to hold office. Few thought, however, that Pirinski's abil­
ity to obtain ballot access was anything but doubtful. 
Nevertheless, Pirinski took the next formal step in advancing his 
candidacy: he petitioned the Central Election Commission (CEC) to 
have his name placed on the election ballot. Under law, this body is 
responsible for evaluating the credentials and documents of presiden­
tial contenders. On August 27, 1996, the CEC announced that it found 
inaccuracies in both the documents submitted by the UDF candidates 
and Pirinski. The defect in the documents submitted by the UDF can­
didates was minor: it was a technical failure to state clearly the status 
of the political forces supporting them. 
The case against Pirinski, however, was more serious. The CEC 
voted eleven for and ten against his registration, three votes short of 
the two-thirds requirement necessary for ballot certification. The com­
mission found that the documents submitted by Pirinski did not estab­
lish clearly how he acquired Bulgarian citizenship. With this negative 
result, the BSP again publicly registered its disapproval; the opposition 
forces displayed satisfaction with their opponents' predicament and 
revealed little apprehension for their own.41 
Within days, the opposing forces, each for their own reasons, ap­
pealed the matter to a five-member panel of the Supreme Court. On 
September 2, 1996, this court unanimously rejected the BSP petition. 
It found that Pirinski did not hold Bulgarian citizenship at the time of 
his birth. The decision was final and unappealable. On September 4, 
1996, the Supreme Court panel ruled on the UDF petition. This time, 
however, the Supreme Court found for the UDF, ordering the UDF 
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candidates for president and vice president to be placed on the Octo­
ber ballot.42 BSP officials bitterly denounced the Supreme Court's neg­
ative decision respecting Pirinski's candidacy. The candidate himself 
initially said he would appeal his case to the European Court of Hu­
man Rights.43 But behaving as practical politicians and, in the process, 
avoiding a constitutional crisis of major proportions, the BSP leader­
ship decided to name new candidates: Ivan Marazov, Pirinski's vice 
presidential running mate, as the presidential candidate and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Irina Bokova as the new vice presidential entry.44 
In the end, the Socialist Party candidate lost to the UDF candidate 
in a November 3, 1996, runoff' Petar Stoyanov won 60 percent of the 
total vote. The voter turnout is comparable to the first presidential 
election in January 1992, with 62 percent of the eligible voters going 
to the polls.45 Despite widespread dissatisfaction with the ability of the 
parliamentary majority to cope with the nation's problems, the result 
of this election reflects diffuse support for the democratic regime. This 
conclusion is especially warranted if one makes the invidious compari­
son to the presidential election held a few days later in the United 
States. With only 48 percent of the eligible voters going to the polls, 
President William Clinton defeated former senator Robert Dole while 
receiving only 49 percent of the total votes. 
Clearly, constitutional politics played an important part in the 
struggle for power between rival forces in Bulgaria's 1996 presidential 
elections. Significantly, the willingness of BSP leaders to abide by the 
problematic decision of the Constitutional Court supports the conclu­
sion that among ruling elements within Bulgarian society there is an 
adherence to the constitutional rules of the game, even when the rules 
are used in ways that disadvantage them politically. This speaks elo­
quently for a successful transition to democracy. Yet, members of the 
Constitutional Court cannot but realize that decisions such as this one 
will reinforce the resolve of their opponents in high places. Further­
more, it may make it difficult for them to elicit widespread public sup­
port for interinstitutional battles that are yet to come. 
Expectation of Interinstitutional Conflict 
The incidents of interinstitutional conflict may be interpreted as indic­
ative of basic instability. Though it is true that the outcomes of the 
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various clashes among government institutions may be detrimental to 
the maintenance of democracy, there is an alternative interpretation 
that is more favorable. Particularly where there is inexperience with 
institutions, reasonable persons may disagree about how each institu­
tion should function and relate to the other. The Constitutional Court 
is new to Bulgaria. How active it should be in the political life of the 
nation is a question that can be answered only within the context of 
events. The presidential institution is endowed with few independent 
powers, and yet, the officeholder is elected by all of the people on a 
separate ballot. This raises a serious issue: How and for what purpose 
should the president exercise leadership? With respect to the proper 
conduct of political parties in the National Assembly, it must be asked: 
Where there is a long-standing void of competing political parties, 
what is the responsibility of a loyal opposition in Parliament? Further­
more, constitutional issues are resolved within the context of practical 
politics. Political forces operate to shape constitutional structures. 
They bend these structures to the felt necessities of the time, or, in 
other words, interinstitutional conflicts reflect the struggle for policy 
domination. President Zhelev, for example, used the Constitutional 
Court to challenge the land reform, privatization, and other policies 
of the Socialist government. The Court rendered authoritative deci­
sions that the National Assembly then employed to adjust its legislative 
judgments to conform with constitutional strictures. 
Prime Minister Zhan Videnov commented that conflict among the 
various institutions of government is common in those societies in 
Eastern Europe undergoing a transition to democracy46 The evidence 
supports his conclusion. For example, scholarly articles have been 
written on the conflict between the Romanian Constitutional Court 
and Parliament, the struggle between the president and Parliament in 
Slovakia, and constitutional brinkmanship in Poland.47 The East Euro­
pean Constitutional Review features country-by-country updates on 
constitutional politics in Eastern Europe and the former republics of 
the Soviet Union. 
In the final analysis, the constitutional politics practiced in Bulgaria 
are not unusual or particularly abhorrent. In the process of practicing 
democracy, Bulgarians are giving meaning and shape to their new in­
stitutions. In the aftermath of the transition to democracy, the consoli­
dation phase is progressing as might reasonably be expected. 
10 
Conclusions 
THE BULGARIAN EXPERIENCE contributes to an understanding of 
what may be necessary for successful transitions from totalitarianism 
or authoritarianism to democracy. One important conclusion is that it 
is erroneous to suppose that certain oft-cited prerequisites are neces­
sary for democracy to succeed. Democracy may come into existence 
when opposing sides negotiate an agreement that is in their mutual 
self-interest. Giuseppe Di Palma's analysis fits the Bulgarian experi­
ence. Democracies may be created even when the supposed macro po­
litical, economic, and social preconditions for their creation and 
survival are absent. There is no doubt that the principal cause for elite 
support from within the BCP for the creation of democratic institu­
tions was a desire to share political power rather than lose it com­
pletely. The result of accommodating the old and new forces in 
Bulgaria was the creation of institutions that have had an autonomous 
influence on subsequent political relations. Parliamentary government 
is a fact of Bulgarian political life. The new institutions created by the 
Roundtable and the Grand National Assembly have taken on a life of 
their own. Although fragile, these institutions are shaping the manner 
and nature of political discourse and coaxing civil society into what 
may become a stable and vigorous existence. 
No one denies that a survey of the world will confirm the observa­
tion that, historically speaking, democracy as a working system of gov­
ernment is the exception and not the rule. To be sure, authoritarian 
and totalitarian regimes are easier to create and maintain than demo­
cratic ones. But the prior successful transitions in Western Europe and 
Latin America and now the successful transitions in Eastern Europe 
suggest that something is wrong with the conventional wisdom. In 
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Bulgaria, like the rest of Eastern Europe, there was no meaningful 
competition among political parties. There was little in terms of a 
middle class. During the last years under Communism, Bulgaria's 
economy suffered from stagnation and insufficient growth to satisfy 
both mass and elite expectations.1 Though many Bulgarians owned 
their own homes and even country cottages, they were not free to own 
property in the Western sense of an entitlement to do with it whatever 
they wanted; they needed permission of one government body or an­
other to use or dispose of their possession. There was no entrepreneur­
ial class that might serve as the rudiments of interest group pluralism. 
Other than the Communist Party, and unlike the Polish case, for ex­
ample, there were few power-wielding groups to which one might 
belong.2 Consequently, it was difficult for most people to acquire 
the skills necessary for creating a civil society. Indeed, most observ­
ers viewed Bulgaria as a repressive regime. Yet, the history of post-
Communist Bulgaria tells another story and beckons us to search for 
new explanations. 
Pacts, Will, and Results 
The objective facts militating against transitions to democracy are sig­
nificant. But as the Bulgarian case illustrates, the reduction of these 
probabilistic findings to individual cases is quite another matter. In 
brief, there is no iron law of preconditions necessary for democracy. 
Giuseppe Di Palma is correct: it is possible to will a democratic system 
into existence. It can happen if the participants in the struggle for 
power understand it is in their mutual interest to reach an accommoda­
tion that guarantees the principal competing forces a place at the table. 
In Bulgaria, the forces of the opposing sides came together to negotiate 
what Di Palma calls in another context refortna pactada: taking their 
chances in an uncertain democratic order, this is an agreement to live 
by new rules that sanction the legitimacy of reform elements of the old 
regime and opposition groups. If the negotiators carefully craft such 
an agreement, as was true for Bulgaria, democratization can be more 
than a pipe dream. In short, as Di Palma maintains, transferring loyal­
ties from authoritarian or totalitarian regimes to democratic ones is 
less difficult than most scholars think.3 
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In Bulgaria, the principals agreed on particular democratic rules, 
including a parliamentary system and a Constitutional Court with the 
authority to protect human rights. Rather than attempting to forge a 
new regime by itself, reform elements within the then existing Commu­
nist Party actively sought to create agreements with their opponents 
that were organized under the auspices of the Union of Democratic 
Forces. Furthermore, though not a perfect umbrella organization, the 
UDF spoke for most oppositionist groups; it forcefully placed de­
mands upon the reform leaders of the Communist Party to yield con­
cessions in return for a place in Bulgaria's uncertain democratic future. 
Finally, the conscious timing of the accommodation for political 
change was superb. The day after the Berlin Wall fell, reformers within 
the Communist Party executed a coup d'etat against their aging leader, 
Todor Zhivkov. The preexisting Ecoglasnost movement served to bring 
together regime opponents to negotiate with the new leaders of the 
Party and government. Together, they agreed within months upon the 
basic rules for the prospective democracy, including free elections for 
a Grand National Assembly. And while the politics of the Grand Na­
tional Assembly were occasionally tumultuous, the deputies were able 
to forge a new Constitution. This document serves as the operating 
guide for how to conduct the governmental process in a democratic 
Bulgaria. 
But beware of those who scheme to use democratic processes to 
defeat and subjugate their enemies. Distrust of the motives of the re­
form remnants of the discredited Communist regime renders the dem­
ocratic pact suspect and those who created it as potential enemies of 
the peoples' true aspirations. While recognizing the basis for such trep­
idation, it is nonetheless unnecessary for functionaries of the past un­
democratic regime to undergo a profound conversion at the altar of 
democracy to conjure up a new order. The enlightened self-interest of 
the leaders of the renamed Communist Party, now the Bulgarian So­
cialist Party, operated to convince party functionaries that their future 
survival depended upon the formation of a new democratic form of 
government. They understood that if they were to survive they would 
have to compete with opposing forces for the votes of the people. 
Given the alternative, there is little wonder that the leaders of the 
BSP participated in the creation of the July 1991 Constitution. At the 
244 • Chapter 10 
same time, opponents of the former Communist Party sought to avoid 
civil war while also guaranteeing a democratic future. They agreed to 
accept the possibility that their former oppressors might retain power 
by winning elections. In fact, after the BSP won a majority of the seats 
in the Grand National Assembly at the June 1990 elections, their dem­
ocratic opponents resolved to continue the process of democratization. 
Despite suffering disunity from within their own ranks, they struggled 
to draft a new constitution. This was done with the faith that by partic­
ipating in democratic politics now, they would get their chance later to 
dislodge the BSP from control of the government. The combined anti-
BSP forces did just that at the next general election in October 1991. 
But one year later, the UDF lost control of the government. Many 
opposition leaders who participated as GNA deputies suffered defeat 
at the polls. Parties led by such luminaries as Dertliev, Ganev, and 
Simeonov were unable to garner the requisite 4 percent of the votes 
necessary for seats in the National Assembly. Ironically, therefore, 
some important architects of Bulgaria's democratic Constitution have 
been relegated to the sidelines of a political system they were respon­
sible for helping to create. 
It is problematic whether political parties played a positive role in 
creating parliamentary government in Bulgaria. As the Bulgarian po­
litical scientist Georgi Karasimeonov points out, the highly confron­
tational relationship between the major parties makes it difficult to 
institute needed reforms, particularly economic changes. Indeed, the 
promise of the Bulgarian transition to democracy is one of accommo­
dation, compromise, tolerance, and political dialogue. To the extent 
that the parties have behaved in ways that are contrary to the institu­
tionalization of political pluralism, progress toward democratic con­
solidation is retarded.4 Yet, there is sufficient evidence to support the 
conclusion that Bulgaria's existing parties are fulfilling the major tasks 
thought desirable for the functioning of democratic institutions. They 
nominate candidates for the principal elective and appointive offices. 
They conduct election campaigns. They educate the voters through the 
comparison of the alternative candidates and treatment of issues. And 
they are integrating the various societal groups into the political sys­
tem. In essence, political parties are providing citizens with genuine 
choices, and this is the central feature of a working democracy. 
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Roundtabl  e an  d Ne w Constitutio n Linkag e 
In medieval Europe legislative assemblies arose because monarchs 
sought consultation and consent from powerful forces in society. This 
sometimes difficult process was important for knitting society together 
in the pursuit of both specific and diffuse policy goals.5 As a represen­
tative assembly of divergent sources of opinion and power, Bulgaria's 
National Roundtable Talks fulfilled a similar function. The event of 
the National Roundtable Talks was an important step in the creation 
of a democratic constitution on the way to regime change. It is the 
foundation for creating a civil society and was an important and effec­
tive step in the de-Stalinization of Bulgarian society 
Yet, some criticize the Roundtable because it failed to eliminate 
completely the power and influence of the Communist Party, which 
became the Bulgarian Socialist Party Indeed, following the June 1990 
elections held after the Roundtable Talks, Bulgaria had a Socialist 
president, a Socialist government, and a Socialist majority in its parlia­
ment. The old Communist Party was still in business, albeit under a 
different name. Moreover, the Roundtable had conferred legitimacy on 
what some might term wolves in sheep's clothing.6 This analysis, how­
ever, overlooks the broader systemic results. With a minimum of vio­
lence and bloodshed, it is no longer appropriate to classify Bulgaria as 
a totalitarian or authoritarian state. The Constitution adopted in July 
1991 reflects the fundamental agreements negotiated at the Round­
table. It contains most of the institutional features of what are univer­
sally understood as embodying democratic values. A deep commit­
ment to human rights is clear, and there is a mechanism for defending 
those rights through an independent judicial system, including a Con­
stitutional Court whose essential role is to do just that. 
On the other hand, a fundamental difficulty with the July 1991 Con­
stitution may be traced to an early Roundtable decision. Representa­
tives of the Turkish ethnic minority were never part of the Roundtable 
deliberations, although both sides publicly invited them to participate. 
The Roundtable subsequently failed to come to terms with representa­
tion of the Turkish minority. In so doing, it missed an important op­
portunity to deal with an underlying tension in Bulgarian society. The 
1991 Constitution denies the right of political parties to be based on 
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ethnic, racial, or religious lines. The Bulgarian Constitutional Court 
successfully turned back this threat to democratic representation in 
the political process when it ruled in favor of the right of the Turkish 
movement, MRF, to participate in elections.7 Moreover, between Au­
gust 1990 and the end of 1997, Bulgaria has had six different govern­
ments, and the MRF has been a pivotal force in the creation and 
maintenance of several of those shaky governments. But do not jump 
to the hasty conclusion that evidence of failed governments proves that 
democracy is faltering. When governments fail, it is as much a sign 
that democracy is working as it is an indication of system disequilib­
rium and instability. 
Participants in the Grand National Assembly disagree whether the 
time spent in crafting a new constitution was worth the result. Some 
well-meaning and informed persons believe the energy and political 
capital expended on this secondary task detracted unnecessarily from 
the primary duty of truly reforming Bulgarian society. The more press­
ing problem, they argue, was how to purge Bulgaria from its Com­
munist Party-driven bureaucratic structures and its commitment to 
socialist solutions for economic problems. What was needed in its 
place, the critics say, is a government completely free of its past or­
ganizing principle and an economy amenable to strong capitalist in­
fluences. The Hungarian example, they argue, may have been a better 
model. The lesson is to amend the constitution as needed in a piece­
meal fashion. Meanwhile, get on with the pressing problems of sub­
stantive reform. I am hard-pressed to argue that a new constitution 
was a condition precedent for Bulgaria to become a democracy. After 
all, most other former totalitarian states have not had constitutional 
conventions. Nonetheless, they have amended as needed their basic 
constitutions, reflecting an understanding of what new political rules 
of the game might be required given the changing political order. 
Thus, looking at it from an American historical viewpoint, one 
plausible lesson of the Bulgarian experience may be just the opposite 
of what one might suppose. In one sense, the critics may have been 
right: it was a waste of time, energy, and political capital to hold a 
constitutional convention. What is essential is reaching an accommo­
dation for a peaceful transition to democracy. This can be done with 
or without holding a constitutional convention. On the other hand, 
the symbolism of writing new constitutional rules is important evi­
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dence that the political system is undergoing fundamental change. Bul-
garia's July 1991 Constitution is a progressive one, and the notion of 
a law-governed state is central to its design. In this sense, the new Con­
stitution is an outward and visible sign of the rejection of the past 
forty-five years. Additionally, beginning with the first one held in 1879, 
Bulgarians redefine their political identity by holding Grand National 
Assemblies. In this sense, the GNA is a historical device linking Bul­
garians to their past. For the anti-Communist forces, the July 1991 
Constitution is concrete evidence of basic change. And for their part, 
the reform Communists can lay claim to a legitimacy that otherwise 
would be denied to them. 
But there is more to the argument in favor of constitution writing 
when the goal is to create a successful transition to democracy. In the 
Bulgarian context, crafting a new constitution made good sense and 
may very well have important applications elsewhere. 
The idea for rewriting the entire Constitution was one insisted upon 
by the anti-Communist forces within the UDE The democratic oppo­
sition expended considerable energy in the constitution-making pro­
cess, while the leaders of the former Communist Party acquiesced 
willingly and contributed considerably to that process. Ironically, in 
the end the renamed Bulgarian Communist Party strongly endorsed 
the new Constitution, leaving in its wake a severely split democratic 
opposition. The source of the disunity is not so much criticism of par­
ticular constitutional provisions as it is the failure of the opposition to 
exact revenge against the ruling elite of the ancien regime. That is, 
some democratic opponents to the Bulgarian Socialist Party would 
have preferred something akin to a de-Nazification program. A large 
net would be cast that in the end would punish a large number of Party 
functionaries for their past misdeeds. To have yielded to such demands, 
however, would mean the nullification of the reforma pactada, and the 
unraveling of the agreement to live together with all the uncertainties 
implicit in democracy. 
A fortiori, by committing to paper basic understandings in the form 
of constitutional rules and principles, the opposition leaders insured 
for themselves an opportunity to compete in the new order. They were 
outlining in advance the rules of the game, including the norms for 
how institutions are to function. These perceptive democrats under­
stood that inevitably there would be conflict over substantive policy 
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goals, but they resolved to minimize conflict over the rules. For them, 
an implicit rather than an explicit acceptance of democracy by consent 
is as unacceptable as totalitarianism by consent. Like the couple who 
tie the wedding knot in a civil ceremony but then renew their vows 
before God in a church, the democratic opponents who insisted upon 
a new constitution sought to insure that the vows that tie the nation 
together are indeed secure. 
It is not surprising that opposition leaders were not united during 
and after the Grand National Assembly proceedings. Although they 
could all agree on the desirability of displacing forever the former 
party state with a law-governed one, they came to the bargaining table 
with differing personal and group agendas. It was not unexpected that 
some movements and parties would, as they did, fall by the wayside 
along the route to a civil and political society. Parties have been recon­
stituted and different segments of the changing society are now repre­
sented in politics. These organizations were not present at the time of 
either the National Roundtable Talks or the Grand National Assembly. 
Some of these change agents preferred a different kind of political or­
der than the one contemplated by the reformed Communists and most 
of their so-called democratic opponents. For example, monarchists 
sought a return of a bygone era with the restoration of the dead king's 
son to the throne. I do not think, however, that monarchy was an alter­
native that ever had a realistic chance to win constitutional sanction. 
Instead, the monarchist movement represents an example of the wide 
range of views within the opposition circle. The extent of internal dis­
unity experienced within the ranks of the democratic opposition was 
not experienced by the post-Communist Bulgarian Socialist Party, al­
though hard-line advocates were present. Those closet Communists 
longing for the past regime wisely muted their feelings; and in the pro­
cess they allowed their reform-minded comrades to negotiate the tricky 
path toward survival. 
At bottom, what is most important is not a few specific criticisms 
of the new Constitution offered up by a variety of malcontents. Rather, 
the opponents of the new Constitution object fundamentally to the 
willingness to work with the members of the former Communist Party 
in creating a new constitutional system. And this view extends to work­
ing with them on the everyday issues facing the nation. 
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Those who oppose cooperation with the functionaries of the former 
Communist Party have good reasons to resist the task. But these other­
wise well-intentioned persons commit a fundamental error that is det­
rimental to the future of democracy in their homeland. They make 
support for reform of the everyday workings of the system the test of 
legitimacy, when, instead, coexistence should be the test of whether 
the system is the expression of the national will. In the extreme, some 
opposition leaders make the test for support of the new system whether 
the former leaders and their political progeny have suffered sufficiently. 
They want assurances that the power and privilege that accompany 
it are forever gone. Concomitantly, they seek the liberal democratic 
antidotes of capitalism and tend to damn social democratic programs 
associated with the welfare state as residual vestiges of the previous 
totalitarian regime. 
But, as Di Palma teaches, democracy is about process and proce­
dures, not substantive ends. Democracy is a way to organize political 
discourse and competition among societal forces. In other words, de­
mocracy has proven an unreliable guarantor of social progress.8 No 
doubt many Bulgarians assume that with democracy comes capitalism 
and with capitalism they will experience prosperity. Yet, in the after­
math of the downfall of the old regime and the creation of democratic 
institutions, Bulgarians have experienced an unfortunate deterioration 
in the quality of their lives. A report of the United Nations indicates 
that in 1995, five years after the coup d'etat, unemployment in Bulgaria 
is conservatively estimated at 12 percent, there is outrageous inflation, 
the quality of medical care is said to be deteriorating, and the crime 
rate is fantastically high.9 In 1996, the Bulgarian lev depreciated by 
600 percent against the U.S. dollar.10 Along with this inflation, there 
was a serious bread shortage, rendering Bulgaria even poorer than in 
the last days of the Communist regime. Nonetheless, despite the failure 
to achieve the good life and regardless of who might be to blame for 
its nonrealization, democracy as a set of procedures is desirable. 
Di Palma's argument is persuasive. Democracy curbs government 
oppression of groups and individuals. The guarantee to the ethnic 
Turkish minority is a major example of how democracy as a set of 
procedures has allowed this minority to protect themselves from a po­
tentially abusive majority. Further, democracy as a set of procedures 
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not only guarantees the mutual coexistence of the reform Commu­
nists and their democratic opponents but also has reconstituted the 
community in a way that establishes the personal self-worth of 
individuals.11 
The Bulgarian experience also reaffirms the common but little ex­
pressed observation that if citizens are to become rulers they must 
learn how to manage democratic institutions. It was not enough for 
opposition leaders to engage in vigorous protest against the Commu­
nist leadership. There is evidence of a self-consciousness among the 
proponents of Bulgaria's new Constitution. They knew it is not enough 
to go from the streets to Parliament armed only with good intentions. 
Instead, it is necessary to comprehend the importance of legislative 
deliberation and to fully discuss matters that would come before the 
Grand National Assembly. 
In this respect, it is instructive to recall the role of particular individ­
uals in persevering to the end. The institutional norm that voting be 
not automatic but something resembling reasoned analysis among col­
leagues did not just happen. Certain individuals at the Grand National 
Assembly insisted upon it. It is also noteworthy, but hardly a new reve­
lation, that persons who stick their political necks out to make ac­
commodation work will be blamed for whatever goes wrong. That 
happened to many talented and dedicated opposition leaders. They 
have been consigned to the political wilderness. Perhaps, however, his­
tory will be kind to them. Finally, there were sufficient opportunities 
for the Grand National Assembly to fold its tent and for the deputies 
to return home. But certain individuals insisted that the peoples' depu­
ties persevere. The result of this individual effort by a relative few was 
the promulgation of a fundamentally democratic and modern constitu­
tion. Today, that same basic document functions as a set of principles 
and rules. It points Bulgaria to the goal of a law-governed state and is 
a break against backsliding into a totalitarian abyss. 
Herein lies an important residual consequence of crafting a new 
constitution. When ascertaining the relative advantage each group 
may have over the others, all sides are compelled to calculate the 
short- and long-term implications of their collective decisions. And in 
the process of negotiation they must work with opponents no matter 
how respected or despised. Crafting a new constitution for Bulgaria 
was a lesson in democracy that participants can draw upon to meet 
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future challenges. They may apply these lessons, even the negative 
ones, to understand how to craft agreements in an emerging demo­
cratic political culture. 
A Successful Transition? 
Bulgaria's leaders of all ideological stripes know it is necessary to 
work at the democratic process by institutionalizing procedures and 
inculcating democratic attitudes. It is a delicate matter. Ginio Ganev's 
insistence that "automatic voting" must be eschewed in favor of full 
debate manifests the importance of creating democratic habits that in 
turn contribute to the legitimacy of the system as a whole. Then, too, 
in October 1993, the father of the Constitution, Petar Dertliev, was 
encouraging the type of dialogue necessary to create and sustain dem­
ocratic habits. Long after the GNA had finished its business, and gov­
ernments had come and gone, he convened a meeting of a variety of 
political parties and movements to discuss how the nation should in 
the future treat ethnic minorities. Moreover, as the parliamentary sys­
tem is institutionalized and the roles of the president, the Council of 
Ministers, and the judiciary are better understood, the concept of con­
stitutionalism will become more deeply embedded within the psyche 
of the body politic. Though this process is fraught with peril, the pros­
pects are encouraging. 
Admittedly, the path toward democracy is not a straight one. De­
spite the guarantees of the National Roundtable Talks and the explicit 
agreements found in the July 1991 Constitution, political actors of all 
stripes find it difficult to work in harmony with their opponents. There 
is evidence of interinstitutional conflict among the separate constitu­
tional authorities. But this occurs in most every democracy because 
boundaries of authority tend to be unclear or ambiguous. These kinds 
of disputes are exacerbated by the tradition of vendetta endemic to 
Bulgaria and the Balkans generally. Mistrust and hatred can operate as 
sturdy impediments to the task of institutionalizing democratic norms. 
Furthermore, the misunderstood promise of democracy as a way to 
achieve economic prosperity is bound to breed cynicism and despair. 
Yet, everyone I interviewed insists that Bulgaria will not return to its 
totalitarian past. In the years since the 1989 coup d'etat ending Com­
munist rule, Bulgarians have been practicing the democratic arts. 
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Parliamentary elections have been held. As of September 1997, there 
have been only a few notable incidents involving violence. In the mean­
time, governments with different agendas have come and gone. The 
courts are functioning, and they have defended the Constitution from 
attack. With a few notable exceptions, there is healthy debate about 
policy choices conducted in an environment relatively free from op­
pression and intimidation. Significantly, Bulgarians achieved these 
huge accomplishments without the existence of the so-called prerequi­
sites for democracy. 
But is it true that Bulgaria has successfully made the transition to 
democracy? This query is particularly pertinent because I have not 
presented new empirical evidence of my own that the masses in Bul­
garia support the new democratic order. Where, one might ask, is the 
original research demonstrating a deep reservoir of diffuse support for 
the democratic regime and where is the analysis of how specific sup­
port may or may not impact diffuse support? 
My answer is twofold. First, survey opinion research conducted by 
researchers in Bulgaria indicates that while there may be disappoint­
ment in political personalities, parties, and the slow pace of economic 
progress, there exists mass support for the democratic regime. More­
over, there is widespread participation in elections far beyond voter 
turnout found in the United States.12 However, the second part of my 
response is more important. We do not need public opinion surveys to 
demonstrate that consent, compliance, and support are present within 
a transitional political system. Di Palma is correct: if the pact 
agreement with its protection for the participation of all relevant par­
ties in the new political order is carefully crafted, then, by definition, 
legitimacy is an accomplished fact. The threat of breakdown games is 
removed when the choices are made for democratization.13 
Although there are noteworthy differences between the transitions 
in Spain and in Bulgaria,14 in both places the transition to democracy 
was a movement from the top. Leading reform elements of the old 
regime came together with regime opponents who were mostly mem­
bers of Bulgaria's intellectual elite. Though there were mass protests, 
they were often organized by intellectuals who succeeded in keeping 
demonstrations from deteriorating into mob rule. Further, to the ex­
tent that the Communist regime of Todor Zhivkov may have enjoyed 
some public support (albeit support of the quiescent variety borne of 
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resignation), and because the proximate origin of the transition to de­
mocracy came from within the existing regime itself, it is fair to con­
clude there must have been widespread support for change. This 
conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the November 10, 1989, coup 
d'etat was bloodless and there is no evidence that the people rose up 
to restore Zhivkov and his confidants to power. There were no strikes, 
no mass demonstrations, and no opposition from below remonstrating 
in favor of the old government. Soon after the time of regime change 
and the events surrounding the National Roundtable Talks, there were 
free and competitive elections: citizens formed political parties and 
movements; Bulgarians participated in the political process by voting 
in large numbers, with 91 percent of the eligible voters casting votes in 
the first ballot and 84 percent in the second round of the June 1990 
elections for the Grand National Assembly15 
Though there is considerable debate among Bulgarians about which 
political parties are best suited to lead the nation, no one seriously 
believes that totalitarian communism will return. Democratic institu­
tions and processes will survive. Yet, at the same time, there is doubt 
about the wisdom and ability to achieve the substantive ends sought 
by many arch-opponents of communism. 
Former President Zhelyu Zhelev, onetime academic philosopher 
and a leading figure in Bulgaria's transition to democracy, expresses 
the anxiety of many opponents of the failed Socialist government of 
Zhan Videnov and others who would presume to lead under the BSP 
banner. In Berlin on September 22, 1995, Zhelev presented a lecture at 
an international conference. He said in part: "Communism cannot re­
turn in its classical form."16 This is the case, as he explains, because 
the dominant elite cannot abolish the multiparty system, eliminate the 
opposition, prohibit freedom of speech and of the press, or resurrect 
the concentration camps. It is no longer possible to close off the 
boundaries of a country and revive the Warsaw treaty17 In other words, 
Zhelev affirms the proposition that from a procedural viewpoint there 
is no dispute that Bulgaria has achieved a successful transition to 
democracy. 
But there is an important difference between process and substan­
tive meanings of democracy. There are no guarantees that because a 
nation-state adopts democratic ways of conducting public affairs that 
policy goals aimed at elevating individual freedom over various forms 
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of collectivism will finally triumph. In fact, the exercise of procedural 
democracy may, depending upon the fashion of the day, result in view­
ing the state as the guarantor of human happiness. For this very rea­
son, Zhelev is critical of the Socialists. He exclaims: "What we are 
faced with now is a substitution of the democratic idea for multiparty 
authoritarian chaos, breeding crime, organized crime, mafia structures, 
corruption and political partisanship, and a substitution of the idea of 
a free market for non-market capitalism." Bulgaria is facing, according 
to Zhelev, the threat of "communism dragging fledgling democracy 
into its grave."18 
Though Zhelev's hyperbole ought to be placed in perspective as po­
litical rhetoric, the concern is a genuine one. What worries Zhelev, and 
other thoughtful persons, are the residual effects of the past political 
culture. The Bulgarian Socialist Party promotes the state as the salva­
tion of society. According to Zhelev, the Socialists are the authors of 
the view that public ownership is good and private property is bad. 
He believes the Socialists are trying to use the state to dominate the 
nongovernmental sector of society.19 
Though Zhelev's concern should be taken seriously, opponents of 
socialism must recognize the probability that Bulgarians will reject the 
most extreme classical liberal vision of democracy: one that exalts indi­
vidual liberty with its emphasis on private property over a social demo­
cratic perspective that focuses on equality, especially in the economic 
realm. In this sense, there is little reason to expect Bulgarians to differ 
significantly from their Western European cousins. There will be con­
tinuing conflicts between those who place a value on limited govern­
ment, on one hand, and those who view government as a positive force 
for achieving equality, on the other. Surely, the two views will collide 
and various political parties will exist to champion variations on each 
theme. The point worth recalling is that a central precept of democracy 
is the acceptance of the unpredictability of the result. The only cer­
tainty is that all sides must behave according to the rules of the game. 
Under tragic circumstances, various institutions and factions within 
Bulgaria's parliamentary government had the occasion to reaffirm 
their commitment to the democratic transition. On October 2, 1996, 
Andrey Lukanov, the former prime minister and articulate leader of 
the BSP, was assassinated. As of December 1997, it is not known who 
fatally shot Lukanov twice outside his apartment in downtown Sofia 
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and for what reason. All agree, however, that it was a professional 
murder reminiscent of the assassinations that characterized Bulgarian 
political life between 1878 and the mid-1930s. In the months preceding 
his murder, there had been a few minor incidents involving pipe bombs 
exploded in the typical terrorist fashion. As my interview with him 
reported in earlier chapters indicates, Lukanov was a chief architect 
and engineer in the peaceful coup that brought down the regime of 
Todor Zhivkov. He was also an active BSP leader at the National 
Roundtable Talks, a deputy at the Grand National Assembly, twice 
prime minister, and an active parliamentarian. Ironically, Andrey Lu­
kanov became the victim of the same type of violence that had touched 
his grandfather and other notable Bulgarian families. 
At the time of his death, Lukanov had become a very controversial 
figure. In 1992 he was stripped of his parliamentary immunity and 
charged with misappropriation and misuse of power and jailed for sev­
eral months. He took his case to the European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg. Eight weeks after his death the court vindicated him; it 
found that the UDF government of Philip Dimitrov had violated his 
rights and should award him FFr 1,000 for each day of his arrest.20 By 
mid-1996, Lukanov had become a vocal critic of the BSP government 
of Zhan Videnov; he accused the government of trying to revive Stalin­
ist structures and attempting to reestablish links between the secret 
service and the party. Moreover, Lukanov became a successful busi­
nessman and was accused by his opponents of using his political posi­
tion to make himself and his friends rich. 
There is some speculation that Lukanov's assassination was not for 
political reasons but might be related instead to his business dealings. 
But the political establishment reacted to the assassination as an attack 
on democracy itself. Parliament issued a declaration on the same day 
as the assassination. It said it part:21 
The National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria categorically 
denounces this flagrant terrorist act targeted at a politicalfigure. We 
insist that its perpetrators and instigators be apprehended and pun­
ished with all the stringency of the law. In these times of difficulties 
and crisis the Bulgarian parliament declares its firm will to uphold 
the democratic processes in the country. We decisively oppose all 
attempts to destabilize Bulgaria's political and social life through 
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such provocations. We shall not permit this act of terrorism to lead 
to the introduction of a state of emergency in the country. The presi­
dential elections will be held on October 27, as previously scheduled 
by the National Assembly. We summon all Bulgarian citizens to keep 
their calm and, together with us, stand for the constitutional order 
and the irreversible democratic development of Bulgaria. 
Other political bodies, including the president, the Constitutional 
Court, and political parties issued similarly worded declarations in 
support of democratic institutions.22 Thus, Bulgarian leaders used the 
tragic occasion of Lukanov's murder to reaffirm their commitment to 
hold to the democratic course. They stay the course although democ­
racy has not delivered the substantive ends that many thought would 
accrue with the rejection of Communism. And, of course, the urge to 
insure order at the expense of liberty is an option that authoritarian 
personality types eagerly pursue when the moment is ripe. Responsible 
officials understand that resorting to violence is an option that some 
may be preparing to pursue. The murder of Lukanov is the type of 
event that could trigger the cycle of violence that so many leaders, 
including the slain leader himself, had hoped the transition to democ­
racy might avoid. To their credit, the nation's leaders unanimously and 
publicly rejected any suggestion that it is time to give up on democracy. 
Instead, democracy as a way to conduct government affairs remains 
the only option they are willing to consider, or so it would seem. 
Qualifying language is necessary because in January 1997 political 
leaders violated if not the letter then the spirit of the constitutional 
rules. By using street demonstrations and labor strikes, opponents de­
manded that the Socialist government forego its mandate to form a 
new government and instead to call early elections. From a constitu­
tional perspective, the BSP had every right to form a new cabinet and 
to continue to rule until the end of their election mandate in 1998. 
That is, unless at some point a majority of members of the National 
Assembly were to vote no-confidence. Instead, the BSP leadership ca­
pitulated to the demands of their opponents both in and outside the 
National Assembly. Though properly speaking the BSP agreed to new 
elections, there can be no mistake: they were forced from office by 
opponents employing extraconstitutional means to achieve what pas­
ses for a democratic end. While this episode is troubling from the view­
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point of a law-governed state, the willingness to give up power without 
resorting to the use of force reaffirms the basic commitment made at 
the National Roundtable Talks. The incumbent rulers agreed to take 
their chances with the competition at the ballot box. In this sense, Bul­
garians renewed their commitment to political competition as a way of 
choosing leaders. Under the circumstances, the expression of three 
cheers for democracy may be excessive, but two cheers are in order. 
Policy Implications 
There are additional implications for scholars and policymakers in the 
so-called developed Western democracies. The first has to do with the 
general theory of politics, and the second with the practical implica­
tions of economic, political, military, and moral aid to authoritarian 
or totalitarian governments that are not yet democratic. As one might 
expect, there is an interrelationship between the theoretical and practi­
cal questions. 
No doubt if a number of favorable environmental conditions are 
present, the chances for democracy taking root are greater than if such 
conditions are not present. Thus, if a state is blessed with a strong 
economy, a middle class, competitive political parties, and a civic cul­
ture, for example, then democracy is more likely to take root and to 
flourish than if they are not present. Variations on this theme may be 
gleaned from the works of the world's best minds, beginning with the 
Greeks, including Plato and Aristotle.23 
With the addition of key concepts and variables, the careful and 
thoughtful scholars of the post-World War II era reinforced and modi­
fied the earlier conclusions, applying them to the problems of the Cold 
War era. Because certain anomalies appeared in such places as Spain, 
Turkey, Portugal, and Greece in the 1970s and early 1980s, scholars, 
had, however, sufficient reason to question the accepted wisdom. But 
the events in the former Soviet Union and in the Eastern bloc countries 
of the Warsaw Pact shook our confidence even more profoundly. Ex­
tant theories could not explain the demise of the Soviet Union and her 
empire. The failure to anticipate these events is a significant reason for 
the lack of a coherent foreign policy to deal with the new realities in 
Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet Union. At 
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bottom, this failure is due to a theoretical approach that fails to con­
sider the role of individuals in bringing about change. 
One cannot understand the demise of the Soviet Union without 
considering the pivotal roles of Gorbachev with his perestroika and 
glasnost. At the same time, the impact of the ideological determination 
of Gorbachev's American counterpart was pivotal. Ronald Reagan's 
relentless anticommunism manifested by an enormous defense buildup 
that forced the Soviets to respond in kind helped to bankrupt that 
country, to say nothing of the United States. By exercising their will 
and knowing how to translate their individual judgments into collec­
tive government action, both Gorbachev and Reagan changed the 
world. Yet, our theories failed to anticipate such an eventuality. 
Giuseppe Di Palma's To Craft Democracies is a welcomed antidote 
to the sociological and economic determinism of modern social sci­
ence. No doubt, interests, ideas, and institutions play significant roles 
in shaping events. But so do individuals. Individuals often behave in 
predictable ways. Without such an understanding a science of man 
would be impossible. But while it is important to understand the cen­
trality of that behavior, we must remember that such predictions are 
based upon probabilities and that deviations from the central tendency 
also need explanation. Indeed, quite often the most interesting prob­
lems begging explanation are why and how events deviate from the 
norm. The anomalies, in other words, are often the most engaging and 
scientifically important questions worth pursuing. Yet, they are also 
the most difficult to explain. For some important cases, such as transi­
tions to democracy, explanation may lie in the exercise of individual 
will. Even one of the most extreme forms of determinism, the historical 
materialism of Karl Marx, is often misunderstood. He did not argue 
that revolution was simply the function of our sociology borne of eco­
nomic conditions wherein individual decisions and psychology have 
no role to play. Rather, properly understood, Marx argued that we will 
will a revolution.24 
Bulgaria's transition to democracy illustrates one scenario of how 
to overcome the odds against democracy. It is similar to the Spanish 
experience, but as Di Palma argues, there may be other ways to accom­
plish the same end. What is important to note is that political science 
investigations should seriously focus at the micro level, that is, upon 
the actions of individuals, while not ignoring macro-level phenomena. 
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By employing micro and macro level analysis together, it will be pos­
sible to create conditional universal propositions that establish 
sounder explanations capable of more accurate prediction. Though 
this result should be reward enough, the Bulgarian case also suggests 
important policy implications for the United States and the so-called 
free world. 
The United States and other Western powers have for some time 
provided economic and other aid to dictators of one type or another. 
Justifications vary from the most blatant linkage of national self-
interest and stability in the underdeveloped world to the argument that 
aid will lead to democracy. The most short-sighted approach is one 
attributed to President Harry Truman when justifying support for the 
dictator of the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo. Truman allegedly 
said: "Trujillo may be an SOB but he is our SOB." A sophisticated and 
more defensible position is presented by the development theorists of 
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Though there are differences among them, 
they commonly argue that providing aid to nondemocratic societies is 
justifiable not as an instrument of immediate national self-interest but 
as a way to promote democracy as an alternative to communism. 
Scholars in the tradition of Deutsch, Lerner, Lipset, and Rostow 
believed that a strong economy implies the development of a middle 
class that also creates the necessary conditions for plural groups in 
society. And this will result in competitive political parties that will 
in turn help to create democratic habits in the body politic, resulting 
in a civil society supportive of democratic institutions.25 Huntington 
warned, however, that a preoccupation with rapid economic develop­
ment could lead to increased expectations for a better life than the 
political institutions may be prepared to deliver. Therefore, he cautions 
that development theorists should focus more attention on stability 
and the institutions that insure orderly change.26 
Significantly, then, the prerequisites-to-democracy perspective of 
the Cold War past carries with it important policy implications. 
Though there were variations in outlook and purpose, this approach 
to political development was used to justify propping up antidemo­
cratic regimes that practiced repression and tyranny. But if it is pos­
sible to create a democracy without the so-called prerequisites, then 
it is unnecessary to invest in dictators and tyrants of all sorts. As a 
precondition for any aid at all, democrats everywhere might insist 
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upon clear agreements with ruling elites and opposition forces to form 
new constitutional orders. Aid should come only after the creation of 
institutional frameworks accompanied by pacts guaranteeing a peace­
ful transition to democracy 
An additional question remains, however. Besides the creation of 
pacts and agreements to create democratic institutions and procedures, 
should the powers of the new world order insist upon particular policy 
prescriptions as a quid pro quo for aid? The answer is no. To insist, for 
example, that Bulgaria must privatize a certain percentage of its public 
economic institutions within a particular time span is to ask too much 
of sovereign people. A nation should be free to choose the nature and 
timing of substantive policy reforms without interference from outside 
powers. It is accomplishment enough to create democratic institutions. 
The faith of democracy is that people will know and follow their own 
best interests when they are free to make their own choices. To be sure, 
the Bulgarian experience provides ample evidence in support of the 
proposition that political leaders will not necessarily make the correct 
choices. In this sense, democracy insures the unpredictability of results. 
What it guarantees, however, is the right to make choices without fear 
and intimation while respecting human rights. 
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Chapter 7 
1. Interview with Ginio Ganev, leader of the Fatherland's Union, Father-
land's Union Headquarters, 18 Vitosha Boulevard, Sofia, Bulgaria, October 
5, 1993. Ganev was born in the city of Bourgas on March 2, 1928. He com­
pleted his higher education degree in state and legal studies at the St. Kliment 
Ohridski University in Sofia. He speaks French and Russian. He is a politi­
cal independent. 
From 1953 to 1976, Ganev worked as the chief legal consultant and the 
chief secretary of the Ministry of Energy. In 1977, he became a member of 
the Bureau of the Patriotic Front's National Council, and from June 1982 to 
December 1989, he worked as the council's secretary. From December 21, 
1989, to February 15, 1990, Ganev was the council's vice chair, and from Feb­
ruary 15 to April 1, 1990, he served as its chair. He was a people's representa­
tive in the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth National Assemblies. In the Ninth 
National Assembly, Ganev was the secretary of the Legislative Commission. 
From June 17, 1986, to 1989, he was a member of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of Bulgaria. 
On April 1, 1990, he was appointed chair of the presidency of the Patriotic 
Union's National Council. 
Ganev worked as a coordinator in the contact group of the National 
Roundtable and as the chair of its secretariat. On April 11, 1990, he was ap­
pointed coordinator of the State and Social Commission for the National 
Question. 
In the Seventh Grand National Assembly, Ganev was a deputy from the 
Patriotic Union. From July 18, 1990, to July 12, 1991, he served as the vice 
chairperson of the Grand National Assembly. Elected on July 26, 1990, he 
also became the chair of the Commission for Drafting the Procedural Rules 
of the Grand National Assembly, and the Commission for Drafting the Con­
stitution of Bulgaria. After Andrey Lukanov's resignation as prime minister, 
Ganev declined the proposal to take Lukanov's place. 
Ganev served as chair of the Coordination Council of the Independent 
Social Committee on National Issues. He is a member of the board of trustees 
of the National Academic Foundation. Ganev is also the president of the Bul­
garian Sports Foundation, and the chair of the Franco-Bulgarian Association 
of Lawyers. Since September 1994, Ganev has been the chair of the Union for 
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the Fatherland Party. Beginning on February 6, 1995, he has served as presi­
dent of the Agency for the Bulgarians Living Outside Bulgaria. Since March 
1996, Ganev has been chair of the Bureau of the Constitutionalism and De­
mocracy Association. 
2. Ganev is referring to the repeal of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1 of the 
then existing constitution in early 1990. Those provisions declared Bulgaria a 
socialist state headed by the working class, meaning the Communist Party. 
3. Interview with Petko Simeonov, leader of the Bulgarian Party Liberals, 
at Party Headquarters, 3 Alabin Street, Sofia, Bulgaria, October 4, 1993. 
4. Interview with Stefan Gaitanjiev, secretary of the Bulgarian Demo­
cratic Center and former member of Parliament in the Grand National As­
sembly, at BDC Headquarters, 12 A Narodno Subranie Square, Sofia, 
Bulgaria, October 13, 1993. 
5. Interview with Jordan Yasilev, leading activist of the UDF and former 
editor-in-chief of the Democracy newspaper at the Institute of Literature, 
Academy of Sciences, 37 Chapaev Street, Sofia, Bulgaria, October 7, 1993. 
Born on September 26, 1935, in the city of Radomir, Jordan Vasilev is a gradu­
ate of the St. Kliment Ohridski University in Sofia. His degree is in Bulgarian 
philology. He is an assistant professor of philology and a senior research asso­
ciate. Vasilev has a working knowledge of Russian and German. He is the 
husband of Blaga Dimitrova, the former vice president of Bulgaria; she re­
signed in protest against the direction taken by President Zhelev. 
Vasilev is the president and a founding member of the Democracy Clubs 
Federation. He is the initiator and first editor-in-chief of the Demokratsiya 
(Democracy) newspaper. In the Seventh Grand National Assembly, he was a 
representative from the UDF's party list and was elected from a constituency 
located in the city of Trojan. His tenure in the Grand National Assembly was 
directed toward securing a mechanism for accomplishing privatization and the 
transition to a market economy. He appealed for the creation of a strong and 
professional military force and for provisions guaranteeing minimum social 
security allowances for retired citizens and the unemployed. In the sphere of 
national education and culture, he supports the idea of reforming the educa­
tional system and sending capable young people to study in the developed 
countries. Vasilev is the author of the idea behind and the declaration of the 
thirty-nine deputies who expressed their protest against the adoption of the 
constitution by leaving Parliament. He was a deputy in the Thirty-sixth Na­
tional Assembly and was chairperson of the Commission for National Secu­
rity. Vasilev resigned twice from parliament: the first time in November 1990, 
and the second in May 1992. He is the author of several books. 
6. Interview with Ivan Glushkov, leader of the Christian-Agrarian Party 
at Party Headquarters, 18 Vitosha Boulevard, Sofia, Bulgaria, October 6, 
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1993. Born in Sofia on January 17, 1937, Ivan Glushkov studied at a French 
college. His university degree is in philological education. In 1971, he started 
work in the Zemedelsko Zname (Agricultural Banner) newspaper as a journal­
ist, later rising to the position of editor in chief. At the Agricultural Party's 
Thirty-sixth Extraordinary Congress, he was elected a member of the leader­
ship council. At the council's session on April 6, 1990, Glushkov was elected 
a permanent member of the party. 
In the Seventh Grand National Assembly, he was a deputy from the Ag­
ricultural Party, and on July 18, 1990, Glushkov was elected vice chairman 
of that body. He was also a member of the Commission for Drafting the Con­
stitution. After the elections in October 1991, Glushkov abandoned the 
leadership of the Agricultural Party. On August 10, 1992, he was appointed 
permanent representative of the Republic of Bulgaria at the Geneva head­
quarters of the UN and other international organizations. But he refused the 
honor. Glushkov led an exploratory committee for creating the Christian 
Agrarian Party, and at the party's founding conference, on December 19, 
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